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The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA or the Act) is a federal statute that 
protects Indian children by keeping them connected to their families and 
culture. The Act’s provisions include support for family reunification, 
kinship care preferences, cultural competency considerations and 
community involvement. These provisions parallel national child welfare 
policies. Nevertheless, the Act is relentlessly attacked as a law that singles 
out Indian children for unique and harmful treatment. This is untrue but, 
ironically, it will be true if challenges to the ICWA are successful. To 
prevent this from occurring, the defense of the Act needs to change. For too 
long, this defense has focused on justifying the Act’s alleged different 
treatment of Indian children. Now, it is time to refute this charge and 
demonstrate this difference is illusory. 
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The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA or the Act) is under attack, again, 
and although the Act has faced numerous challenges in the past, the current 
attacks are different. Today’s anti-ICWA arguments are focused on the 
Act’s destruction rather than its modification. However, what is particularly 
extraordinary about these attacks and their recent success is that they are 
occurring at the same time that support for the protections and policies 
enshrined in the ICWA is growing. 
Over the past decade, numerous states have enacted child welfare laws 
and policies that mirror the ICWA’s most important protections.
1
 
                                                                                                             
 1. In fact, many states have also enacted state ICWAs, including California, Colorado, 
Michigan, New Jersey, and Vermont, which have all enacted this legislation in the past 
decade. CAL. FAM. CODE § 175(c) (Deering 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-126 (2020); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 712B.1 (LexisNexis 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1517 
(LexisNexis 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:10-6 (West 2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5120 
(2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.38.010 (LexisNexis 2011); WIS. STAT. § 48.028 
(2016). In addition, a state ICWA bill has been drafted in South Carolina and is awaiting 
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Consequently, this Article argues that the ICWA’s defenders should stop 
trying to justify the different treatment of Indian children and families and, 
instead, demonstrate that the Act’s protections simply ensure Indian 
families receive the same protections as other families. 
Current attacks on the ICWA are grounded in a misunderstanding of 
modern child welfare law. Anti-ICWA advocates claim the Act harms 
Indian children by treating them differently than non-Indian children. 
However, what the ICWA actually does is ensure Indian children receive 
the same protections as non-Indian children.  
Child welfare ideas have evolved drastically over the past half-century. 
When the ICWA was first enacted, the ideas it embraced—family 
preservation over termination of parental rights—were considered the best 
child welfare practices for all children.
2
 Over time, ideas about children’s 
best interests changed, and the ICWA began to conflict with new child 
welfare laws and policies. This conflict created the perception that the Act 
harms Indian children. Today, ideas regarding child welfare best practices 
are changing again, and modern child welfare policy substantially aligns 
with the ICWA. Consequently, arguments that the ICWA requires the 
different and harmful treatment of Indian children have no merit. 
Nevertheless, these claims are being used to challenge the Act’s 
constitutionality, and courts appear increasingly receptive to such 
arguments. 
Unfortunately, the ICWA’s defenders give credence to these arguments 
when they seek to justify the Act’s alleged different treatment of Indian 
families, rather than objecting to the underlying assumption of difference. 
As the recent case Brackeen v. Zinke
3
 demonstrates, when courts accept the 
claims that the ICWA requires the different treatment of Indian and non-
Indian children, they may be more inclined to view the Act as harmful and 
more willing to find it unconstitutional. Consequently, it is imperative to 
change the narrative surrounding the ICWA and challenge the idea that the 
Act mandates the different and harmful treatment of Indian children.
4
  
                                                                                                             
presentation to the state legislature. See A Bill to Enact the South Carolina Indian Child 
Welfare Act (n.d.) (on file with author). 
 2. See infra Section I.A (discussing the history of the ICWA). 
 3. 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (N.D. Tex. 2018). 
 4. One of the ironies of this argument is that the Act is commonly cited as the “gold 
standard” in child welfare law. See, e.g., Danielle J. Mayberry, The Origins and Evolution of 
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 14 JUD. NOTICE 34, 45 (2019) (“For over forty years, the 
ICWA has been called the ‘gold standard’ of child-welfare policy due to its emphasis on 
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A successful ICWA defense must establish that the Act is not just a 
legally permissible exercise of Congress’s plenary power over Indian tribes, 
but that it is also morally permissible. As long as the argument that the Act 
encourages the harmful treatment of Indian children remains viable, the 
ICWA’s future is imperiled. It is, therefore, vitally important to 
demonstrate that the Act does not harm Indian children; the best way to do 
this is to show that the ICWA’s provisions closely align with the child 
welfare policies applicable to non-Indian children. Accordingly, the 
purpose of this Article is twofold. First, it seeks to explain why the ICWA 
is under attack and, second, to demonstrate why these attacks are 
unjustified. 
Part I of this Article will describe the recent history of child welfare 
policy and show how ideas regarding children’s best interests have 
fluctuated between the divergent goals of reunification and termination. It 
will describe how the ICWA originally aligned with accepted notions of 
best practices in the child welfare context but then diverged and that this 
divergence is the basis for current ICWA challenges.  
Part II will discuss recent challenges to the ICWA. It examines the 
Brackeen Court’s decision finding the Act unconstitutional, the Fifth 
Circuit’s reversal, and the arguments and defenses used in these types of 
ICWA challenges. This Part argues that relying on federal Indian law 
precedent to uphold the Act is an increasingly dangerous strategy and 
suggests that ICWA advocates must do more to address and debunk the 
                                                                                                             
placing children with relatives as the foremost goal.”); see also Pledge to Defend ICWA, 
Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians SD-15-011, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Ann. Sess. (2015), 
http://www.ncai.org/resources/resolutions/pledge-to-defend-icwa (“WHEREAS, a coalition 
of leading national child welfare organizations have declared ICWA to be a ‘gold standard’ 
for child welfare because as ICWA mandates, it is in every child’s best interest to be 
protected from harm and to prevent the unnecessary trauma that occurs when children are 
removed from their family, culture, and community . . . .”). The eighteen organizations of 
this coalition can be found in the Casey Family Programs’ press release. Press Release, 
Casey Fam. Programs, 18 National Child Welfare Organizations Join Supreme Court 
Amicus Brief in Support of Indian Child Welfare Act (Apr. 11, 2013), https://www. 
casey.org/media/ICWA-PR-FINAL-1.pdf; see also Letter from Nat’l Indian Child Welfare 
Ass’n to Elizabeth Appel, Off. of Regul. Affs. & Collaborative Action, Indian Affs., U.S. 
Dep’t of the Interior (May 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/D8HJ-6YYC (citing amicus brief of 
Casey Family Programs, Child Welfare League of American, Children's Defense Fund, 
Donaldson Adoption Institute, North American Council on Adoptable Children, Voice for 
Adoption, and twelve other child welfare organizations, all noting that “ICWA has been 
deemed the ‘gold standard of child welfare practice’ by mainstream organizations”). 
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perception that ICWA treats Indian children different from and worse than 
non-native children.  
Part III demonstrates that views regarding child welfare best practices 
are shifting once again and increasingly align with the ICWA. This Part 
examines the most challenged and controversial provisions of the Act and 
shows how they parallel current state and federal child welfare policy.  
I. From Reunification to Termination 
In the mid-twentieth century, child welfare practice was based on a child 
rescue philosophy.
5
 During this period, child welfare agencies made little 
effort to prevent the breakup of families. Instead, the focus was on ensuring 
children were removed from unsafe homes.
6
 This policy was well-
intentioned, but the result was catastrophic. Children were doomed to years 
of foster care with little or no hope of ever receiving a permanent home.
7
 In 
the 1970s, child protection experts and national panels began arguing that 
the emphasis on child removals was not working and that both children and 
their parents were frequently harmed by prolonged separations.
8
 These 
child advocates cited the growing numbers of children in foster care as 
proof that child welfare policy needed to change.
9
 They then recommended 
a three-pronged reform program that would discourage removals, aid 
                                                                                                             
 5. See Alice C. Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect 
Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 CAL. W. L. REV. 223, 254–55 (1989-1990) (“Child welfare 
practice in the United States prior to the passage of [the Adoption Assistance 
and Child Welfare Act of 1980] was largely based on a child rescue philosophy, with little 
focused effort made by agencies to prevent the breakup of families and a child's subsequent 
placement into foster care.”) 
 6. Id. at 255. 
 7. Id. at 224 (describing the five years of congressional testimony covering the harms 
of removal and the United States’ “dysfunctional child welfare system”); see also Kathleen 
S. Bean, Reasonable Efforts: What State Courts Think, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 321, 324–25 
(2005) (describing the five years of congressional testimony “that highlighted the fact that a 
staggering number of children—500,000 or more—were currently residing in foster care” 
and the fact that children were frequently “moved from one foster family to another while 
waiting, sometimes for their entire childhoods, for the child protection agency to decide 
whether they should be reunited with their parents or whether alternative permanent plans 
should be implemented”). 
 8. See supra note 7.  
 9. By 1979, there were almost half a million children in foster care. Linda Lee Reimer 
Stevenson, Comment, Fair Play or a Stacked Deck?: In Search of a Proper Standard of 
Proof in Juvenile Dependency Hearings, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 613, 614 (1999). 
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rehabilitation, and seek reunification whenever possible.
10
 These 
recommendations were quickly embraced. 
A. The Family Preservation Movement 
 By the 1980s, support for family preservation gained widespread 
acceptance and laws and policies were enacted to identify children “at risk 
of placement” and prevent them from being removed from their families 
and sent to foster care.
11
 One family preservation policy adopted by many 
states was Intensive Family Preservation Services (IFPS). IFPS was 
premised on the belief that many child abuse and neglect cases resulted 
from a crisis in the family and could be addressed by providing families 
with intensive, short-term support services.
12
  
In 1974, the first IFPS program, called Homebuilders, was created.
13
 It 
then became a model for other IFPS programs and by 1992, the majority of 
states had enacted their own versions of the Homebuilders program.
14
 Such 
programs were important wins for advocates of family preservation, but the 
                                                                                                             
 10. These experts urged 
that public authorities should: 1) not place a child in foster care unless her 
parents were so inadequate that the problems were impossible to resolve in the 
home; 2) if foster care was required, work seriously and intensively toward 
family reunification for a planned period; and, 3) if reunification efforts failed, 
terminate the parent’s rights and place the child in a stable adoptive home. 
Marsha Garrison, Reforming Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective, 12 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 590, 590 (2005). 
 11. See Elizabeth Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child Welfare: 
False Facts and Dangerous Directions, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 896 (2009) [hereinafter 
Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement]. 
 12. Claire Houston, What Ever Happened to the “Child Maltreatment Revolution”?, 19 
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 32–33 (2017) (noting the goal of IFPS was to make the “home safe 
for children by providing families with intensive services (a mix of counseling, skills 
training, and help with basic needs) over a short period of time”); see also Elizabeth 
Bartholet, Differential Response: A Dangerous Experiment in Child Welfare, 42 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 573, 582 (2015) (criticizing IFPS as based on the incorrect assumption that child 
maltreatment was typically a short-term crisis) [hereinafter Bartholet, Differential 
Response]. 
 13. See, e.g., JOAN BARTHEL, FOR CHILDREN'S SAKE: THE PROMISE OF FAMILY 
PRESERVATION 14-15 (1992); JILL KINNEY, KEEPING FAMILIES TOGETHER: THE 
HOMEBUILDERS MODEL (1991) (describing the Homebuilders model). 
 14. Houston, supra note 12, at 33. “Large foundations, such as the Edna McConnell 
Clark Foundation, funded and promoted IFPS, and the CDF and CWLA supported IFPS as 
an important child protection strategy.” Id. 
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biggest victory was the passage of the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA).
15
  
When the AACWA was passed, it was called “the most significant 
legislation in the history of child welfare.”
16 
The purpose of the AACWA 
was to ensure family preservation became the basis of child protection law 
and to avoid the harms caused by long-term foster care placement.
17
 One of 
the AACWA’s most important reforms was the requirement that states 
demonstrate “reasonable efforts” had been made to prevent removal of 
children from their parents and, if removal was deemed necessary, that the 
state had also made reasonable efforts to help the parents address the 
problems that led to removal.
18
 Under the AACWA, alternative placements, 
such as adoption, could only be considered if preservation services failed 
and returning the child was deemed unsafe.
19
 The AACWA enforced its 
requirements by tying federal foster care funding to states making 
“reasonable efforts” to maintain and reunify families.
20
  
                                                                                                             
 15. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.); Houston, supra note 12, at 33. 
 16. Houston, supra note 12, at 33 (quoting RICHARD J. GELLES, THE BOOK OF DAVID: 
HOW PRESERVING FAMILIES CAN COST CHILDREN’S LIVES 93 (1997)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 17. See, e.g., Bean, supra note 7, at 325 (explaining that “In response to these [foster 
care] and related concerns, AACWA was designed with a focus on family preservation and 
reunification” ); Sherry A. Hess, Comment, Texas Family Code Section 263.401: Improving 
the Mandatory Dismissal Deadline to Be Truly in the Best Interest of the Child, 9 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 95, 101 (2002) (noting the AACWA is primarily based on a family 
preservation philosophy). 
 18. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, sec. 101, § 471(15), 94 Stat. at 503 
(requiring that “reasonable [reunification] efforts” be made “(A) prior to the placement of a 
child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, 
and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his home.”) Eventually this requirement 
would be viewed as an impossible balancing act where “states were expected to keep 
children safe while keeping them with abusive parents.” Houston, supra note 12, at 33; see 
also Marcia Yablon-Zug, Separation, Deportation, Termination, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 
63, 73–75 (2012) (describing the backlash against the family preservation policies of the 
AACWA). 
 19. See Garrison, supra note 10, at 590–91; Stevenson, supra note 9, at 614–15; see 
also Hess, supra note 17, at 100–01 (describing the success and failure of the AACWA). 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15). The statute states that “[i]n order for a State to be eligible 
for payments under this part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary” providing that 
in each case, reasonable efforts will be made “prior to the placement of a child in foster care, 
to prevent or eliminate the need” for removal of the child from his home, and “to make it 
possible for a child to safely return to the child’s home.” Id. § 671(a). Federal funds were 
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 was enacted two years before the AACWA.
22
 The ICWA’s 
immediate goal was to end discrimination against Indian families,
23
 but it 
also sought to provide these families with additional protections grounded 
in emerging ideas about family preservation and child welfare best 
practices.
24
 Consequently, it is not surprising that many of the AACWA’s 
                                                                                                             
made available to help welfare workers keep children with their families or, if they had been 
removed, help them return home. S. REP. NO. 96-336, at 4 (1979), as reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448, 1453.In addition, the AACWA required the development of a case plan 
to help “improve family conditions and facilitate returning the child to his home.” H.R. REP. 
NO. 96-900, at 46 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1561, 1566. 
Reasonable efforts under the Act included preventative services, providing periodic case 
review, and services to reunite children with their parents. See Garrison, supra note 10, at 
590–91. 
 21. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). 
 22. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 
Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 23. Before the ICWA, state child welfare agencies routinely singled Indian families out 
for different treatment. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 10–11 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7533 [hereinafter 1978 HOUSE REPORT]. Indian children were removed 
at significantly higher rates than non-Indian children and their parents were given fewer 
resources and opportunities to regain custody of their children after removal. See id. at 9; see 
also Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,778, 38,780 (June 14, 2016); 
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the 
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. (1978) [hereinafter 1978 
Hearings] (describing how Indian children face disproportionate high rates of family 
separation and removal); Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S.1214 Before the 
Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Hearings] 
(same); Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of 
the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong. (1974) [hereinafter 1974 
Hearings] (same). American Indian families were also less likely than non-Indian families to 
receive supportive services as an alternative to removal of their children. See 1978 Hearings, 
supra, at 36 (regarding “active efforts”); 1977 Hearings, supra, at 29. During this time, 
approximately 25-35% of all Indian children were being removed from their parents and 
placed in foster care. 1978 House Report, supra, at 9; see also Lorie M. Graham, “The Past 
Never Vanishes”: A Contextual Critique of the Existing Indian Family Doctrine, 23 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 24 (1998) (stating that “[c]onservative estimates indicated that one-third of 
all American Indian children were being separated” from their parents in the years preceding 
the passage of the ICWA). In some states, the rates were higher. For example, “Minnesota, 
Montana, South Dakota, and Washington had American Indian placement rates that were 
five to nineteen times greater than that of the non-Indian rate” and in Wisconsin, the rate was 
“1600 times greater.” Id. 
 24. The Act protects Indian families by delineating a set of procedural and substantive 
standards for Indian child custody proceedings. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911–1923. These regulations 
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provisions parallel the ICWA’s.
25
 This similarity shows the ICWA was not 
an isolated piece of legislation proscribing different rules for Indian 
families. Rather, the ICWA was part of a national family preservation 
movement aimed at protecting all children, both Indian and non-Indian, 




B. The Family Preservation Backlash 
The support for family preservation enshrined in the AACWA did not 
end with the law’s passage. In the decade after the AACWA’s enactment, 
states continued to institute IFPS programs and support family preservation 
policies.
27
 However, there was also a growing fear that the intense focus on 
family preservation might be hurting children.
28
 Much of this fear stemmed 
                                                                                                             
include protections to safeguard the interests of Indian parents as well as others intended to 
protect the best interests of Indian children. See, e.g., id. § 1912(a), (b), (d) (requiring 
parental notice, appointment of counsel and the provision of remedial services in involuntary 
termination proceedings); id. § 1913(d) (allowing any party to a child custody proceeding to 
withdraw their consent to adoption and invalidate the adoption if the consent was obtained 
through fraud or duress); id. § 1915(a) (giving preference to placements with the child’s 
family). A handful of these regulations were unique to the Indian child welfare context. See, 
e.g., id. § 1911(b) (requiring transfer to tribal court in many circumstances). However, the 
majority of the ICWA’s provisions were similar to the child welfare practices and policies 
that were gaining national support at the time of the Act’s passage. 
 25. In fact, the ICWA’s provision may have served as a model for the AACWA. See, 
e.g., CATHLEEN A. LEWANDOWSKI, CHILD WELFARE: AN INTEGRATIVE PERSPECTIVE 40 
(2018) (noting that the “ICWA[’s] . . . passage may have inspired further child welfare 
legislation, beginning with passage of AACWA . . . .” and that both statutes “emphasized 
that children’s own families could best meet the children’s needs”); see also Jordan Blair 
Woods, Unaccompanied Youth and Private-Public Order Failures, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1639, 
1667 n.168 (2018) (“[T]he AACWA was not the first legislative response that Congress 
made to growing concerns in the 1970s surrounding foster care and adoption.”). 
 26. Woods, supra note 25 (describing ICWA as a precursor to AACWA); see also 
Christine Diedrick Mochel, Comment, Redefining “Child” and Redefining Lives: The 
Possible Beneficial Impact the Fostering Connections to Success Act and Court Involvement 
Could Have on Older Foster Care Youth, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 517, 530 (2012) (citing ICWA 
and AACWA as part of the “large amounts of legislation dealing specifically with the 
removal, placement in foster care, and subsequent adoptions of abused children”). 
 27. See, e.g., Houston, supra note 12, at 33 (“[B]y 1992, nearly thirty states had 
replicated the program.”); Richard Wexler, Take the Child and Run: Tales from the Age of 
ASFA, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 129, 139 (2001) (describing IFPS programs in Michigan since 
1988 and in Alabama shortly thereafter). 
 28. Such shifts are common. As Professor Catherine Ross has noted, “The pendulum of 
child welfare reform has repeatedly swung between efforts to preserve troubled families at 
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from the apparent failure of policies aimed at addressing child 
maltreatment. These policies included mandatory child abuse reporting 
laws, expanded child protection services, and increased criminal justice 
intervention in child maltreatment cases.
29
 When these changes failed to 
curtail the rising tide of child abuse cases,
30
 anti-child abuse advocates 
began blaming family preservation policies and the provisions that made it 
harder to remove children.
31
 These concerns were then reinforced by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Santosky v. Kramer, holding that parents have 
                                                                                                             
virtually all costs and a passion to rescue every child in need.” Catherine J. Ross, The 
Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable Children, “Bad” Mothers, and Statutory Deadlines in Parental 
Termination Proceedings, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 176, 194 (2004); see also Houston, 
supra note 9, at 34 (“States and local governments were re-directing funds from more 
traditional child protection services to IFPS. And in 1993, with support from the Edna 
McConnell Clark Foundation, Congress passed the Family Preservation and Support 
Services Act of 1993, which earmarked $1 billion for state family preservation efforts.”). 
 29. Other reforms from this period included laws requiring suspected child abuse 
fatalities to be reported directly to district attorneys and/or medical examiners or coroners, 
cross-reporting laws requiring CPAs to report sexual abuse or “serious” physical abuse to 
law enforcement, and changes to state and federal laws increasing the ability of children to 
testify in child abuse cases or have their evidence admitted in another form. Houston, supra 
note 12, at 29. As Claire Houston has noted, during this period  
[p]olice departments established specialized teams to investigate child abuse 
reports, and prosecutors’ offices developed specialized units to prosecute these 
cases. Prosecutors also developed strategies . . . to improve the child abuse 
prosecution rate. In many communities, Child Advocacy Centers (CACs) were 
established to provide multidisciplinary investigation of criminal child abuse 
and support child witnesses. At the federal level, Congress passed the 
Children’s Justice and Assistance Act, which allocated funding to states to 
improve the investigation and prosecution of child abuse cases. Finally, 
CAPTA was amended to encourage states to facilitate multidisciplinary and 
interagency child abuse investigations. 
Id. at 29–30. 
 30. Id. at 29 (“By 1985, the number of reports to CPAs had swelled to 1.5 million, of 
which 500,000 were substantiated for maltreatment.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Houston, supra note 12, at 34 (describing the critics of family preservation 
and the AACWA); John E.B. Myers, A Short History of Child Protection in America, 42 
FAM. L.Q. 449, 459 (2008) (“In the 1990s . . . critics argued that over-reliance on family 
preservation sometimes led to tragedy.”); Wexler, supra note 27, at 143 (“‘[F]amily 
preservation’ became the scapegoat whenever any child was left in any home under any 
circumstances and something went wrong – regardless of whether the child had been 
anywhere near a real family preservation program.”). 
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Santosky involved a challenge to New York’s civil child abuse law, 
which permitted the termination of parental rights if a court determined, 
based on “a preponderance of the evidence,” a child had been “permanently 
neglected.”
33
 The Santoskys claimed this low evidentiary standard violated 
their parental rights, and the Supreme Court agreed. According to the Court, 
“[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, 
and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have 
not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the 
State.”
34
 The Court explained that until unfitness is proven, it must be 
assumed that parents and their child speak with one voice and share an 
interest in preventing termination.
35
 After Santosky, a state needed to 




Santosky was a win for family preservation. However, the case troubled 
child protection advocates, many of whom were already concerned about 
the effects of family preservation policies on rates of child abuse. These 
advocates feared that, by making it more difficult for states to terminate 
parental rights, the Santosky Court had increased the likelihood “that 
children [would be] return[ed] to the care of maltreating parents.”
37
 One of 
the most prominent of these critics was Richard Gelles, the author of the 




                                                                                                             
 32. 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982), cited in Houston, supra note 9, at 33. 
 33. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 774. 
 34. Id. at 755. 
 35. Id. at 760 (“[U]ntil the State proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents 
share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.”); see 
also Ross, supra note 28, at 184 (“[O]nly after the State proves parental unfitness, are the 
interests of parent and child deemed to ‘diverge.’”). The fiction of this assumption was 
emphasized by the fact that one of the children, “who had been removed from his parents 
when he was only three days old, was seven when the case was argued and had never lived 
with his parents” and thus could not be assumed to share their interests. “Yet even on those 
facts, the Court preserved the legal fiction . . . .” Id. 
 36. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747–48. 
 37. Houston, supra note 12, at 33–34. 
 38. GELLES, supra note 16. 
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Gelles’ book recounted numerous stories of children returned to their 
families who then experienced further abuse and, in some cases, death.
39
 
Gelles argued these tragedies were the result of family preservation laws 
and policies, which forced social workers and courts to return children to 
their biological families even when such return endangered the children’s 
lives.
40
 According to Gelles, “the basic flaw of the child protection system 
is that it has two inherently contradictory goals: protecting children and 
preserving families.”
41
 Gelles believed family preservation policies were 
antithetical to children’s rights, and other child welfare advocates soon 
adopted this view.  
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, increasing numbers of child 
welfare advocates challenged the Santosky Court’s position that children—
particularly abused children—should be assumed to share the same interests 
as their abusing parents. These advocates considered such assumptions 
dangerous, and they sought legal reforms requiring courts and child welfare 
agencies to focus on children’s needs as separate from their family’s 
needs.
42
 In making these arguments, child welfare advocates relied heavily 
on the “psychological parent” theory of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and 
Albert J. Solnit.
43
 According to this theory, “[w]hether any adult becomes 
the psychological parent of a child is based . . . on day-to-day interaction, 
companionship, and shared experiences.”
44
 Consequently, “[t]he role can be 
fulfilled either by a biological parent . . . or by any other caring adult.”
45
 
The psychological parent theory supported child welfare advocates’ 
position that if a child cannot return home quickly, the best alternative is to 
                                                                                                             
 39. Id.; see also Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and 
Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 647 (1999) 
(noting the numerous cases of children returned to abusing parents). 
 40. GELLES, supra note 16, at 152. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Sarah Katz, The Value of Permanency: State Implementation of Legal Guardianship 
Under the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1079, 1092–93; 
Houston, supra note 12, at 34. 
 43. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1986) (regarding 
the role of child professionals in child placement decisions); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., 
BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979) (addressing the grounds for intervention); 
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973) [hereinafter 
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS]. 
 44. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 43, at 19. 
 45. Id. 
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sever the child’s “ties with their biological family and formalize 
attachments to the current caregivers.”
46
  
During this period, many legal scholars also became ardent opponents of 
family preservation policies. One prominent critic was Professor Elizabeth 
Bartholet, who forcefully challenged the idea that family preservation 
policies serve children’s interests and suggested that “children would 
generally be better served by policies encouraging child protection workers 
to intervene earlier and more often to remove victimized children from 
maltreating parents, to terminate parental rights, and to place children in 
adoption.”
47
 Professor Bartholet and other family preservation critics 
recognized that their approach, which favored permanent removal over 
reunification, could create unfairness to parents; however, they argued that 
any potential unfairness was outweighed by the benefits.
48
 Ultimately, these 
                                                                                                             
 46. Katz, supra note 42, at 1093. Other medical and scientific research also seemed to 
support this position. For example, in a 1996 article, Dr. Amy Henegan and her colleagues 
advised: 
[M]ore attention should be directed toward determining whether the child’s 
overall functioning has improved because of the services received. Has abuse 
or neglect reoccurred? Have the child’s growth and development been 
optimized? Has the child’s cognitive and social development shown changes 
for the better? These and other outcomes will need to be addressed to obtain a 
clearer understanding of the benefits and limitations of family preservation . . . . 
Alternatives to family preservation, such as permanency planning (adoption) 
and foster care, also must be reexamined . . . Applying family preservation to 
every family, as a matter of policy, may actually be placing children at risk.  
Amy M. Heneghan et al., Evaluating Intensive Family Preservation Programs: A 
Methodological Review, 97 PEDIATRICS 535, 541 (1996); see also 2 WESTAT ET AL., 
EVALUATION OF FAMILY PRESERVATION AND REUNIFICATION PROGRAMS: FINAL REPORT 9-1 
(2002), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/180326/report2.pdf (finding no evidence that 
families receiving IFPS were better able to avoid foster care placement). But see Wexler, 
supra note 27, at 136–37 (concluding that at least one of these studies was defective on 
numerous grounds and thus unreliable). 
 47. Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating a Child-Friendly Child Welfare System: Effective 
Early Intervention to Prevent Maltreatment and Protect Victimized Children, 60 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1323, 1325 (2012) (citing her book ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999) [hereinafter 
BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN]). 
 48. Gordon, supra note 39, at 657 (“Even when it is possible to prioritize children in a 
general way, putting them first in specific situations is often ‘difficult and painful.’ It is 
difficult because adults do not have children’s needs and cannot easily see what they are. It 
is painful because what is good for children may be unfair to adults.”) (footnote omitted) 
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arguments persuaded Congress and, in 1997, the Adoption and Safe 




When the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA)
50
 was 
enacted, nearly half-a-million children were in foster care.
51
 Foster care was 
designed as a temporary solution; however, by this time, it had become 
increasingly clear that substantial numbers of foster children would never 
rejoin their parents. Many child welfare advocates blamed family 
reunification policies for this predicament.
52
 They claimed that the 
emphasis on reunification had doomed these children to either a childhood 
in foster care
53
 or to the repeated dangers of an unsafe familial home.
54
 The 
                                                                                                             
(quoting JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST 
DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 81 (1996)). 
 49. 143 CONG. REC. H2017 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997). 
 50. Pub. L. No. 105–89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 51. DONALD DUQUETTE & MARK HARDIN, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND STATE LEGISLATION GOVERNING PERMANENCE FOR 
CHILDREN I-7 (1999). 
 52.  See, e.g., Allison E. Korn, Detoxing the Child Welfare System, 23 VA. J. SOC. 
POL'Y & L. 293, 336 (2016) (noting such advocates “blamed the foster care surge on ideas 
of family preservation and an emphasis on reunification of children in foster care with their 
families”). See generally BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN, supra note 47 (arguing 
that the policy of family preservation is flawed, that it fails to keep children with 
their families and instead, subjects them to years of harmful foster care). 
 53. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice in Children's Rights?: The Critique of 
Federal Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112, 128 (1999–2000) (“Family 
preservation policies were blamed both for arbitrarily returning children to violent homes 
and for inflating the foster care population.”). 
 54. Dorothy E. Roberts, Poverty, Race, and New Directions in Child Welfare Policy, 1 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 63, 66 (1999) (“The congressional testimony and newspaper articles 
during the pre-ASFA hearings emphasized cases of children who were returned home and 
killed.”); see also 143 CONG. REC. H10776-05, H10789 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement 
of Rep. Pryce). When lobbying for the ASFA’s passage, “one senate member told Congress 
the story of extreme abuse of an eight year old boy by his aunt in October 1997.” Kathleen 
A. Bailie, Note, The Other “Neglected” Parties in Child Protective Proceedings: Parents in 
Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285, 2292 
(1998). 
Using this tragedy as an example of the danger of the family preservation 
philosophy, the senator remarked: “Don’t we have to ask . . . what on Earth was 
that woman doing taking care of that child? Why in the world was that child 
put back into that same home, put back with that abusive woman?” 
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ASFA’s remedy was to encourage speedy terminations and adoptions.
55
 
The law’s supporters believed this would prevent children from being 




The ASFA reflected changed ideas about children’s best interests.
57
 By 
the time it was enacted, most advocates favored a child-centered approach 
to child welfare. They emphasized children’s rights over parental rights
58
 
and believed previous reunification policies, particularly the AACWA, 
protected parents’ rights at the expense of their children.
59
 This shifting 
view of child welfare is apparent in the discussion surrounding the ASFA’s 
passage. For example, in explaining his support for the ASFA, Senator 
Mike DeWine said, “[W]e have to start worrying [more] about the 
children’s rights and less about the rights of the natural parents.”
60
 
Similarly, Rep. Steny Hoyer said, “[O]ur child welfare system too often 
protects parents’ rights rather than children’s rights.”
61
 The ASFA was a 
clear reversal of this prior policy.  
The ASFA favored adoption over reunification and did so in two 
particular categories of cases. First, the ASFA favored adoption in cases 
where a court could make an early determination that it would be unsafe for 
the child to return home due to “aggravated circumstances,” such as severe 
abuse. Second, it favored adoption in the cases of children who have “been 
                                                                                                             
Id. at 2292–93 (alteration in original). 
 55. Garrison, supra note 10, at 591–92 (“In order to curb growth of the foster care 
population, ASFA mandates parental rights termination if a child has been in state care for 
fifteen of the past twenty-two months.”). 
 56. Id. (noting ASFA was touted as the as the best and possibly only means “to curb the 
human and public costs of prolonged foster care”). 
 57. This change is reflected in the guidelines issued by the Department of Health and 
Human Services for implementing ASFA which were “developed by a cross-disciplinary 
group of experts in child welfare, comprised of administrators, lawyers, judges, advocates 
and front-line workers” and “reflect their best thinking about child welfare policy 
frameworks and what ought to be.” DUQUETTE & HARDIN, supra note 52, at i (quoting Carol 
Williams, Assoc. Comm’r, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.), quoted in Ross, supra note 28, 
at 196 n.87. 
 58. See Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement, supra note 11, at 928 
(describing the ASFA as a “good law because it shifts the balance in child welfare law and 
policy somewhat in the direction of valuing children’s rights more, and parents’ rights less”). 
See generally Yablon-Zug, supra note 18 (describing the shift from the AACWA to ASFA). 
 59. See Yablon-Zug, supra note 18.  
 60. 143 CONG. REC. S3947-02 (daily ed. May 5, 1997). 
 61. 143 CONG. REC. H2021 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997). 
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in foster care under the responsibility of the State for 15 of the most recent 
22 months.”
62
 In both types of cases, the ASFA promotes adoption by 
reducing the amount of time a child spends in foster care while waiting to 
reunite with his or her birth parents. To that end, the statute also states that 
“reasonable efforts” are often not required in cases of abuse and neglect,
63
 
and that permanency hearings must be scheduled after twelve months, 
lessening the time period for reunification efforts to have an effect.
64
 As 
                                                                                                             
 62. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–89, § 103(a)(3)(E), 111 
Stat. 2115, 2118 (codified as amended in various sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
 63. Under the ASFA, 
states are not required to use reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify families 
in cases where the child had been subject to “aggravated circumstances.” 
Aggravated circumstances are defined by state law, and may include 
abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, or sexual abuse. States may also forego 
reasonable efforts in cases where a parent has been convicted of murder or 
voluntary manslaughter of another child or felony assault resulting in serious 
bodily injury to the child or another child, or where parental rights to a sibling 
have been terminated involuntarily. 
Houston, supra note 9, at 35. 
 64. 
[T]he 1997 Act specifies a twelve-month period for the state to hold a 
permanency hearing. This shorter period of time lessens the opportunity for any 
beneficial results from state reasonable efforts expended to reunite the family; 
concomitantly, the shorter time frame lessens the time that a child will spend in 
foster care while waiting for parental conduct to improve.  
Raymond C. O’Brien, Reasonable Efforts and Parent-Child Reunification, 2013 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 1029, 1044. In addition, 
ASFA also requires states to file a petition to terminate parental rights where a 
child has been in foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months, or where 
a child has been removed from the home and a court finds that the parent has 
committed murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child or felony assault 
resulting in serious bodily injury to the child or another child. 
Houston, supra note 9, at 35; see also Laura Grzetic Eibsen & Toni J. Gray, Dependency 
and Neglect Appeals Under C.A.R. 3.4, COLO. LAW., Oct. 2007, at 55, 55 (“The federally 
mandated reasonable efforts requirement underwent a transformation whereby the focus on 
reunification was broadened to place greater emphasis on the health and safety of the child. 
Furthermore, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, with its mandate to place children 
in permanent homes as soon as possible, recognized ‘the important element of time.’ Thus, 
there was a shift in focus from family reunification per se to ‘time-limited family 
reunification services.’”). 
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Ohio Senator Mike DeWine noted, the ASFA represented a “historic 
change” in federal child welfare law.
65
 
Courts interpreting the ASFA also recognized that the legislation 
represented a seismic shift in child welfare policy. For example, when the 
Iowa Supreme Court first applied the law, the court spoke of the 
“transformation” it represented and how “the family preservation concept 
which guided our general national policy for the last two decades [is now] 
found to be detrimental to children in some cases.”
66
 Similarly, a Delaware 
family court described the ASFA’s “departure in philosophical focus from 
[AACWA]”
67
 explaining “that the safety of the child and the child’s need 
for permanency are [ASFA’s] foremost concerns, as opposed to the 
inherent rights of the biological parents.”
68
 In addition, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court noted that the ASFA “make[s] clear that the health and 
safety of the child supersede all other considerations.”
69
 
As these courts understood, the ASFA encourages speedy terminations 
and adoptions and assumes family preservation is often contrary to 
                                                                                                             
 65. See 143 CONG. REC. S12668, S12670 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
DeWine). 
 66. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). 
 67. Bean, supra note 7, at 335 (quoting In re Rasheta D., No. 98-08-07-TN, 2000 WL 
1693157, at *20 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 2, 2000)); see N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. 
A.R.G., 824 A.2d 213, 233 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003), aff’d in part, modified in part 
and remanded sub nom. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.G, 845 A.2d 106 (N.J. 
2004) (rejecting mother’s argument that the agency had not made reasonable efforts to keep 
the daughter in the home and finding, based on ASFA that such efforts were not on the 
health and safety of the child). Similar remarks were made by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court which described the statute as having “limit[ed] the reasonable efforts social service 
agencies must undertake to reunite families.” In re Guardianship of DMH, 736 A.2d 1261, 
1273 (N.J. 1999). 
 68. Bean, supra note 7, at 335 (quoting In re Rasheta D., No. 98-08-07-TN, 2000 WL 
1693157, at *20 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 2, 2000) (alteration in original). 
 69. In re Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 333 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); see In re Guardianship of 
DMH, 736 A.2d at 1273. Post-ASFA courts viewed ASFA as a directive to interpret the 
“reasonable” in “reasonable efforts,” in a manner that would allow “agency reunification 
efforts [to] qualify as reasonable more quickly and easily than” prior to the ASFA’s passage. 
Bean, supra note 7, at 334 (noting that the primary way in which courts lessened the 
reasonable reunification efforts requirement was by focusing “on the health and safety of the 
child,” which courts perceived as the ASFA’s overriding concern); see also State ex rel. 
Child., Youth & Fams. Dep’t, 47 P.3d 859, 864 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (describing the statute 
as having “unquestionably had an impact on what is regarded as a reasonable effort.”). 
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 Thus, the ASFA created a problem for the ICWA 
and its supporters. After the ASFA’s enactment, the ICWA no longer 
aligned with state and federal child welfare policies. Indian children were 
exempt from the direct application of the statute, but its passage indicated 
that the policies of family preservation and reunification, the policies 
undergirding the ICWA, were harmful. 
Current ICWA challenges are based on this history and the continuing 
perception that the ICWA contradicts child welfare best practices. 
However, these cases ignore the fact that child welfare practices are 
changing once again and that these practices increasingly reject the ASFA’s 
policies of speedy termination and adoption. 
D. Post-ASFA 
Today, the ASFA is subject to significant disapproval,
71
 and many of its 
most important ideas are no longer considered best practices.
72
 There is also 
mounting evidence that the ASFA is particularly harmful for children of 
                                                                                                             
 70. The statute provides significant adoption subsidies while giving little 
encouragement to relative placements or other non-adoptive options. A child being cared for 
by a relative is one of the few exceptions to the speedy termination requirements. However, 
as Professor Josh Gupta-Kagan has noted, there was no preference for kinship care or push 
to place with relatives in the first instance which meant that the termination exception would 
not apply even if there were relatives willing to receive the child. In addition, although 
ASFA defined guardianship’s place as a permanency option, it was clearly not preferred, and 
the Act provided no funds for guardianship subsidies. See Josh Gupta-Kagan, The New 
Permanency, 19 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 33 (2015) (“ASFA expanded adoption 
subsidies, creating new adoption incentive payments that would flow directly to state 
governments that increased the number of foster child adoptions.”); see also Ernestine S. 
Gray, Judicial Viewpoints on ASFA, 29 CHILD L. PRAC. 62, 63 (2010) (discussing the lack of 
encouragement for the other options).  
 71. See, e.g., Shanta Trivedi, The Harm of Child Removal, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 523, 573 (2019) (“ASFA simply adopts the problems of its predecessors and 
weakens the few protections . . . .”); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF 
CHILD WELFARE 113 (2002) (arguing that ASFA’s emphasis on adoption is harmful to 
children and perpetuates a racist and overly-punitive child welfare system); Wexler, supra 
note 27 (arguing that ASFA has made children less safe and primarily targets poor families). 
 72. See, e.g., Rachel Leigh, Note, Analyzing the Special Needs Designation and 
Accommodation of Parental Racial Preferences in Adoption, 22 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 
375, 392 (2019) (“[T]here are many critics to ASFA, claiming it goes too far in the direction 
away from family preservation.”); see also Trivedi, supra note 71, at 566 (describing “a shift 
away from ASFA back towards family preservation and reunification”). 
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 Multiple studies demonstrate that African American children enter 
and remain in foster care in numbers disproportionate to their percentage of 
the general population.
74
 Moreover, as Professor Tanya Washington has 
noted, not only do these children enter foster care at higher rates, but 
“children of color [also] tend to receive fewer services, stay in care longer, 
and generally have worse outcomes than white children.”
75
  
This over-representation problem is similar to that which spurred the 
passage of the ICWA and is one of the reasons why state and federal child 
welfare policies are reembracing family preservation.
76
 The renewed 
interest in family preservation is further encouraged by emerging research 
demonstrating the importance of kinship care, cultural competency, and 
community support.
77
 Still, despite the fact that state and federal support for 
family preservation is growing, challenges to the ICWA are simultaneously 
becoming more frequent and more alarming. 
II. The ICWA Challenges 
For over four decades, the ICWA has been subject to legal challenges. 
Initially, these challenges tended to accept the Act as generally beneficial 
but claimed that its application to a particular case or set of cases would be 
unjust.
78
 Over time, this has changed. Today’s challenges focus on 
eliminating the Act in its entirety and assume the Act is primarily harmful.  
                                                                                                             
 73. See Tanya M. Washington, Throwing Black Babies Out with the Bathwater: A 
Child-Centered Challenge to Same-Sex Adoption Bans, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1, 
19–20 (2009). 
 74.  
Nationally, African-American children made up less than 15 percent of the 
overall child population in the 2000 census, but that they represented 27 
percent of the children who entered foster care during the fiscal year 2004, and 
they represented 34 percent of the children remaining in foster care at the end 
of that year. 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-816, AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN IN FOSTER 
CARE 7 (2007), quoted in Gray, supra note 70, at 63. 
 75. Gray, supra note 70, at 63.  
 76. See infra Part III. 
 77. See infra Part III. 
 78. Although the Act is widely considered one of the most important pieces of federal 
Indian legislation, proving the IWCA’s success is difficult. Judicial exceptions and agency 
non-compliance, see infra notes 183–184, 191 and accompanying text, are among the 
reasons it is often so difficult to determine the success of the ICWA. Nevertheless, even with 
these obstacles there is significant evidence that ICWA is serving its congressional purpose. 
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A. Early ICWA Challenges 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield
79
 was the Supreme 
Court’s first ICWA case. Holyfield involved section 1911(a) of the ICWA, 
which states that tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving 
reservation-domiciled Indian children, so such cases must be transferred to 
tribal court.
80
 In Holyfield, the Indian parents were both domiciled on the 
reservation, but the mother left the reservation to give birth and then placed 
her twin babies for adoption with a non-Indian couple.
81
 The potential 
adoptive parents were fit and loving
82
 and, under state law, the adoptive 
placement would have been permissible.
83
 However, because the case was 
governed by the ICWA, the state court lacked jurisdiction
84
 and the Tribe 
had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the children’s placement.
85
 The 
Holyfields challenged the Tribe’s exclusive jurisdiction and argued that 
permitting the Tribe to determine the children’s placement was contrary to 
the children’s best interests.
86
  
                                                                                                             
See Sarah Krakoff, They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race, and the 
Constitutional Minimum, 69 STAN. L. REV. 491, 508 (2017) (“[T]he assessments to date 
indicate that ICWA, when properly implemented, achieves its goals.”) (citing Gordon E. 
Limb et al., An Empirical Examination of the Indian Child Welfare Act and Its Impact on 
Cultural and Familial Preservation for American Indian Children, 28 CHILD ABUSE & 
NEGLECT 1279, 1280–82 (2004); Ann E. MacEachron et al., The Effectiveness of the Indian 
Child Welfare Act of 1978, 70 SOC. SERV. REV. 451, 454–60 (1996)). Professor Krakoff 
further notes that “[m]ost studies of ICWA, including a 2005 Government Accountability 
Office report, note that insufficient recordkeeping and data collection hamper assessments of 
ICWA compliance and outcomes.” Id. at 508 n.94 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFF., GAO-05-290, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT: EXISTING INFORMATION ON 
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES COULD BE USED TO TARGET GUIDANCE AND ASSISTANCE TO STATES 
4–5 (2005), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-05-290 [hereinafter GAO, INDIAN CHILD 
WELFARE ACT]; Margaret C. Plantz et al., Indian Child Welfare: A Status Report, 18 CHILD. 
TODAY 24 (1989)). 
 79. 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
 80. Id. at 36. 
 81. Id. at 37–38. 
 82. Solangel Maldonado, Race, Culture, and Adoption: Lessons from Mississippi Band 
of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 17 (2008) (“[B]y all 
accounts, [Joan Holyfield] was a loving parent who provided a stable home environment.”). 
 83. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 38. 
 84. Id. at 52–53. 
 85. Id. at 53. 
 86. The irony of this custody case, is that the after winning on the jurisdictional issue 
and thus, winning the right to decide the children’s placement, the Tribe ultimately made the 
same placement determination as the state court would have. The fear that the tribal court 
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The Holyfield couple lost, but many subsequent challenges were 
successful and resulted in the creation of significant exceptions to the Act’s 
application. The two most notable exceptions used during this period were 
the “existing Indian family” exception and the “good cause” exception.
87
 
1. Existing Indian Family (EIF) Exception  
One of the earliest ICWA exception cases was The Kansas Supreme 
Court case In re Adoption of Baby Boy L.
88 
Baby Boy L concerned the 
adoption of an Indian child by a non-Indian family.
89
 The adoption would 
have been permissible under state law, but not under ICWA.
90
 The Baby 
Boy L court considered this difference problematic and contrary to the 
child’s best interests.
91
 As a result, the court created an exception to the 
ICWA for Indian children who have never spent time as part of an Indian 
                                                                                                             
would not consider the children’s best interests was unfounded. See Maldonado, supra note 
82, at 17 (“[O]ne might have expected the Tribal Court to return the twins to the Tribe. 
However, the Tribal Court balanced the Tribes' interest in keeping tribal children in tribal 
communities against the children's interests in continuity and stability.”).  
 87. See, e.g., Kirk Albertson, Applying Twenty-Five Years of Experience: The Iowa 
Indian Child Welfare Act, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 193, 195 (2004-2005) (“State courts have 
created exceptions to the applicability of ICWA, most notably the ‘existing Indian family’ 
exception[, . . . [and] have taken great liberty with the ‘good cause’ language in § 1915 to 
deviate from the stated placement preferences.”). 
 88. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In re A.J.S., 
204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009). 
 89. Baby Boy L involved a child of mixed heritage: 
In that dispute, the unmarried non-Indian mother sought to voluntarily 
relinquish her child for adoption by a non-Indian couple. The Indian father and 
the tribe objected, arguing that the tribe had a right to intervene in the 
proceedings and that the trial court should comply with the placement priorities 
of the ICWA. Rejecting the application of the ICWA outright, the Kansas 
Supreme Court reasoned that because the child was not being removed from an 
existing Indian family no legislative purpose of the ICWA would be served by 
allowing intervention by the tribe. 
Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New 
Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 626 (2002) [hereinafter 
Atwood, Flashpoints]; see also Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 174. 
 90. Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175–76. 
 91. Id. at 174 (finding that the ICWA “if applied as requested by the appellants, would 
also be inconsistent, contradictory, and would accomplish no worthwhile or useful 
purpose.”). 
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 Under this exception, the court determines whether the Indian 
child is part of an “existing Indian family” and, if they are not, the court 
finds the ICWA inapplicable.
93
 For decades, this exception meant the 
ICWA was not protecting a sizable portion of Indian children. Eventually, 
after tireless advocacy, this exception was eliminated.
94
  
                                                                                                             
 92. Id. at 175–76. Typically, these cases involved bi-racial children who have only been 
in the custody of their non-Indian parents or relatives. See Atwood, Flashpoints, supra note 
89, at 626 (“[C]ourts that have followed the lead of the Kansas Supreme Court have invoked 
the exception in a variety of circumstances, the exception has been asserted most often in 
disputes involving children of mixed heritage, with the Baby Boy L. factual paradigm 
appearing with particular prominence.”). 
 93. After decades of litigation and advocacy work, the EIF exception has now mostly 
been repudiated. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. However, this victory was short 
lived. In 2013 the Supreme Court decided Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, which created a 
new exception based on reasoning similar to the EIF doctrine. 570 U.S. 637 (2013). The 
Court’s discussion of the importance of prior custody is very similar to EIF, see id. at 649 
(explaining that when an Indian parent has never had legal or physical custody the ICWA is 
inapplicable because “the ICWA’s primary goal of preventing the unwarranted removal of 
Indian children and the dissolution of Indian families is not implicated.”). However, the 
exception created under Adoptive Couple is narrower than the EIF exception since, unlike 
previous EIF cases, it does not prevent the applicability of other ICWA provisions to 
children not previously in the custody of an Indian parent.. Marcia A. Zug, The Real Impact 
of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: The Existing Indian Family Doctrine Is Not Affirmed, but 
the Future of the ICWA's Placement Preferences Is Jeopardized, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 327, 
338–39 (2014). 
Some scholars have argued that although Adoptive Couple does not specifically endorse 
the EIF, anti-ICWA groups “may view the Court’s reasoning as at least an indirect basis for 
renewing efforts in states that have never addressed the issue or have rejected the 
exception.” Caroline M. Turner, Implementing and Defending the Indian Child Welfare Act 
Through Revised State Requirements, 49 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 501, 525 (2016). 
 94. See 25 C.F.R. § 23.103 (2016). Although the rule does not use the exact 
nomenclature of the EIF exception, it includes a “mandatory prohibition on consideration of 
certain listed factors, because they are not relevant to the inquiry of whether the statute 
applies.” Bureau of Indian Affs., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, RIN 1076-AF25, Indian Child 
Welfare Act Proceedings 93 (2016), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/bia/ois/ 
pdf/idc1-034238.pdf [hereinafter BIA, ICWA PROCEEDINGS], quoted in Elizabeth 
MacLachlan, Comment, Tensions Underlying the Indian Child Welfare Act: Tribal 
Jurisdiction over Traditional State Court Family Law Matters, 2018 BYU L. REV. 455, 494. 
These prohibited factors include “the participation of the parents or the Indian child in Tribal 
cultural, social, religious, or political activities, the relationship between the Indian child and 
his or her parents, whether the parent ever had custody of the child, or the Indian child's 
blood quantum.” Id. § 23.103(c). However, even before the codification of the BIA 
regulations, the EIF exception was no longer widely accepted. See BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFS., 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE 
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2. Good Cause Exception 
The second exception courts employed in response to the ICWA 
challenges was the “good cause” exception. The ICWA permits deviation 
from the ICWA’s placement preferences for “good cause,” but does not 
define the term.
95
 As a result, courts began crafting their own definition, 
which was frequently little more than a best interests standard.
96
 Like many 
existing Indian family cases, the good cause exception is often used when 
the court seeks to place an Indian child in a non-Indian home that would be 
acceptable under state law but is impermissible under the ICWA.
97
 In such 
cases, courts use good cause as an end run around the ICWA 
requirements.
98
 In 2016, the problem of courts abusing the good cause 
exception was addressed through the codification of Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) regulations defining “good cause.”
99
 Now, courts must use 
this mandated definition to decide whether good cause exists to deviate 
                                                                                                             
ACT 15 (2016), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/bia/ois/pdf/idc2-056831.pdf 
[hereinafter BIA, ICWA GUIDELINES]; BIA, ICWA PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 92 (noting that 
only a handful of states still applied the exception). 
 95. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).  
 96. See, e.g., In re Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-8287, 828 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1991); Adoption of N.P.S., 868 P.2d 934, 936 (Alaska 1994). 
 97. These cases typically involve children of mixed Indian heritage and the exception is 
frequently used to keep these children in a non-Indian home in which they have been living 
for a period of time. Atwood, Flashpoints, supra note 89, at 645 (“[S]tate courts concluding 
that the child’s best interests require a permanent placement that will preserve existing 
emotional bonds and attachments.”). 
 98. See, e.g., In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361 (Alaska 1993) (finding that the 
child’s attachment to the non-Indian adoptive mother and other considerations constituted 
good cause for placing the child with non-Indian parents); In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
507, 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding the children have a “constitutionally protected 
interest in their relationship with the only family they have ever known” and refusing to 
apply the ICWA) (superseded by statute on another ground, as stated in In re Santos Y., 92 
Cal. App. 4th 1274, 1312 (2001), but that statute, 2006 Cal. Stat. ch. 838, § 47, was then 
subsequently repealed); In re Custody of S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d 872 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1993), rev'd, 521 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1994) (finding good cause to place the children in the 
non-Indian adoptive home because the children had bonded with the potential adoptive 
parents and an Indian adoptive home was not available); see also Albertson, supra note 
87, at 208–09 (“State courts most often find good cause to deviate from the Act's placement 
preferences because they apply a best interests test, ‘and then make an Anglo determination 
of the Indian child's best interests.’”). 
 99. 25 C.F.R. § 23.132 (2016). 
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from the placement preferences. As a result, this change has limited courts’ 
ability to use good cause to circumvent the ICWA’s requirements.
100
 
B. Post-ASFA ICWA Cases 
After the passage of the ASFA, the concern that the ICWA might be bad 
for most Indian children, not just some, increasingly appeared in court 
decisions applying the Act. Cases decided shortly after the ASFA’s 
enactment show courts struggling to explain how the ICWA could protect 
the best interests of Indian children while conflicting with otherwise 
applicable state or federal child welfare policies. This struggle is apparent 
in cases like In re W.H.D,
101
 in which a Texas appeals court explained “it is 
not possible to comply” with both the best interest standard under the Texas 
code and the best interest requirement under the ICWA because “the term 
‘best interests of Indian children,’ as found in the ICWA, is different than 
the general Anglo American ‘best interest of the child’ standard used in 
cases involving non-Indian children.”
102
  
The W.H.D. court held that it could still protect the best interests of 
Indian children while applying the ICWA’s standard, but other courts found 
the ASFA and ICWA standards impossible to reconcile.
103
 For example, in 
J.S. v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged that the child 
custody case was governed by the ICWA, yet it refused to apply the 
applicable ICWA provision. Instead, the court looked to the ASFA for 
guidance and explained that the congressional policy underlying the ASFA 
is, or should be, the policy underlying the ICWA.
104
  
                                                                                                             
 100. Id. 
 101. In re W.D.H., 43 S.W.3d 30, 36–37, 40 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001). 
 102. Id. at 36. 
[I]t is not possible to comply with both the two-prong test of the Family Code, 
which requires a determination of the best interest of the child under the 
‘Anglo’ standard, and the ICWA, which views the best interest of the Indian 
child in the context of maintaining the child’s relationship with the Indian 
Tribe, culture, and family. 
Id. at 36–37. 
 103. “[W]hat is best for an Indian child is to maintain ties with the Indian Tribe, culture, 
and family.” Id. at 36. 
 104. J.S. v. State, 50 P.3d 388, 391–92 (Alaska 2002). As a result, the court refused to 
apply ICWA’s active efforts requirement and replaced it was the aggravated circumstances 
of ASFA. Id.; see Sheri L. Hazeltine, Speedy Termination of Alaska Native Parental Rights: 
The 1998 Changes to Alaska’s Child in Need of Aid Statutes and Their Inherent Conflict 
with the Mandates of the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 57, 68 n.67 
(2002). 
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 C. ICWA’s Statutory Differences 
As the J.S. decision demonstrates, the ICWA is most vulnerable when it 
differs from otherwise applicable child welfare laws.
105
 The most 
significant potential differences between the ICWA and the laws governing 
non-ICWA cases concern “different burdens of proof,” “different 
requirements regarding remedial services,” “different required sources of 




1. Burden of Proof 
The ICWA heightens the evidentiary burden needed to terminate parental 
rights.
107
 Section 1912(f) of the Act states:  
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such 
proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . that the continued 
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to 
result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.
108
 
In contrast, most state termination laws only require a showing of clear and 




                                                                                                             
 105. This includes both federal child welfare statutes like the ASFA as well as state child 
welfare laws. J.S., 50 P.3d at 391–92.  
 106. Peter K. Wahl, Little Power to Help Brenda? A Defense of the Indian Child Welfare 
Act and Its Continued Implementation in Minnesota, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 811, 827 
(2000). This list is just referring to state court child custody cases involving Indian children. 
Many Indian child custody cases are never heard in state court. The custody cases of 
reservation domiciled children are under the exclusive jurisdiction of tribal courts. 
Determining when a child is considered a domiciliary of an Indian reservation was the 
subject of Mississippi Band of Choctaw v. Holyfield, the Supreme Court’s first ICWA case. 
490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
 107. This is only for termination. Foster care placements are governed by a clear and 
convincing evidence standard. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (“No foster care placement may be 
ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by clear and 
convincing evidence, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued 
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional 
or physical damage to the child.”). 
 108. Id. § 1912(f), 
 109. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-
180 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2250 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.163 
(West 2017); W. VA. CODE § 49-4-601(i) (West 2019); see also Camille Workman, The 
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2. Remedial Services 
The ICWA also requires a different level of family reunification efforts 
than is required in non-ICWA cases. In an ICWA proceeding, a court must 
ensure the state-employed “active efforts” to remedy the problems that led 
to removal and return the child to the child’s parents.
110
 In most non-ICWA 




3. Sources of Proof 
In an ICWA proceeding in state court, the court must admit and consider 
testimony by a qualified expert in Indian culture before it may order foster 
care or terminate a parent’s rights over an Indian child.
112
 For individuals to 
be considered “qualified” under the Act, they must have particularized 
knowledge regarding Indian culture.
113
 Such experts typically testify as to 
whether an Indian child’s cultural needs can be met through a non-Indian 
placement.
114
 Cultural experts are not mandated in any other category of 
child welfare proceedings.  
4. Placement Preferences 
Lastly, § 1915(a) of the ICWA provides an order of placement 
preferences for adoptions.
115
 Under this provision, first preference is to “be 
                                                                                                             
2017 Uniform Parentage Act: A Response to the Changing Definition of Family?, 32 J. AM. 
ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 233, 247 (2019) (“Most states now incorporate the use of 
the clear and convincing standard in a termination hearing.”). 
 110. 25 U.S.C § 1912(d). 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (effective Oct. 1, 2019) (requiring only reasonable 
efforts); see also, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419B.340(1) (West 2020) (making the explicit 
distinction between “whether the department has made reasonable efforts or, if the Indian 
Child Welfare Act applies, active efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the 
ward from the home”). 
 112. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f); Barbara Ann Atwood, Achieving Permanency for 
American Indian and Alaska Native Children: Lessons from Tribal Traditions, 37 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 239, 249 (2008) [hereinafter Atwood, Achieving Permanency]. 
 113. Atwood, Achieving Permanency, supra note 112, at 249; see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f). 
 114. Atwood, Achieving Permanency, supra note 112, at 249 n.48 (citing In re Adoption 
of Sara J., 123 P.3d 1017, 1032 (Alaska 2005) (considering competing expert testimony on 
whether the cultural needs of the Yup’ik children involved the case could be satisfied by a 
non-Indian placement)). 
 115. “It is one of the most controversial sections of the ICWA because it necessarily 
requires the consideration of race when placing children in adoptive homes.” Kathleena 
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given to a member of the child’s extended family, then to other members of 
the child’s tribe, and, finally, to other Indian families.”
116
 No state has this 
type of explicit tiered placement requirement.
117
 As a result, this provision 
is often seen as mandating adoptive placements that differ greatly from 
what would be expected in a non-ICWA case. 
D. Baby Girl and the ICWA Backlash 
The difference between the ICWA and state child welfare law was 
vividly and emotionally highlighted in the 2015 Supreme Court case of 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.
118
 Initially, Baby Girl appeared to be a 
straight-forward ICWA violation case. Baby Girl was an Indian child as 
defined by the ICWA, and her placement with a non-Indian adoptive 
couple, instead of her biological father, appeared to be a clear violation of 
the Act.
119
 Her father had not consented to her adoption
120
 and, although the 
                                                                                                             
Kruck, Note, The Indian Child Welfare Act’s Waning Power After Adoptive Couple v. Baby 
Girl, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 445, 453 (2015).  
 116. Wahl, supra note 106, at 829. 
ICWA is more specific in the placement preferences when Indian children are 
placed in out-of-home foster care. Section 1915(b) of ICWA first requires that 
the child be placed in the least restrictive setting which most resembles a 
family. Second, the child must be placed within reasonable proximity to his or 
her home. Finally, barring any good cause, the child first is to be placed with 
extended family. If extended family is unavailable or unsuitable, the child is to 
be placed in a foster home approved by the child’s tribe, then to a licensed 
Indian foster home, and finally to an institution approved by the child’s tribe or 
run by an Indian organization. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 117. The Act also requires a similar, although not identical, set of placement options that 
apply when Indian children are placed in foster care. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b). 
 118. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 644 (2013) (“[F]or the duration of the 
pregnancy and the first four months after Baby Girl's birth, Biological Father provided no 
financial assistance to Birth Mother or Baby Girl . . . .”).  
 119. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 560 (S.C. 2012). 
 120. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. at 644–45. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
28 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
 
 
father’s consent wasn’t necessary under South Carolina law,
121
 the family 
court held that it was required under the ICWA.
122
 
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the family 
court’s decision, stating that the ICWA “mandates state courts consider 
heightened federal requirements to terminate parental rights as to ICWA 
parents.”
123
 Given this interpretation of the ICWA, the court agreed there 
was no basis to terminate the father’s rights.
124
 In addition, it noted that 
even if there were termination grounds, the § 1915 placement preferences 
meant the adoptive couple would still not be eligible to adopt the child.
125
 
The court then ordered Baby Girl returned to her father.
126
 
The Baby Girl decision led to a national outcry.
127
 There were protests in 
front of courthouses, teary interviews on national television, and hundreds 
of thousands of dollars collected through fundraising appeals.
128
 In these 
forums, the adoptive couple repeatedly argued that the ICWA was unfair 
and harmful, and the non-Indian public responded with sympathy and 
                                                                                                             
 121. Under South Carolina law, failure to financially support the mother during 
pregnancy constitutes ground for involuntary termination. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2570(4) 
(2017); cf. id. § 63-9-310 (2010) (establishing that, if the father supported the mother during 
pregnancy, the father must consent to the adoption); see also Zug, supra note 93, at 340 
(“Under South Carolina law, a parent's failure to provide financial support for a child 
constitutes grounds for involuntary termination of that parent's parental rights.”).  
 122. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d at 556, 561. 
 123. Id. at 560. 
 124. Id. at 567. 
 125. Id. at 566–67. 
 126. Id. at 567. 
 127. See, e.g., Allyson Bird, Broken Home: The Save Veronica Story, CHARLESTON CITY 
PAPER (Sept. 26, 2012, 4:01 AM), http://www.charlestoncitypaper.com/charleston/broken-
home/Content?oid=4185523; Veronica May Not Be Saved, ABC NEWS 4 (July 26, 2012), 
http://www.abcnews4.com/story/19121303/veronica-may-not-be-saved; Anderson Cooper 
360°: Baby Veronica's Story (CNN television broadcast Feb. 21, 2012); Adoption 
Controversy: Battle over Baby Veronica, DR. PHIL (June 6, 2013), https://www.drphil.com/ 
shows/1895/. 
 128. Jane Burke, Note, The “Baby Veronica” Case: Current Implementation Problems of 
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 307 (2014) (“‘Save Veronica’ has become 
a common phrase in the American South over the past year. It appears on the signs of local 
businesses, is stamped on light purple bracelets, and is the rallying cry for fundraisers, 
candlelight vigils, and cupcake sales on holidays. It is the topic of many newspaper articles 
and television news broadcasts and was recently featured on an episode of the television 
show ‘Dr. Phil’.”). 
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 Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the 
case.  
Ostensibly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether 
the ICWA’s “reasonable doubt” standard, “active efforts” requirement, and 
placement preferences were applicable to an unmarried father whose child 
was placed for adoption at birth without his consent.
130
 Nevertheless, it is 
clear from the Court’s decision that it was also moved by the adoptive 
couple’s arguments regarding the dangers of the ICWA. Like the adoptive 
couple, the Court was extremely concerned that the Act harmed Indian 
children by treating them differently from non-Indian children.
131
 This 
concern is evident in the majority’s declaration that “[i]t is undisputed that, 
had Baby Girl not been 3/256 Cherokee, Biological Father would have had 
no right to object to her adoption under South Carolina law.”
132
 It is also 
revealed in the concurrence’s statement that “[ICWA’s] requirements often 
lead to different outcomes than would result under state law. That is 
precisely what happened here.”
133
  
The Baby Girl Court worried that different outcomes meant the ICWA 
was harming Baby Girl.
134
 As a result, the Court employed a tortured 
reading of the Act to permit termination of the father’s parental rights and 
prevent him from “play[ing] his ICWA trump card at the eleventh hour to 
override the mother’s decision and the child’s best interests.”
135 
 
Baby Girl was a turning point in ICWA litigation. The case brought the 
ICWA and its “injustices” to national prominence. In addition, the Court’s 
decision and sympathy with anti-ICWA arguments emboldened the Act’s 
                                                                                                             
 129. See supra note 127. 
 130. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 646 (2013). 
 131. In the years preceding Baby Girl, ICWA advocates had worked tirelessly to 
eliminate the existing Indian family exception and, although the Court did not exactly bring 
it back, it was a reversal in the efforts to ensure the Act’s protections apply to all Indian 
parents. See, e.g., 10 OKLA. STAT. § 40.4 (2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232B.5(13) (West 
2020); see also Philip (Jay) McCarthy, Jr., The Oncoming Storm: State Indian Child Welfare 
Act Laws and the Clash of Tribal, Parental, and Child Rights, 15 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43, 55 
(2013) (describing this trend toward eliminating the EIF). 
 132. See Baby Girl, 570 U.S. at 646. 
 133. Id. at 658 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 134. Id. at 655 (“The Indian Child Welfare Act was enacted to help preserve the cultural 
identity and heritage of Indian tribes, but under the State Supreme Court's reading, the Act 
would put certain vulnerable children at a great disadvantage solely because an ancestor—
even a remote one—was an Indian.”). 
 135. Id. at 656 (majority opinion). 
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 In the years since Baby Girl, challenges to the Act have 
become more frequent and more dangerous. Constitutional objections to the 
Act are now filed yearly and, unlike earlier ICWA lawsuits, current 
challenges focus on eliminating the Act entirely.
137
 
Many of these lawsuits are brought by the Goldwater Institute, an 
organization unapologetically dedicated to eliminating the ICWA. In fact, 
since the anti-ICWA victory in Baby Girl, the Goldwater Institute has filed 
thirteen complaints challenging the Act as a form of unconstitutional racial 
discrimination.
138
 So far, nine of these suits have been unsuccessful; the 
others remain pending.
139
 However, these suits are not the only ICWA 
challenges. Goldwater’s aggressive anti-ICWA tactics have also been 
adopted by other ICWA litigants. On October 4, 2018, in Brackeen v. 
Zinke,
140
 anti-ICWA efforts finally succeeded. The Texas district court in 




The Brackeen decision was reversed on appeal and then reheard before 
an en banc panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
142
 The Fifth 
Circuit’s decision is currently pending.
143
 Still, regardless of the outcome, 
Brackeen represents a turning point in ICWA litigation. For the first time, a 
                                                                                                             
 136. In addition, tribes have had increasing success fighting the application of the good 
cause exception through the passage of state statutes which restrict the use of the good cause 
exception and most recently through the codification of the BIA guidelines into binding 
regulations. See BIA, ICWA GUIDELINES, supra note 94, at 49; see also 10 OKLA. STAT. 
§ 40.4; IOWA CODE ANN. § 232B.5(13); McCarthy, supra note 131, at 55 (describing this 
trend). 
 137. See infra notes 138–141 and accompanying text. 
 138. Bethany R. Berger, Savage Equalities, 94 WASH. L. REV. 583, 625 (2019) (citing 
Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 15, A.D. v. 
Washburn, No. 15-01259, 2016 WL 5464582 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2016); Kathryn Fort & 
Victoria Sweet, Outlier Outsiders: The ICWA Lawsuits and What Is Really Going On, 
FEDBAR.ORG (May 8, 2019, 12:16 PM), https://perma.cc/DC8T-JVDU (slideshow)). 
 139. See id. at 626. 
 140. Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (N.D. Tex. 2018). 
 141. This case was not initiated by the Goldwater Institute, but they strongly support it 
and did file an amicus brief in the Brackeen case. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Goldater [sic] 
Institute, Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (No. 4:17-cv-868-O), 
https://goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/GIs-Brief-Amicus-Curiae.pdf. 
 142. Reversed by Brackeen v. Berhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (Tex. 5th Cir.), rehearing en banc 
granted by 942 F.3d 287 (Tex. 5th Cir. 2019). 
 143. Id. 
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federal district court accepted the argument that the ICWA, as a whole, is 
harmful to Indian children and should be abolished.
144
 
E. Brackeen v. Zinke 
Brackeen was a challenge to the constitutionality of the ICWA. The 
court’s decision was based on the assumption that the Act requires different 
outcomes in ICWA and non-ICWA cases and that these differences harm 
Indian children.
145
 Such arguments are not new and, in the past, these 
concerns often led courts to create exceptions to the Act.
146
 However, the 




The specific issue in Brackeen was whether the ICWA prevented the 
Brackeens, a non-Indian couple, from adopting an Indian child when the 
child also had an Indian family wishing to adopt him.
148
 Under § 1915(a), 
the tribal couple should have been a preferred placement and received 
custody.
149
 However, the Brackeens objected.
150
 They claimed that without 
the ICWA, they would have been entitled to adopt the child.
151
 
Consequently, placement with the Indian family was both racially 
discriminatory, because the ICWA only applied to Indian children,
152
 and 
harmful, because it was contrary to state child welfare law.
153
 
                                                                                                             
 144. The district court found that “[t]he specific classification at issue in this case mirrors 
the impermissible racial classification in Rice, and is legally and factually distinguishable 
from the political classification in Mancari.” Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 533. The court 
therefore “concluded sections 1901–23 and 1951–52 of the ICWA are unconstitutional.” Id. 
at 541-42. 
 145. Id. at 528–29 (noting the difference between a case decided under ICWA compared 
with one evaluated under Texas law).. 
 146. See supra Sections II.A.1-.2 (discussing the Existing Indian Family exception and 
the Good Cause exception). 
 147. “This decision is significant for the child welfare field because the district court’s 
decision marked the first time a federal court found ICWA unconstitutional since its 
enactment more than 40 years ago.” Fifth Circuit Holds Indian Child Welfare Act Is 
Constitutional, AM. BAR ASS’N: CHILD L. PRAC. TODAY (Sept. 17, 2010), https://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/januar
y---december-2019/fifth-circuit-holds-indian-child-welfare-act-is-constitutional/. 
 148. Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 526. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 531. 
 153. Id. at 529. 
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The Brackeens’ argument that the ICWA is a form of unconstitutional 
racial discrimination should have been easily dismissed. As the government 
noted, such racial discrimination arguments were settled by the Supreme 
Court decades ago.
154
 Well-established judicial precedent supported the 
government’s argument that “Indian” is not a racial classification
155
 and that 
                                                                                                             
 154. In 1974, the Supreme Court decided Morton v. Mancari, and upheld a BIA hiring 
preference which favored Indian candidates over non-Indian ones. 417 U.S. 535 (1974). The 
Court held that the term “Indian” in this context was a political rather than racial 
classification. Id. at 553 n.24. Moreover, in the decades since Mancari was decided, this 
distinction has been repeatedly reaffirmed and also specifically held to apply to domestic 
relations. For example, in Fisher v. District Court, the Court held that the state must 
relinquish jurisdiction over and Indian adoption case because the tribe possessed exclusive 
jurisdiction. 424 U.S. 382, 390–91 (1976). The Court explained that this jurisdictional 
treatment was not due to race, but stemmed from the “quasi-sovereign status of 
the . . . [t]ribe” and was therefore constitutional. Id. at 390. The Brackeen plaintiffs argued 
that this precedent doesn’t apply and that the ICWA provisions were unconstitutional racial 
classifications. Brief of Individual Plaintiffs-Appellees at 33–34, Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d 
514 (No. 4:17-cv-868-O), 2019 WL 571398. 
 155. The court accepted the Brackeens’ argument that ICWA should be treated like the 
voter statute in Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000). Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 531–
34. However, Rice is a rare exception to the Mancari doctrine. Nevertheless, the Brackeen 
court held that ICWA had more in common with the statute at issue in Rice than the one in 
Mancari. According to the court, eligibility for tribal membership is nothing like the actual 
tribal membership at issue in Mancari. The Brackeen court held that eligibility for tribal 
membership is akin to saying, “one is an Indian child if the child is related to a tribal 
ancestor by blood” and, thus, according to the Brackeen court, is “similar to the ‘blanket 
exemption for Indians,’ which Mancari noted would raise the difficult issue of racial 
preferences.” Id. at 533. Therefore, because the Brackeen court held that ICWA uses 
ancestry as a proxy for race, it must be analyzed under strict scrutiny. The Brackeen court’s 
understanding of “eligibility” under the Act is, as a factual matter, wrong. One is not an 
“Indian child” under the statute simply by having a tribal ancestor. Such an ancestor is a 
necessary but far from sufficient condition for tribal membership. Under the Act, an “Indian 
child” is a child who is already a member of a federally recognized tribe, or one “who is 
eligible for membership and is the biological child” of a tribal member. Atwood, 
Flashpoints, supra note 89, at 608 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4)). Children who have Native 
ancestry but are neither members nor eligible for membership are not “Indian children” 
under the Act. Id. Therefore, ICWA only applies to children that have a political connection 
to a federally recognized tribe. The Act’s definition means that a child can be 100% Native 
American yet exempt from ICWA’s coverage if neither parent is an enrolled tribal member. 
See Brief for Indian Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants at 24–25, 
Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-11479), https://turtletalk. 
files.wordpress.com/2019/01/indian-law-scholars-amicus-as-filed.pdf (noting that by 
omitting the part of the definition that requires children eligible for membership to have a 
biological parent who is a “member of an Indian tribe,” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4)(b) (emphasis 
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the designation “Indian” as used in the Act is a political, and not racial, 
classification.
156
 Based on this precedent, the government correctly noted 
that laws singling out Indians are permissible as long as it can be 
demonstrated that such laws are “rationally” related to “the fulfillment of 
Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians.”
157
 In addition, the 
government also pointed out that numerous court decisions had rejected the 
Brackeens’ specific claim that the ICWA is unconstitutional race 
discrimination,
158
 and that there was nothing in the facts of the Brackeen 
case to distinguish it from these previous challenges.
159
 In fact, the only 
                                                                                                             
added), the court lopped off the part of the statute that plants it firmly on the “political” side 
of Mancari’s distinction). The district court therefore incorrectly concluded that ICWA’s 
distinction was based on “blood” rather than political membership. Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 
425–29. The comparison with Rice is also incorrect. The Rice Court refused to extend 
Mancari in that case because it would have permitted the State, “by racial classification, to 
fence out whole classes of its citizens from decisionmaking in critical state affairs.” Rice, 
528 U.S. at 522. In contrast, as Atwood notes, the ICWA 
is designed precisely to benefit Indian children as tribal members and to protect 
tribal survival by ensuring the prominence of the tribe’s voice in child welfare 
proceedings. Unlike the scheme involved in Rice, tribal self-government is 
directly served by the jurisdictional and procedural protections afforded tribes 
under the Act. So long as the Act’s key definition of “Indian child” remains 
intact, the constitutionality would seem secure, even when applied to cases 
involving children whose families have not maintained meaningful affiliation 
with their tribes. 
Atwood, Flashpoints, supra note 89, at 632. 
 156. Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 427; Mancari, 417 U.S. 535. 
 157. Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 531 (citing Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554–55). 
 158. The district court first held that ICWA’s preference to place Indian children in 
Indian homes is race-based, and under “strict scrutiny” review, the law is not narrowly 
tailored to further a compelling government interest. Id. at 534. The district court held that 
ICWA, therefore, violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause. Id. This holding ignores well-established Supreme Court precedent 
regarding American Indian tribes as political entities, not racial groups, to which the federal 
government owes a unique trust responsibility. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554–55. It is also 
noteworthy that just one year earlier, the Supreme Court declined to review the argument 
that ICWA is a race-based law, resulting in the upholding of an Arizona Court of Appeals’ 
decision that ICWA is not based on race. See S.S. v. Stephanie H., 388 P.3d 569, 576 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. S.S. v. Colo. River Indian Tribes, 138 S. Ct. 380 
(2017). 
 159. In its decision, the court also held the ICWA was unconstitutional because it 
violated the anti-commandeering clause of the constitution by making the states implement 
ICWA. However, although this argument has not been made before in the ICWA context, it 
is also easily dismissed. As the Fifth Circuit noted, long-standing constitutional precedent 
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The Brackeen decision rejected long-accepted arguments that the quasi-
sovereign status of Indian tribes permits the different treatment of Indian 
children and that this different treatment is beneficial. It showed that such 
claims are now being met with judicial skepticism and disbelief and that the 
traditional defenses of the Act are no longer sufficient. Consequently, to 
ensure the ICWA’s future, the argument that the Act is a justifiable 
exception to normally applicable child welfare law needs to be discarded. 
Instead of defending the ICWA’s differences from state and federal child 
welfare law, future defenses of the Act must emphasize its similarities.
161
  
The remainder of this Article argues that the alleged differences between 
ICWA and non-ICWA cases are much greater than the actual differences. 
Today, state welfare policies favoring quick separations and terminations 
are being replaced with practices that closely align with the ICWA. Future 
ICWA advocacy must highlight these similarities and work to increase 
them. The strongest argument in favor of the ICWA is not that it is good for 
Indian families, but that its policies are good for all families. 
  
                                                                                                             
gives congress the right to pass laws and have state courts and agencies enforce them. See 
Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 431 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178–79 
(1992) (“Federal statutes enforceable in state courts do, in a sense, direct state judges to 
enforce them, but this sort of federal ‘direction’ of state judges is mandated by the text of the 
Supremacy Clause.”)). 
 160. This is not to concede any argument that potential differences are unconstitutional. 
In fact, even harmful differences would be constitutional, but such arguments are not 
winning the war of public opinion. In addition to the above line of Indian law cases, there 
are also strong constitutional arguments that different treatment, even potentially harmful 
treatment is constitutional under Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Burt v. Oneida 
Community, 33 N.E. 307 (N.Y. 1893), Smith v. Community Board No.14, 491 N.Y.S.2d 584 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); and recognized by the New York legislature in Board of Education of 
Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). Glen O. Robinson, 
Communities, 83 VA. L. REV. 269, 342 (1997) (“The accommodation of distinctive 
communities is an essential part of what it means to be a liberal society. This tenet has been 
central to the spirit of American pluralism from the founding of the Republic to the present. 
On this principle there is no apparent basis for distinguishing between Indians and, say, 
Amish, or Orthodox Jews.”). 
 161. See infra Part III. 
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III. ICWA’s Shrinking Difference 
Equal protection challenges to the ICWA, such as those made in 
Brackeen, are premised on the assumption that Indian and non-Indian 
children are being treated differently, and that this different treatment is 
race-based and harmful. In addressing these arguments, ICWA advocates 
contend that such differences are both constitutionally permissible and 
beneficial. To support these arguments, many note the Act’s similarities 
with current child welfare practices,
162





 However, such arguments don’t go far enough. To 
change the current perception that the ICWA is harmful, the Act’s 
defenders must address directly the accusation of difference. They must 
show that the similarities between the Act and current child welfare law are 




After the passage of the ASFA, the difference between ICWA and non-
ICWA cases was significant; thus, for many years, a claim of similarity 
would have been incorrect. This is no longer the case. Rapid changes to 
child welfare law and policy have eliminated many of the former 
differences between ICWA and non-ICWA cases and recognizing these 
changes is crucial to defending the Act. The growing alignment between 
ICWA and non-ICWA cases means it is now easier to refute equal 
protection challenges and the argument that the Act harms Indian children.  
As discussed in Part II, the ICWA provisions that appear to differ the 
most from state law are the burden of proof for termination, the need for 
                                                                                                             
 162. See, e.g., Brief of Casey Family Programs and 30 Other Organizations Working 
with Children, Families, and Courts to Support Children’s Welfare as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Appellants at 4, Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-
11479), https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/caseyamicusbrief.pdf (“Undoing the 
careful work Congress has done to enact ICWA standards—which are grounded in best-
practices for all children—would cause enormous harm to Indian children and undermine the 
ability of child welfare agencies and courts to serve them.”). 
 163. Id. at 9–10 (noting that all but two states give relative preference and such 
preference is widely accepted as best for children who have to be removed from their 
families). 
 164. Id. at 9 (“[The] most frequent guiding principle in state statutes for determining a 
child’s best interests is the ‘importance of family integrity and preference for avoiding 
removal of the child from his/her home.’”) (quoting CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, 
DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 2 (2016)). 
 165. One of the benefits of this approach is it would also permit ICWA’s defenders to 
sidestep the question of whether Indians are a political or racial group. 
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expert testimony, the level of remedial efforts required, and the placement 
preferences. Upon closer examination, these apparent differences largely 
disappear. 
A. Different Burdens of Proofs 
The ICWA requires a higher standard of proof for the termination of 
Indian parents’ rights than required under state law. Specifically, under the 
ICWA, parental rights may not be terminated without a showing beyond a 
reasonable doubt “that the continued custody of the child by the parent or 
Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage 
to the child.”
166
 Conversely, most states only require clear and convincing 
evidence that remaining with the parent is not in the child’s best interest 
before permitting the termination of parental rights. At first glance, this 
seems to be a significant difference, but this difference is illusory. Many 
state termination cases employ a higher termination standard than clear and 
convincing, while many ICWA cases are decided under a standard lower 
than reasonable doubt.  
1. Reinstatement of Parental Rights 
In the decades since the ASFA’s passage, many states acknowledged that 
the ASFA’s termination standard, which permits termination when a child 
has been in state care for fifteen out of the previous twenty-two months, is 
too lax.
167
 To remedy this problem, these states enacted statutes permitting 
the reinstatement of parental rights after termination.
168
 In 2005, California 
                                                                                                             
 166. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f). 
 167. Scholars have also argued for a higher termination standard, arguing to establish a 
higher threshold “before terminating parental rights,” specifically a showing that child will 
be adopted. See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the 
Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care—An Empirical Analysis in Two 
States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121, 135 (1995) (“[E]ven when preconditions to termination have been 
proven by clear and convincing evidence, parental rights should not be terminated if reasons 
exist to maintain the parent/child relationship. Termination of parental rights should only be 
ordered upon a specific showing that termination is necessary to promote the child’s 
welfare.”); see also Kirstin Andreasen, Eliminating the Legal Orphan Problem, 16 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 351, 353 (2007); Stephanie Smith Ledesma, The Vanishing of the 
African-American Family: “Reasonable Efforts” and Its Connection To the 
Disproportionality of the Child Welfare System, 9 CHARLESTON L. REV. 29, 71 (2014) 
(suggesting that ICWA’s clear and convincing standard of removal should be applied to all 
removal cases). 
 168. Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113, 150 (2013) 
(“The impetus behind reinstatement statutes is largely uniform: they are an attempt to 
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was the first state to enact such legislation;
169
 other states soon followed. 
Currently, eighteen states have statutes permitting “rehabilitated” biological 
parents to resume or assume parenting responsibilities for their children 
after their parental rights were legally terminated.
170
 Many of the cases 
deemed appropriate for reinstatement are cases that would not have resulted 
in termination under a higher evidentiary standard. 
In her article, The Sky Is Not Falling: Lessons and Recommendations 
from Ten Years of Reinstating Parental Rights, Professor Meredith L. 
Schalick groups parental-rights reinstatement cases into three categories. 
The first involves hard-to-locate parents. In these cases, parental rights are 
terminated when a child has been removed to state care and the non-
custodial parent cannot be quickly located.
171
 For example, Professor 
Schalick describes a particularly illustrative case involving a child who lost 
contact with his father following the mother’s relocation to a new state.
172
 
The child was later removed from his mother due to neglect.
173
 Child 
welfare officials then attempted to locate the father as a potential placement 
and, when they failed to find him, his parental rights were terminated.
174
 
Several years later, through the use of social media, the child found his 
father.
175
 The child’s lawyer then filed a successful petition to reinstate the 
father’s rights.
176
 By reinstating the father’s rights, the court acknowledged 
that termination had not been in the child’s best interest and, in effect, 
retroactively increased the applicable termination standard. 
The second category of reinstatement cases involves children living with 
relatives, who continue to maintain contact with a parent despite the 
termination of the parent’s rights.
177
 In these cases, the children seek to 
return to their parent’s custody after their relative caregiver becomes unable 
                                                                                                             
address the large number of legal orphans created by the increase in terminations under 
ASFA.”). 
 169. CAL.WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(i)(3) (2017).. 
 170. For a complete list of states, see Meredith L. Schalick, The Sky Is Not Falling: 
Lessons and Recommendations from Ten Years of Reinstating Parental Rights, 51 FAM. L.Q. 
219, 220–21 (2017). 
 171. Id. at 226. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 226-27. 
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to care for them, usually due to illness.
178
 Typically, the court then 
reinstates the parent’s rights based on the fact that the child and parent 
maintained their relationship despite termination.
179
 By reinstating the 
parent’s rights, these courts acknowledge that termination was not in the 




The third category of reinstatement cases involves teenagers who are 
unlikely to be adopted and wish to maintain a relationship or reengage with 
their biological parents. Courts reinstating parental rights in these cases 
recognize that, although a child may not be able to return to his or her 
parent’s care, he or she can still benefit from resuming a legal relationship 
with the parents and extended family. Like the previous two categories of 
cases, these reinstatement cases acknowledge the problems with speedy 




States that address the above situations through the enactment of 
reinstatement statutes
182
 are, in effect, retroactively raising the applicable 
termination standard.
183
 Reinstatement statutes bring state termination 
policy closer to the ICWA’s policy by recognizing that the clear and 
convincing termination standard may be inadequate to protect children from 
the significant harm caused by the loss of the parental relationship. 
                                                                                                             
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. In one such example, 
parental rights were reinstated for the biological mother of her client who had 
an emancipation goal but who was living with the maternal grandmother in a 
kinship foster care home. The grandmother was diagnosed with cancer and 
became very ill. Because the biological mother had been seeing the child 
several times a year for family holiday celebrations already, the court agreed 
that reinstatement of parental rights was appropriate. 
Id. at 227. 
 181. Id. at 227–28. 
 182. Until recently, most states barred biological parents from seeking to adopt their 
children after the termination of their parental rights. Paula Polasky, Customary Adoptions 
for Non-Indian Children: Borrowing from Tribal Traditions to Encourage Permanency for 
Legal Orphans Through Bypassing Termination of Parental Rights, 30 LAW & INEQ. 401, 
410 (2012) (“This would mean that if parental rights were terminated and the adoption of the 
child failed, the birth parents would be barred from re-adopting their own child.”). 
 183. They are also moving closer to the tribal conception of the parent child relationship 
which is the belief that the “natural parent-child relationship as something the court cannot 
permanently and legally sever.” Id. at 410–11. 
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2. EIF and Baby Girl 
Reinstatement statutes reveal how states are raising their terminations 
statutes above a clear and convincing standard. At the same time, ICWA 
exceptions—such as the former EIF and good faith doctrines, and current 
exceptions, such as that created in Baby Girl—illustrate how states are 
often able to avoid the ICWA’s reasonable doubt standard.
184
 As Teresa 
Legere notes, “Because the evidentiary standard is so high, one might 
conclude that the Indian families are adequately protected. The reality, 
however, is that many state courts have created exceptions to the ICWA 




When such exceptions apply, parental rights terminations occur under 
the clear and convincing standard.
186
 However, exceptions are not the only 
way this lower standard is applied to an ICWA case. Even without an 
applicable exception, many courts still apply the lower clear and convincing 
evidentiary standard to ICWA cases. For example, in the Michigan case In 
re Lee,
187
 an Indian mother argued that the court terminated her rights based 
on “anticipatory neglect” and that this did not meet the ICWA’s reasonable 
                                                                                                             
 184. Scholars have noted the similarities between the Baby Girl exception. See, e.g., 
Courtney Hodge, Note, Is the Indian Child Welfare Act Losing Steam?: Narrowing Non-
Custodial Parental Rights After Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 7 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 191, 
229 (2016) (noting “how the analysis in [Baby Girl] is very similar to the logic used in the 
Existing Indian Family Exception cases”); Kelsey Vujnich, Comment, A Brief Overview of 
the Indian Child Welfare Act, State Court Responses, and Actions Taken in the Past Decade 
to Improve Implementation Outcomes, 26 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 183, 205 (2013) 
(“[T]he [Baby Girl] Court essentially agrees with the ‘existing Indian family’ doctrine.”). 
However, the EIF, and the exceptions carved out in Baby Girl are different thus, the Baby 
Girl exceptions continue despite the elimination of the EIF exception. See, e.g., Zug, supra 
note 93 (explaining why Baby Girl is not an affirmation of the EIF doctrine but creates its 
own unique exceptions); see also Joshua B. Fischman, Politics and Authority in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1513, 1578 (2019) (“[The] majority carved out two 
narrow exceptions to ICWA in cases where the Indian parent had not previously had custody 
of the child.”). 
 185. Theresa D. Legere, Note, Preventing Judicially Mandated Orphans, 38 FAM. & 
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 260, 269 (2000). 
 186. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 650 (2013) (finding the ICWA 
termination standard inapplicable because the child was not being removed from the father’s 
continued custody and thus state termination standards applied.) 
 187. Lee v. Lee (In re Lee), No. 283038, 2008 WL 4603740 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 
2008), aff’d sub nom. JL v. Lee (In re JL), 770 N.W.2d 853 (Mich. 2009). 
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 The Michigan Supreme Court agreed that anticipatory 
neglect would not meet the ICWA standard.
189
 Yet, it upheld the 
termination based on the mother’s “lack of maturity” which, as the 




State court non-compliance with the ICWA, such as that demonstrated in 
In re Lee, is both common and ongoing.
191
 There are numerous, well-
documented instances of courts refusing to comply with the Act.
192
 For 
example, in 2015, two South Dakota Indian tribes sued the state of South 
Dakota for violating the ICWA.
193
 The case revealed that the removal rate 
for South Dakota’s Indian children was over 80%.
194
 In addition, it was 
shown that one particularly egregious judge had an Indian child removal 
rate of 100%.
195
 Such cases demonstrate that many parental rights 
termination decisions are being made using a standard far below reasonable 
doubt. 
                                                                                                             
 188. Id. at *22. 
 189. In re JL, 770 N.W.2d 853, 870 (Mich. 2009). 
 190. Id. at 874–77 (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the 
majority’s termination decision). 
 191. See Atwood, Flashpoints, supra note 89, at 587 (“By some accounts the Act has 
been the victim of entrenched state court hostility ever since its enactment more than two 
decades ago.”).  
 192. See Bethany R. Berger, In the Name of the Child: Race, Gender, and Economics in 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 67 FLA. L. REV. 295, 301–10 (2015) (“Studies have 
found widespread noncompliance with ICWA. Some of this non-compliance is due to 
ignorance or carelessness, but there is evidence that it is also part of a common technique to 
facilitate private adoptions of Indian children by non-Indians.”). 
 193. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik, 100 F. Supp. 3d 749, 753, 757 (D.S.D. 2015). 
 194. Marcia Zug, Traditional Problems: How Tribal Same-Sex Marriage Bans Threaten 
Tribal Sovereignty, 43 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 761, 796 n.206 (2017) (citing  
Laura Sullivan, Native American Tribes Win Child Welfare Case in South Dakota, NPR 
(Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/31/396636927/native-american-tribes-win-
child-welfare-case-in-south-dakota). Sullivan notes that in South Dakota, “[m]ore than 80 
percent of native children are placed in white foster homes” and that “[o]ne of the biggest 
complaints of native families who lost children is that they were never allowed to present 
their side.” Sullivan, supra. 
 195. See, e.g., Judge in South Dakota Sanctioned in Indian Child Welfare Act Case, 
INDIANZ (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.indianz.com/News/2016/04/18/judge-in-south-dakota-
sanction.asp (noting Judge Davis “rule[d] against tribes and Indian guardians in 100 percent 
of the cases involving Indian children”); see also Oglala Sioux Tribe, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 
753–54, 757.  
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The irony of the widespread non-compliance with the ICWA’s 
reasonable doubt standard is that, despite the complaint that the ICWA’s 
termination standard is too high, it is likely too low. If there is a difference 
in termination standards between ICWA and non-ICWA cases, it is that 
Indian parents are more likely than non-Indian parents to have their rights 
terminated.
196
 Despite the seemingly higher evidentiary standard required 
under the ICWA, cases such as those out of South Dakota reveal that many 
Indian families do not even receive the protection of the clear and 
convincing standard applicable in non-ICWA cases. 
B. Remedial Services 
The second seeming difference between ICWA and non-ICWA cases 
concerns the provision of remedial services. Under the ICWA, a state is 
required to employ “active efforts” to prevent the break-up of an Indian 
family. In non-ICWA cases, the standard is “reasonable efforts.” 
“Reasonable efforts” is viewed as a lower standard that is deemed satisfied 
when a family is referred to remedial services.
197
 In contrast, the term 
“active efforts” is typically defined as significant assistance provided 
                                                                                                             
 196. The actual termination rates for Indian parents is often much higher than for non-
Indian parents. See Elizabeth MacLachlan, Comment, Tensions Underlying the Indian Child 
Welfare Act: Tribal Jurisdiction over Traditional State Court Family Law Matters, 2018 
BYU L. REV. 455, 487 (“In February 2015, former assistant secretary of Indian Affairs 
Kevin Washburn announced that the BIA had published revised ICWA guidelines to protect 
the rights of Indian families and children under the Act and to prevent the breakup of Indian 
families and destruction of tribes. Washburn stated that these updates have become 
necessary due to the continued noncompliance of ICWA by state and federal courts.”). 
 197. See In re Brianna C., 912 A.2d 505, 512 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (“While the 
department, perhaps, didn't do everything that it reasonably could have done to prevent 
removal from the home, the court is satisfied that the department did make reasonable 
efforts, not all efforts, not all that perhaps should have been done, but made reasonable 
efforts to prevent removal from the home.”) (quoting the trial court order) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200, 204 (R.I. 1989) (“This court does 
not expect the impossible from the various agencies that deal with child protection and 
placement. Nor shall we burden the agency with the additional responsibility of holding the 
hand of a recalcitrant parent.”) (citation omitted); Jeanne M. Kaiser, Finding A Reasonable 
Way to Enforce the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Child Protection Cases, 7 RUTGERS 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 100, 116 (2009) (“[In Massachusetts] [t]he Appeals Court has also made 
it clear that the Department's efforts are limited to linking parents to existing services and 
that it is not required to fill the gaps in available services on its own. In fact, the Department 
is not even required to look very hard for available services and instead can rely on an expert 
opinion asserting that there are no services that would fill a particular need of a parent.”). 
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directly to families by case workers and agencies.
198
 Using these 
definitions, there is a clear difference between the terms “active efforts” and 
“reasonable efforts,”
199
 yet courts and welfare workers are increasingly 
discarding the traditional definition of reasonable efforts in favor of one 
more akin to active efforts.
200
 Moreover, as the trend toward family 
preservation continues, any remaining difference between the two standards 
should disappear.  
1. Case Law on Reasonable Efforts 
The Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) directs states to make 
“reasonable efforts” to prevent the removal of children from their families 
and to effectuate their return home as quickly as possible.
201
 However, 
“reasonable efforts” is not defined.
202
 Consequently, states are free to 
determine what constitutes “reasonable efforts.”
203
 More importantly, they 
                                                                                                             
 198. See GAO, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT, supra note 78, at 39 (describing that active 
efforts under the ICWA often includes “extra assistance” such as help with transportation, 
providing culturally sensitive hearings or spending more time attempting reunification). 
 199. See Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State’s Burden 
Under Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 259, 302 (2003) 
(discussing how states define reasonable efforts). 
 200. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 201. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A)–(B)(ii). 
 202. As the Department of Health and Human Services detailed in its Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking regarding ASFA, the lack of definition regarding the term “reasonable efforts” 
was deliberate. 63 Fed. Reg. 50058, 50073 (1998). It explained: 
During our consultation with the field, some recommended that we define 
reasonable efforts in implementing the ASFA. We do not intend to define 
“reasonable efforts.” To do so would be a direct contradiction of the intent of 
the law. The statute requires that reasonable efforts determinations be made on 
a case-by-case basis. We think any regulatory definition would either limit the 
courts’ ability to make determinations on a case-by-case basis or be so broad as 
to be ineffective. In the absence of a definition, courts may entertain actions 
such as the following in determining whether reasonable efforts were 
made . . . . 
Id. 
 203. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-301(10) (West 2015); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.086 
(West 2015); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 39.521(1)(f) (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-292 (West 2009); MINN. STAT. § 
260.012(b) (2020); N.Y. SOC. SERV. L. § 384-b (McKinney 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2151.419 (West 2015); 10A OKLA. STAT. § 1-4-808 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-
102(1)(A) (West 2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-440 (West 2015). 
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are free to define it similarly or even identically to “active efforts.”
204
 Some 
states, such as California and Colorado, have done so explicitly
205
 while 
many others claim the two terms are different, yet treat them the same in 
practice.
206
 For example, in In re RJF,
207
 the Montana Supreme Court 
explained that, “[t]o meet its requirements to provide reasonable efforts, the 
[child welfare] Department must in good faith develop and implement 
voluntary services plans and treatment plans designed to preserve the 
parent-child relationship and the family unit.”
208
 Additionally, the court 
stated that the department must abide by its own “policy to provide ‘the 
child maximum opportunity for visits with his/her birth parents while 
services are provided to the family.’”
209
 Lastly, it explained that “the 
Department must, in good faith, assist a parent in completing his or her 
voluntary services and treatment plan.”.
210
 
In Dunlap v. Department of Family Services (In re B.A.D.), the 
Wyoming Supreme Court also articulated a rigorous “reasonable efforts” 
                                                                                                             
 204. Bob Friend & Kelly Beck, How “Reasonable Efforts” Leads to Emotional and 
Legal Permanence, 45 CAP. U. L. REV. 249, 274 (2017) (“Allowing the court to determine 
reasonable efforts on a case-by-case basis leaves room for these types of innovative practices 
to be utilized prior to the time of removal and at the same time as reunification services are 
being offered, in order to better ensure permanency for the child.”). 
 205. See Adoption of Hannah S. v. Walter S., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 605, 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006); see also People ex rel. K.D., 155 P.3d 634, 637 (Colo. App. 2007); see also Scanlon, 
supra note 198, at 630 (“States like California and Colorado treat active efforts the same as 
‘reasonable efforts,’ the standard used in proceedings that do not involve the ICWA.”). 
 206. For example, in In re Eden F., 741 A.2d 873 (Conn. 1999), the Connecticut trial 
court’s reasonable efforts determinations likely met the ASFA standard. However, the 
termination was reversed because Connecticut’s appellate courts have defined reasonable 
efforts in a manner that exceeds minimal federal requirements. To satisfy Connecticut’s 
reasonable efforts requirement, the court must prove through “clear and convincing 
evidence” that reasonable efforts were provided and this evidence must include significant 
detail about the nature of services and the specific party (parent, child, or other person) 
receiving those services. In re Eden F., 710 A.2d 771, 785–86 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998), rev’d, 
741 A.2d 873 (Conn. 1999). 
 207. In re R.J.F., 2019 MT 113, 395 Mont. 454, 443 P.3d 387; see also In re Welfare of 
Children of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (“‘Reasonable efforts’ at 
rehabilitation are services that ‘go beyond mere matters of form so as to include real, 
genuine assistance.’”) (quoting In re Welfare of H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1990)). 
 208. In re R.J.F., 2019 MT 113, ¶ 28. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
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standard more akin to active efforts.
211
 Specifically, the court noted that 
“reasonable efforts” must “go beyond mere matters of form, such as the 
scheduling of appointments, so as to include real, genuine help to see that 
all things are done that might conceivably improve the circumstances of the 
parent and the relationship of the parent with the child.”
212
  
Legal scholars note the substantial overlap between reasonable and 
active efforts requirements. For example, in his article “Active” Versus 
“Reasonable” Efforts: The Duties to Reunify the Family Under the Indian 
Child Welfare Act and the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Statutes, Mark 
Andrews examined over 500 Alaskan cases involving families facing 
parental rights termination and found that, regardless of whether the cases 
were ICWA or non-ICWA, the efforts requirement was the same.
213
 
According to Andrews, “the Alaska Supreme Court has applied a single 
standard fairly consistently over the past quarter century.”
214
 Andrews 
concludes that it is “[t]he court’s failure to succinctly articulate” that there 
is only one standard that “has created an appearance of uncertainty where it 
does not exist.”
215
 A 2005 report by the U.S. Government and 
Accountability Office also remarked on the shrinking difference between 
these two standards.
216
 According to the report, state child welfare officials 
noted that “the level of services offered to the general child welfare 
population has been increasing, blurring the line between active efforts and 
the ‘reasonable efforts’ states are required to provide to all families whose 




                                                                                                             
 211. 2019 WY 83, ¶ 37, 446 P.3d 222, 232 (Wyo. 2019). 
 212. Id. A number of states use the term “diligent efforts.” See, e.g., In re Zyrrius Q., 161 
A.D.3d 1233, 1233–34 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018), leave denied, 109 N.E.3d 1156 (N.Y. 2018); 
see also In re Cordell M., 150 A.D.3d 1424, 1425 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017); Tyler K. v. State, 
No. S-16310, 2017 WL 464380, at *4 (Alaska Feb. 1, 2017) (“‘[R]easonable efforts’ must 
include locating support services to assist the parent, referring the parent to those services 
where available, and documenting its efforts.”). See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-
533(B)(8)–(11) (2014); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§ 2151.414(E)(1) (West 2016) (requiring 
“diligent efforts,” rather than “reasonable efforts”). 
 213. Mark Andrews, “Active” Versus “Reasonable” Efforts: The Duties to Reunify the 
Family Under the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Statutes, 19 
ALASKA L. REV. 85 (2002). 
 214. Id. at 116. 
 215. Id. 
 216. GAO, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT, supra note 78, at 37. 
 217. Id. 
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2. Differential Response 
The difference between active and reasonable efforts is disappearing as 
state child welfare agencies increasingly implement policies requiring a 
higher level of reunification services similar to the active efforts 
requirement under the ICWA. One of the most important of these policies is 
“differential response.” The purpose of differential response is to provide 
families involved in the child welfare system, but considered low-risk for 
child maltreatment, an alternate pathway for achieving reunification.
218
 
Families that choose differential response work cooperatively with the state 
child welfare department to develop a family assessment and service plan to 
address their needs and the needs of their children.
219
 The goal of 
differential response is to provide as many services as possible to keep 
families together.
220
 Differential response programs recognize that families 
may have multiple needs and attempt to meet these needs through better 




So far, the results of differential response programs are positive.
222
 
Recent studies of families in these programs confirm they receive greater 
                                                                                                             
 218. See Cynthia Godsoe, Just Intervention: Differential Response in Child Protection, 
21 J.L. & POL’Y 73, 74 (2012). 
 219. CASEY FAM. SERVS., CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 
DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE SYSTEM (2010), https://business.ct.gov/-/media/DCF/DRS/pdf/ 
CFSExecutiveReportDRSFinalReprintpdf.pdf. 
 220. Services can include 
 . . . financial assistance, food stamps, food banks, clothing closets, diaper 
banks, utilities assistance, transitional and subsidized housing, furniture, 
health care, public benefits enrollment, and coordination; 
$ Mental health (chronic, situational, trauma-informed); 
$ Alcohol and drug abuse treatment; 
$ Employment and training assistance; 
$ Child care (drop-in, after school, special needs, hours to accommodate 
shift workers) 
$ Transportation; 
$ Parenting education and skill development/life coaching and mentoring; 
$ Parent leadership, peer support, parent advocacy; 
$ Social supports, enrichment, and recreational activities; and 
$ Legal services. 
Id. at 10. 
 221. Id. at 4–8. 
 222. Id. at 6. 
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services and feel more satisfied and involved in the process.
223
 Studies also 
indicate that differential response families experienced fewer repeat reports 
of child maltreatment and fewer out-of-home placements.
224
  
In 2010, the success of differential response programs garnered the 
attention of Congress. In its reauthorization of the Child Abuse Prevention 
and Treatment Act (CAPTA),
225
 Congress specifically encouraged states to 
adopt differential response.
226
 The CAPTA mandates that states adopt 
“triage procedures, including the use of differential response, for the 
appropriate referral of a child not at risk of imminent harm to a community 
organization or voluntary preventive service.”
227
  
Given the success and encouragement of differential response programs, 
it is not surprising that a majority of states have implemented these 
programs as part of their child welfare policy.
228
 In fact, one comprehensive 
analysis of differential response described it as “one of the more widely 
replicated child welfare reform efforts in recent history.”
229
 Consequently, 
more and more families are receiving heightened reunification services, and 
the number should continue to grow.
230
 
3. Federal Encouragement of “Active Efforts” 
The CAPTA’s encouragement of differential response was not the only 
way the federal government has sought to increase services for families at 
risk of child removal or parental rights termination. Most notably, in 
February of 2018, Congress passed the Family First Prevention Services 
Act (FFPSA) and made federal foster care funds available for preventive 
services.
231
 Specifically, the FFPSA “reforms the federal child welfare 
                                                                                                             
 223. Id. 
 224. See id. 
 225. CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-320, 124 Stat. 3459.  
 226. Id. § 115, 124 Stat. at 3467-70.  
 227. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(v). 
 228. Houston, supra note 12, at 36. A number of states have created pilot programs. For 
example, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Washington, and Hawaii all have statewide 
programs. Godsoe, supra note 218, at 75. In March 2019, Connecticut began a pilot program 
in certain counties and New York City is also set to begin one soon. Id. 
 229. Bartholet, Differential Response, supra note 12, at 575.  
 230. Studies indicate that provision of significant services is among the reunification 
approaches that are the most effective. See Kaiser, supra note 197, at 136–37. However, it 
should be noted that studies of reunification service are limited. Id. at 136. 
 231. Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 232 (2018) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.) (title VII of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 64). 
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financing streams, Titles IV-E and IV-B of the Social Security Act, to 
provide services to families who are at risk of entering the child welfare 
system.”
232 
Such services include reimbursement for mental health services, 
substance abuse prevention and treatment, and parenting skills training.
233
 
Under the FFPSA, states can receive reimbursement for providing up to 
twelve months of prevention services.
234
 The FFPSA allows other program 
funds “to be used for unlimited family reunification services for children in 
foster care,”
235
 and it permits an additional fifteen months of family 




The CAPTA and the FFPSA reflect an overall shift in federal policy 
away from speedy terminations and, once again, toward family 
preservation. In July of 2018, Associate Commissioner of the Children’s 
Bureau at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), 
Jerry Milner, wrote an editorial for the ABA encouraging this change and 
advocating for the return to a family-centered approach to child welfare.
237
 
                                                                                                             
 232. Sarah Katz, Trauma-Informed Practice: The Future of Child Welfare?, 28 WIDENER 
COMMONWEALTH L. REV. 51, 81 (2019); see Family First Prevention Services Act §§ 50711-
50713, 50721-50723, 132 Stat. at 232-51. 
 233. Katz, supra note 232, at 81 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 671(e)(1)). 
 234. Family First Prevention Services Act §§ 50712, 132 Stat. at 244. Moreover, states 
may only be reimbursed for children placed in group care settings for more than two weeks. 
Fabiola Villalpando, Family First Prevention Services Act: An Overhaul of National Child 
Welfare Policies, 39 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 283, 285 (2019) (“Beginning in 2020, Title IV-E 
reimbursements for group homes will only be available for two weeks unless a child is in a 
qualified residential treatment program . . . .”). 
 235. Children’s Def. Fund, The Family First Prevention Services Act: Historic Reforms 
to the Child Welfare System Will Improve Outcomes for Vulnerable Children 2 (Feb. 2018), 
https://www.childrensdefense.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ffpsa-short-summary.pdf. 
These funds come from the Promoting Safe and Stable Families Program. See CHILDREN’S 
BUREAU, PROMOTING SAFE AND STABLE FAMILIES 2 (n.d.), https://library.childwelfare. 
gov/cwig/ws/library/docs/capacity/Blob/105742.pdf?r=1&rpp=10&upp=0&w=+NATIVE%
28%27recno%3D105742%27%29&m=1. 
 236. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 235, at 5. 
 237. Jerry Milner, Reshaping Child Welfare in the United States: Lawyers as Partners in 
Prevention, AM. BAR ASS’N: CHILD L. PRAC. TODAY (July 4, 2018), https://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/januar
y-december-2018/reshaping-child-welfare-in-the-united-states--lawyers-as-partner/ (“[T]he 
evidence is clear that child welfare in the United States needs a radical transformation in its 
funding, programs, and its definition of what child welfare can and should achieve. Too 
often, we use foster care as our primary intervention to protect children, and lack the 
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Milner advocated for this return as a way to prevent “the unnecessary 
removal of children from their homes[.]”
238
 In particular, Milner noted the 
importance of increased services to families, stating the DHHS believes 
“services that strengthen critical protective factors should be available to all 
families, in their communities, when families need and desire 
assistance.”
239
 A few months later, “in November [of] 2018, the Children’s 
Bureau issued an information memorandum to ‘strongly encourage’ child 
protective agencies to focus more on preventive efforts.”
240
  
Due to changing state and federal child welfare policy, non-Indian 
children are increasingly receiving family reunification services akin to the 
ICWA’s active efforts requirement. This change undermines the anti-ICWA 
argument that applying active efforts to Indian families means Indian 
children are treated differently and worse than non-Indian children. 
Receiving a high level of reunification services is now viewed as good for 
all children. Consequently, it is the families that only receive reasonable 
efforts that now have the strongest claim of harm. 
C. Sources of Proof 
The third frequently cited difference between ICWA and non-ICWA 
cases is that the ICWA requires the testimony of an expert in Indian culture. 
Originally, one of the main problems the ICWA sought to alleviate was the 
                                                                                                             
flexibility in funding and services to respond to families’ needs before they are in crisis and 
harm to children has occurred.”). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. In a different editorial, Jerry Milner and David Kelly, who is Special Assistant to 
the Associate Commissioner/Child Welfare Program Specialist for Court Improvement at the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, called on attorneys for children and parents 
to be “active voices for preventing the trauma of unnecessary family separation in and out of 
the courtroom” and “[a]dvocat[e] vigorously for reasonable efforts to be made to prevent 
removal or for a finding that reasonable efforts have not been made to prevent removal when 
that is the situation.” Jerry Milner & David Kelly, Reasonable Efforts as Prevention, AM. 
BAR ASS’N: CHILD L. PRAC. TODAY (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/public_interest/child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/january-december-
2018/reasonable-efforts-as-prevention/. 
 240. Stephanie K. Glaberson, Coding over the Cracks: Predictive Analytics and Child 
Protection, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 307, 362 (2019); see ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMS., U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., LOG NO. ACYF-CB-IM-18-05, RESHAPING CHILD 
WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES TO FOCUS ON STRENGTHENING FAMILIES THROUGH PRIMARY 
PREVENTION OF CHILD MALTREATMENT AND UNNECESSARY PARENT-CHILD SEPARATION 
(2018), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/im1805.pdf.  
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removal of children due to biases about Indian parenting.
241
 The purpose of 
the expert testimony was to provide a cultural perspective on an Indian 
parent’s actions and prevent cultural bias from causing unwarranted 
interference with the parent-child relationship.
242
 Today, the expert’s role is 
still to prevent biased removals from occurring but, increasingly, this 
testimony is also used to ensure the child is placed in an environment that 
meets their cultural needs and provides exposure and connection to their 
Indian heritage.
243
 In many cases, this objective means the expert is asked 
to testify as to whether the placement of an Indian child in a non-Indian 
home can meet these needs.
244
  
                                                                                                             
 241. For example, 
In one 1977 California case, a child was removed from the custody of her aunt 
by a social worker on the sole ground that “an Indian reservation is an 
unsuitable environment for a child and that the pre-adoptive parents were 
financially able to provide a home and a way of life superior to the one 
furnished by the natural mother.” 
Graham, supra note 23, at 27 (quoting THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN INDIAN FAMILIES 3 
(Steven Unger ed., 1977)). In a different case, a Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux mother, faced 
termination of her parental rights “on the grounds that she often left [her son] with his sixty-
nine-year-old great grandmother,” id. at 25–26, and in a third, an Indian mother from Oregon 
faced termination because her son went to live with his aunt while his mother recovered 
from a broken leg, id. at 26. 
 242. Kacy Wothe, Comment, The Ambiguity of Culture as a Best Interests Factor: 
Finding Guidance in the Indian Child Welfare Act’s Qualified Expert Witness, 35 HAMLINE 
L. REV. 729, 771 (2012). 
 243. Id.; see also Solangel Maldonado, Bias in the Family: Race, Ethnicity, and Culture 
in Custody Disputes, 55 FAM. CT. REV. 213, 223 (2017) [hereinafter Maldonado, Bias in the 
Family] (noting that studies also demonstrate that a connection with their Indian heritage 
may be important for the healthy development of Indian children). 
 244. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Sara J., 123 P.3d 1017, 1032 (Alaska 2005) (weighing 
conflicting testimony of two different qualified expert witnesses to determine if the 
children’s placement outside the tribe could meet their cultural needs); In re Custody of 
S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 360–61 (Minn. 1994) (using the testimony of a qualified expert 
witness to hold that it was unlikely the non-native family could adequately meet the Indian 
children’s cultural needs); see In re Adoption of M.T.S., 489 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1992) (considering the testimony of a qualified expert witness to determine if an Indian 
child’s extended family would better meet their emotional and cultural needs than placement 
with a non-Indian foster family); In re Ashley B., No. H12CP02008297A, 2004 WL 
3106084, at *45 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2004) (considering testimony from a qualified 
expert witness regarding whether placement in a non-Indian home would still permit the 
child access “to information about her Indian background and what that culture is”). 
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ICWA cases mandate the use of cultural perspective testimony.
245
 
However, all child welfare cases require courts to consider evidence 
regarding a child’s best interest
246
 and many courts have held this means 
factoring cultural considerations into their child custody determinations.
247
 
Consequently, the ICWA is not particularly unique when it comes to 
considering culture in child welfare decisions. 
1. Cultural Competence 
In the child custody context, cultural competency is defined as the 
willingness and ability of a prospective parent to meet the special needs of a 
child who does not share their racial or cultural background. Consideration 
of cultural competency is widespread and frequently viewed as an 
important factor in determining whether a particular placement will serve 
the child’s best interest. In some states, the importance of cultural 
competency is built into the family law code. For example, Minnesota 
explicitly mandates consideration of the “capacity and disposition of the 
parties to . . . continue educating and raising the child in the child’s culture” 
as well as consideration of the “child’s cultural background.”
248
  
                                                                                                             
 245. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d); see also Linda K. Thomas, Child Custody, Community and 
Autonomy: The Ties That Bind?, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 645, 653 (1997) 
(noting most of the cases “taking into account the importance of culture and a 
child's cultural community occur in the context of child custody decisions relating to Indian 
children” and attributing that to the ICWA’s mandate). 
 246. Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence 
on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1058–59 (1991) (“In virtually all 
states, child custody decisions require . . . determination of a custody arrangement that is in 
the best interest of the child.”); John Thomas Halloran, Families First: Reframing Parental 
Rights As Familial Rights in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. 
JUV. L. & POL'Y 51, 69 (2014) (“The best interest standard is found within the statutory 
schemes pertaining to the termination of parental rights in each of the fifty states.”). 
 247. See generally Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family, 162 U. PA. 
L. REV. 537, 538 (2014) (noting that race is commonly used in family law cases and that 
courts have been reluctant to limit these race-based practices, indicating that such uses are 
either benign or even desirable); see also Thomas, supra note 245, at 655 (“In a smaller 
subset of cases which appear to import considerations of cultural context into the traditional 
‘best interests of the child’ standard, courts sometimes take into account a child's racial or 
other cultural community in child custody decisions.”). 
 248. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 subdiv. l(a)(10)-(l1) (West 2014) (repealed 2015), 
quoted in Maldonado, Bias in the Family, supra note 243, at 215. In addition, many states 
require that parties include provisions for religious training, if applicable, in their parenting 
plans. See also D.C. CODE § 16-914(c)(7) (2012). 
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In other states, the importance of cultural competency has been 
developed by the courts. These courts consider which parent is more likely 
to expose the child to its culture and hold it is an important factor in their 
best interest determinations.
249
 For example, in Jones v. Jones, the South 
Dakota Supreme Court explained that “it is proper for a trial court . . . to 
consider the matter of race as it relates to a child’s ethnic heritage and 
which parent is more prepared to expose the child to it.”
250
 The Jones court 
further reasoned:  
All of us form our own personal identities, based in part, on our 
religious, racial and cultural backgrounds [and] [t]o say . . . that 
a court should never consider whether a parent is willing and 
able to expose to and educate children on their heritage, is to say 




Similarly, in In re Marriage of Gambla, a divorce case involving an 
African American mother, Caucasian father, and biracial daughter, the 
Illinois court viewed cultural competency as an extremely important factor 
in making its custody determination.
252
 The court admitted testimony from 
a university professor who specialized in multiculturalism and child 
development to help it determine which of the child’s parents would be 
better equipped to meet her cultural needs.
253
 The father objected to this 
testimony and appealed its inclusion, but the court of appeals affirmed the 
family court.
254
 The court explained that the use of testimony regarding 
cultural competency was permissible because it aided the trial court in 
determining the child’s best interests.
255
 
                                                                                                             
 249. “Some other states’ statutes, without mentioning culture, also require that parties 
include provisions for religious training, if applicable, in their parenting plans.” Cynthia R. 
Mabry, Blending Cultures and Religions: Effects That the Changing Makeup of Families in 
Our Nation Have on Child Custody Determinations, 26 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAWS. 31, 34 
(2013) (describing such laws). 
 250.  542 N.W.2d 119, 123–24 (S.D. 1996). Although Jones involved an Indian child, it 
was not an ICWA case because it involved a custody dispute between two biological 
parents.  
 251. Id. at 123. 
 252. 853 N.E.2d 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
 253. Id. at 857–58.  
 254. Id. at 862–64.  
 255. Id. at 864; see Wothe, supra note 242, at 749–50. 
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Both Gambla and Jones involved custody disputes between biological 
parents.
256
 However, the issue of cultural competence also arises in foster 
and adoption cases. For example, in In re Guardianship of L.S., the court 
considered the cultural competency of the potential adoptive parents and 




 aspects of a different-
race child before approving the adoption.
259
 Similarly in In re Q.B., a 
Massachusetts court considered the potential adoptive parent’s willingness 
“to accept and nurture the culture and heritage of a child of a different race 
or background” in determining whether to permit the adoption of Q.B.
260
 
These cases are not unique. 
Cultural competency considerations are also increasingly common 
outside of court cases. For example, many states now have provisions 
permitting birth parents to express a preference for the placement of their 
child with a foster or adoptive parent of the same religious background or 
                                                                                                             
 256. Maldonado, Bias in the Family, supra note 243, at 216; see also Rooney v. Rooney, 
914 P.2d 212, 218 (Alaska 1996) (“[T]he opportunities for [the child] to be exposed to his 
Tlingit heritage are greater in Sitka than in Wrangell . . . . [T]he court must consider the 
child’s cultural needs as one factor in the overall context of his best interests.”); Foster v. 
Waterman, 738 N.W.2d 662 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007) (considering the cultural competence of 
the non-Korean mother to exposure her part-Koran daughter to her Korean culture); In re 
Marriage of Mikelson, 299 N.W.2d 670 (Iowa 1980) (upholding the lower court’s decision 
to award custody to the mother after consideration of the ability of each of the parents, who 
were white, to provide their adopted children, who were half African-American and half 
white, with frequent association with other African Americans). But see Beazley v. Davis, 
545 P.2d 206 (Nev. 1976) (reversing an award of custody of two children to African-
American father rather than Caucasian mother which was based on the fact that the 
children’s physical characteristics were African-American because it constituted 
impermissible discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 257. In re Guardianship of L.S., No. 4-13-0766, 2014 WL 272665, at *5, ¶ 29 (Ill. App. 
Ct. Jan. 23, 2014) (“With respect to race, Emily testified she and Scott agreed it was 
important for their children, especially their adopted biracial son, to be exposed to ‘many 
different people, many different cultures.’ Emily said she does not ‘not see color,’ but rather, 
‘see[s] color’ and ‘think[s] it’s wonderful.’”). 
 258. “As to the question of religion, the court noted the evidence demonstrated L.S. was 
‘very involved’ with respondents in their faith and L.S. was not familiar with any other 
faith.” Id. at *6, ¶ 40. 
 259. See also In re Adoption of Persephone, No. 13–P–188, 2013 WL 5628820, at *1 
(Mass. App. Ct. Oct. 16, 2013) (“[J]udges must be sensitive to the backgrounds of the 
children before them, and to the potential value of cultural connections . . . .”). 
 260. Nos. 2-11-0736, 2-11-0966, 2012 WL 6969764, at *11, ¶ 34 (Ill. App. Ct., Mar. 13, 
2012). 
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knowledgeable and appreciative of that background.
261
 Similarly, in 
domestic adoptions, public and private adoption agencies frequently offer 
cultural competency training for parents seeking to adopt cross-racially
262
 
and, in international adoptions, cultural competency training is required.
263
 
The importance of cultural competency is supported by research 
demonstrating that cultural dissimilarity between foster or adopted children 
and their caregivers can result in negative psychosocial outcomes. These 
harms are particularly significant for minority children.
264
 Transracially 
adopted minority children often report growing up fearing people of their 
own race and trying to avoid them.
265
 At the same time, a lack of exposure 
to people of the same race or background leaves many minority adoptees 
feeling isolated or with low self-esteem.
266
 Studies do not suggest that all 
transracial adoptions are harmful, but they do highlight the importance of 
placing children with parents willing and able to provide the cultural 
support their children need to thrive.
267
As Professor Solangel Maldonado 
notes, “[A]doptive families can and do raise children of other races with 
high self-esteem and a strong self-identity and sense of belonging.”
268
 
                                                                                                             
 261. In this regard, a number of states permit placement based on families of the same 
religion. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102(b) (West 2011); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8709(a) (West 
2012) (“may consider the child's religious background in determining an appropriate 
placement”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 (West 1995). 
 262. A parent’s decision to refuse such training can be considered in a parental 
competency assessment. Tanya Washington, Loving Grutter: Recognizing Race in 
Transracial Adoptions, 16 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 3 n.7 (2005) (“While the required 
training would not dispositively inform the placement determination, it would certainly be 
relevant to parental competency.”). 
 263. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the 17th Session, 
Including the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-51, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167. 
 264. Sarah A. Font, Kinship and Nonrelative Foster Care: The Effect of Placement Type 
on Child Well-Being, 85 CHILD DEV. 2074, 2075 (2014).  
 265. Solangel Maldonado, Permanency v. Biology: Making the Case for Post-Adoption 
Contact, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 321, 338 (2008) [hereinafter Maldonado, Permanency]. 
 266. “For example, in one study an African-American transracial adoptee reported 
feeling ‘different from black people’ and having ‘different feelings’ than them. Another 
child reported feeling more connected to whites because the African-Americans she knew 
‘act ghetto’ and dress differently from her.” Id. 
 267. Id. at 338–39; see also RITA SIMON ET AL., THE CASE FOR TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 
48, 51 (1994); David D. Meyer, Palmore Comes of Age: The Place of Race in the Placement 
of Children, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 183, 202 (2007) (citing studies). 
 268. Maldonado, Permanency, supra note 265, at 338–39; see also In re M.F., 1 S.W.3d 
524, 534–35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (granting preference to a Caucasian couple over the 
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Nevertheless, Professor Maldonado cautions that “parents must be sensitive 
to society’s racial biases and ensure that children are exposed to their racial 
and ethnic background and communities.”
269
 This means parents must do 
more than simply expose children to their birth cultures through books and 
cultural events. They must also provide them with opportunities for 
significant contact with persons of the child’s racial or ethnic background 
and ensure this exposure continues as the child ages.
270
  
Professor Maldonado further notes that “[a]lthough some families 
adopting transracially recognize the salience of race and ethnicity to their 
children’s self-identities and make efforts to expose the children to their 
birth culture or people of their own race, not all do.”
271
 For example, one 
study on transracial adoption found that their parents “tended to minimize 
the importance of race and downplay incidents of racial slurs or 
discrimination.”
272
 As one parent in the study
 
remarked: 
People say, “Stay in touch with his racial heritage.” I don’t even 
know what that is. What is his racial heritage? Some people say 
we are “denying him his culture,” but from what I can see, if we 
hadn’t come along, he would be dead. He was malnourished. He 
was neglected. What really is his culture?
273
 
                                                                                                             
child’s African-American aunt because it found the Caucasian couple had demonstrated 
cultural competency and was equally able to meet the child’s needs with respect to her 
cultural and racial background). 
 269. Maldonado, Permanency, supra note 265, at 339. 
 270.  
[A]doptive parents’ efforts to expose their children to their birth parents’ 
culture decreases as children grow older. For example, one study of African-
American transracial adoptees found that when the children were seven years 
old, forty-two percent of families emphasized bicultural socialization. 
However, by the time the children were seventeen, only twenty percent of 
families did so. 
Id. at 338 (citing Kimberly M. DeBerry et al., Family Racial Socialization and Ecological 
Competence: Longitudinal Assessments of African-American Transracial Adoptees, 67 
CHILD. DEV. 2378, 2380 (1996)). 
 271. Id. at 337. According to Professor Maldonado, the “parenting styles and values that 
are perceived as functional for Caucasian, middle-income families may be inappropriate in 
other cultural contexts.” Maldonado, Bias in the Family, supra note 243, at 225. 
 272. Id. (quoting Maria Vidal de Haymes & Shirley Simon, Transracial Adoption: 
Families Identify Issues and Needed Support Services, 82 CHILD WELFARE 251, 252 (2003)). 
 273. Id. (quoting Haymes & Simon, supra note 272, at 264). 
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Given the strong negative effects of failing to expose adopted children to 
their culture and heritage, a potential parent’s cultural competence is 
increasingly recognized as an important factor in determining a child’s best 
interest in all custody cases, and not simply those involving Indian children. 
2. Transmitting “American” Culture 
The ICWA’s critics object to the Act’s emphasis on the transmission of 
Indian culture, but this may be a disagreement about whose culture gets 
transmitted rather than an objection to the importance of cultural connection 
in general.
274 
In the non-ICWA context, courts are often quite open to 
considering the importance of transmitting American culture to an 
American child. For example, in custody cases in which “one parent intends 
to raise the child outside the United States,” it is common for courts to 
compare the relative advantages of the foreign culture versus American 
culture and presume continued exposure to American culture is in the best 
interests of an American-born child.
275
  
In Schultz v. Elremmash, the Louisiana Court of Appeal awarded an 
American Catholic mother sole custody of her daughter over the objection 
of the child’s Libyan Muslim father.
276
 The court reached this decision 
because it found custody with the mother would give the child a better 
opportunity “to explore her heritage.”
277
 In explaining its decision, the court 
highlighted the father’s lack of U.S. citizenship and added, disapprovingly, 
                                                                                                             
 274. Many transracial adoptee parents object to exposing their adopted children to the 
children’s birth culture because they prefer to pass their own culture and family legacy to 
their adopted child. Professor Jessica Weaver has suggested that  
one factor that may impact the desire of white couples to adopt Asian and 
Hispanic children is their maintenance of family legacy. Asian and Hispanic 
children are perceived to be able to assimilate into white culture easier. 
Statistically, they enter into interracial marriages with whites in larger 
percentages than blacks; therefore, the property of the family will essentially be 
kept within the race. While there are obviously other more immediate reasons 
that whites prefer Asian and Hispanic children over African American children, 
the fact that their adopted children will inherit their wealth, and therefore 
perpetuate their form of community, should not be overlooked. 
Jessica Dixon Weaver, The Changing Tides of Adoption: Why Marriage, Race, and Family 
Identity Still Matter, 71 SMU L. REV. 159, 174–75 (2018). 
 275. Thomas, supra note 245, at 656–57, quoted in Maldonado, Bias in the Family, supra 
note 243, at 223. 
 276. 615 So. 2d 396 (La. Ct. App. 1993). 
 277. Id. at 399. 
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that “[h]e appears to be extremely critical of American ways.”
278
 In 
particular, the court implied that the father’s refusal to allow the child to 
participate in American cultural events, such as the school Christmas 
pageant or the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance was “inappropriate.”
279
 
The consideration of and preference for American culture is also present 
in adoption cases—particularly those between an American potential 
adoptive parent and an immigrant birth parent. For instance, in In re 
Adoption of C.M.B.R., an undocumented mother lost custody of her 
American-born son in large part because the court compared the child’s 
potential life with his mother in Guatemala with the benefits he would have 
as an American child growing up in the United States.
280
 Similarly, in 
Nebraska v. Maria L. (In re Angelica L.),
281
 which also involved the 
termination of an undocumented immigrant mother’s parental rights, the 
lower court terminated the mother’s rights because it determined that 
“living in Guatemala would put [the American children] at a disadvantage 
compared to living in the United States.”
282
 This case was ultimately 
reversed on appeal yet, the Nebraska Supreme Court was sympathetic to the 
“culture clash” the case presented.
283
 
American courts routinely consider the role of culture in non-Indian 
family law cases. Thus, there is little merit to the argument that cultural 
considerations are uniquely or unfairly applied to Indian child custody 
cases. In fact, such cases indicate that not only is the consideration of 
cultural competency widespread and not unique to ICWA cases, but that 
                                                                                                             
 278. Id. at 400.  
 279. Id. at 399. The court concluded that the child’s mother had her “best interest at 
heart” because she wanted her daughter “to experience life in a carefree manner.” It then 
contrasted this desire with the father, whom the court believed wanted the child “to be raised 
in a very restricted manner.” Id. at 400, quoted in Maldonado, Bias in the Family, supra note 
243, at 220. 
 280. No. SD 30342, 2010 WL 2841486, at *8 (Mo. Ct. App. July 21, 2010) (“While the 
trial court did not expressly say that Respondents could provide a better home in the United 
States for Child, it did so through its actions because it found for Respondents even though it 
had no knowledge of the type of home Mother could offer to Child in Guatemala.”); Marcia 
Zug, Should I Stay or Should I Go: Why Immigrant Reunification Decisions Should Be 
Based on the Best Interest of the Child, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1139, 1144–47 (discussing 
whether the potential benefits of life in the United States should factor into immigrant child 
custody determinations). 
 281. 767 N.W.2d 74, 94 (Neb. 2009). 
 282. Id. The trial court’s decision was overturned because the Nebraska Supreme Court 
held that such considerations “not determinative of the children's best interests.”. Id. 
 283. Id. 
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court preference for American culture means cultural competency 
considerations are especially needed in ICWA cases. 
D. Placement Preferences 
The ICWA’s placement preferences set out an order of preference for the 
placement of Indian children. First preference is with the child’s immediate 
family, second preference is with a member of the child’s tribe, and third 
preference is with any other Indian.
284
 This preference provision is 
contentious because potential adoptive parents may find themselves passed 
over in favor of caregivers who satisfy one of the preferences categories. 
Not surprisingly, many ICWA challenges are brought by potential adoptive 
parents who did not meet the ICWA preference categories. These parents 
claim the preferences are racially discriminatory and harm Indian children. 
The merit of such claims must be evaluated for each of the three categories 
separately.  
1. Relative Preference Under State Law 
The first preference category under the ICWA is for placement with the 
child’s relatives.
285
 However, preference for relative placement is not 
unique to the ICWA. As Professor Sarah Krakoff notes, “ICWA’s goal of 
ensuring that children are placed with their relatives rather than in foster 
care or institutions is, according to many schools of thought, the best 
                                                                                                             
 284. This section states that in any adoptive placement, “a preference shall be given, in 
the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child’s 
extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child’s tribe; (3) other Indian families.” 25 
U.S.C. § 1915(a). The ICWA also specifies the following preferences for foster placement 
proceedings: 
 In any foster care or preadoptive placement, a preference shall be given, in 
the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with— 
 (i) a member of the Indian child’s extended family; 
 (ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian child’s 
tribe; 
 (iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian 
licensing authority; or 
 (iv) an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or operated by an 
Indian organization which has a program suitable to meet the Indian child’s 
needs. 
See id. § 1915(b). 
 285. See id. 
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approach for all children, not only American Indian children.”
286
 Studies 
consistently demonstrate that children placed in kinship care experience 
greater placement stability and are less likely to return to foster care as 
compared to children living with foster families.
287
 Therefore, it is not 
surprising that both state and federal laws strongly support relative 
placement. For example, in South Carolina, “[r]elatives are given 
preference in placement options provided such placement is in the best 
interest of the child(ren).”
288
 Similarly, Colorado’s family law code states 
“the court shall place the child with a relative . . . if such placement is in the 
child’s best interests.”
289
 Louisiana’s code is also similar and states that 
“[t]he court shall place the child in the custody of a relative unless the court 




In addition to explicit kinship care preferences, such as the ones noted 
above, many states are enacting laws and policies encouraging relative 
caregiving. Two of the most prominent examples of this trend are the 
increasing support for legal guardianship and the growth of grandparent 
visitation statutes. 
(a) Legal Guardianship 
A legal guardian is a person who assumes legal responsibility for a child 
in place of a birth parent.
291
 However, under a legal guardianship 
arrangement, the birth parent’s rights are not terminated.
292
 Instead, parents 
retain various rights and obligations including visitation rights and the 
                                                                                                             
 286. Sarah Krakoff, They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race, and the 
Constitutional Minimum, 69 STAN. L. REV. 491, 509 (2017). 
 287. William Vesneski et al., An Analysis of State Law and Policy Regarding Subsidized 
Guardianship for Children: Innovations in Permanency, 21 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 
27, 37 (2017). 
 288. Licensure for Foster Care, S.C. CODE ANN. § 114-550(L)(2) (2003).  
 289. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-508(5)(b)(I) (2018). 
 290. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 683 (B) (2014); see also In re JW, 2010 WY 28, ¶ 22, 
226 P.3d 873, 879 (Wyo. 2010) (citing DFS Policy 5.7 (2008) which states “ Relative and 
kinship placements are less restrictive and therefore preferable to other types of out-of-home 
care. The DFS caseworker is responsible for conducting an ongoing diligent search for 
relatives and kin for any child in DFS custody until permanency is achieved.”). 
 291. Eliza Patten, The Subordination of Subsidized Guardianship in Child Welfare 
Proceedings, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 237, 255 (2004). 
 292. Id. 
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obligation to provide child support.
293
 In addition, under a legal 
guardianship arrangement, the state fully relinquishes “custody of the child 
and the permanent guardian is not subject to continuing state 
supervision.”
294
 For these reasons, kinship caregivers often prefer legal 
guardianship; yet, until recently, states considered it an inferior custody 
option. 
Legal guardianship was first identified as a permanency outcome under 
the ASFA but was not strongly encouraged.
295
 The ASFA’s hierarchy of 
“permanency goals” prioritizes “reunification with the biological parent, 
then adoption, then legal guardianship with a relative or other caregiver.”
296
 
The ASFA considers adoption more permanent and, thus, more desirable 
than other custody options; for decades, this influenced state treatment of 
kinship care.
297
 Nevertheless, the ASFA’s assumptions about permanency 
are flawed. As Professor Sacha Coupet notes, the ASFA’s presumption 
favoring adoption  
fails to account for the fact that adoption within kinship 
networks “is [inherently] complicated by the complex and 
ambivalent nature” of the relationship between the caregiver and 
both the birth parent and the other members of the family. 
Indeed, “[o]ne of the most difficult challenges facing child 
welfare caseworkers is discussing adoption and [permanent] 
guardianship with [kinship caregivers] who [legitimately] do not 
believe that” changes in their legal status vis-à-vis their wards 




Similarly, in their work on kinship caregiving families, Professors 
Patricia O’Brien, Carol Rippey Massat, and James P. Gleeson note that 
                                                                                                             
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. See Katz, supra note 42, at 1085 n.22 (“ASFA was originally titled the ‘Adoption 
Promotion Act of 1997.’ See H.R. Rep. No. 105-77, at 1 (1997).”). 
 296. Id. at 1085–86. 
 297. This preference was based on acceptance of the ASFA’s view that adoption 
provided the most permanency and was compounded by the absence of federal 
reimbursement for guardianships commensurate to that applicable to adoption. See infra 
Section III.D.2 (discussing current federal support for legal guardianship). See also Patten, 
supra note 294, at 254. 
 298. Sacha Coupet, Swimming Upstream Against the Great Adoption Tide: Making the 
Case for “Impermanence”, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 405, 440 (2005) (alterations in original). 
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“[a]lthough it is commonly believed that adoption . . . increases the sense of 
permanence, security, and belonging of children adopted by nonrelative 
foster parents, caregivers in this and other studies point out that these 
children are already members of their families.”
299
  
The circumstances surrounding kinship care are significantly different 
than traditional adoption in which the adoptive parent’s rights and 
connection to the child are grounded in the termination of the birth parent’s 
rights. Only recently have states begun to recognize that a lack of parental 
rights termination cannot be assumed to make kinship care less permanent. 
This new understanding of legal guardianship, combined with the growing 
recognition of the other benefits of kinship care, has led to a dramatic 
increase in state subsidized legal guardianship. “In 1996, only six states had 
subsidized legal guardianship programs . . . [b]y 2002, [thirty-four] states 
and the District of Columbia had some form of subsidized legal 
guardianship program for children in foster care.”
300
 Today, due to the 
availability of federal support, the numbers are even higher.
301
 As a result, a 




(b) Grandparent Visitation 
The nationwide existence of grandparent visitation statutes,
303
 even after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville, further highlights state 
                                                                                                             
 299. Patricia O’Brien et al., Upping the Ante: Relative Caregivers’ Perceptions of 
Changes in Child Welfare Policies, 80 CHILD WELFARE 719, 742 (2001). 
 300. Patten, supra note 294, at 257. 
 301. See infra Section III.D.2. 
 302. See Jill Duerr Berrick, When Children Cannot Remain Home: Foster Family Care 
and Kinship Care, 8 FUTURE CHILD. 72–74 (1998) (describing the trend towards placement 
within the family, the rapid growth of kinship foster care nationwide and the impact of 
financial incentives). 
 303. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-4.2 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-409 (2013); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (West 2019); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3103 (West 1994 & Supp. 
2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 190-1-117 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 
2013)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1031(7) (West 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.011 (West 
2015), IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-5-2 (West 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600C.1 (West 2012); 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (West 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39D 
(West 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-16-1 (1999 & Supp. 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-
102 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.050 (West 
2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:13 (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (West 1999); 
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.2(b1) (West 
2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-202 (West 2013). 
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recognition of the importance of helping children maintain their familial 
relationships in the event of family disruption.
304
 In Troxel, the Supreme 
Court held that Washington state’s relative visitation statute was overly 
broad and unconstitutional.
305
 After Troxel, many states revised their 
visitation statutes, but all continued to permit relative visitation under 
certain circumstances, such as the death of a parent or parental divorce.
306
 
Louisiana’s visitation statute is typical; it permits grandparents to seek 
visitation if the parents are not married or are divorced and the court deems 
such visitation in the child’s “best interest.”
307
 The statute also states that, in 
extraordinary circumstances such as the opioid crisis, visitation may be 




Visitation is not same as custody. Nevertheless, state protection and 
encouragement of relative visitation rights should be viewed as part of 
states’ overall preference for kinship care placements.
309
  
2. Federal Support for Relative Preference 
Relative preference is also supported by federal law. The two most 
important statutes are the 2008 Fostering Connections to Success and 




                                                                                                             
 304. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 305. Id. at 75. 
 306. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.11 (West 2000) (relative can seek visitation 
after the death of the child’s parent); see also In re RV, 470 P.3d 531, 538–39 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2020) (“The death of a parent is not infrequently the source of visitation disputes” and 
may be “consider[ed] . . . as an ‘other factor relevant to the child's best interest.’”). 
 307. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136 (2018).  
 308. Id. § 136(B)(2). In Esasky v. Ford, 743 S.E.2d 550, 551 (2013), the court even 
awarded visitation after the child had been adopted (this, however, was a limited exception 
to cases where the child has been adopted by a blood relative). 
 309. These state statutes acknowledge that abruptly ending these emotional ties through 
denial of visitation can cause severe psychological harm, stressing continuity and stability in 
a child’s life. Granting nonparental visitation is necessary to prevent this harm. Rachel 
Roberson, Nonparent Visitation: Science Says It’s in the Child’s Best Interests, TENN. B.J., 
Apr. 2018, at 23–24 (“[S]everal state laws use statutory or equitable power to grant visitation 
to nonparents in cases involving cohabitation, loco parentis, or a ‘psychological 
parent[,]’ . . . when a substantial personal relationship between the child and nonparent 
exists.”). 
 310. Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (FCA), 
Pub. L. No 110-351, 122 Stat. 3949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., 
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a) Fostering Connections Act 
One of the major hurdles for increasing legal guardianship was that the 
ASFA provides financial incentives for adoption
311
 but not for legal 
guardianship. The FCA’s passage remedied this imbalance. The FCA seeks 
to incentivize relative caregiving by allowing federal Title IV-E foster care 
maintenance money to be used by states to provide kinship legal guardians 
with subsidies similar to those received by adoptive parents under the 
ASFA.
312
 However, the FCA’s support for relative caregiving went beyond 
funding equalization. For example, the FCA also demonstrated its 
preference for relative caregiving through the creation of family finding 
programs. Such programs help locate biological family members to care for 
children removed from their parents’ custody. Additionally, the FCA 
created “Kinship Navigator” programs, which provide relative caregivers 
with information and support services.
313
 Most importantly, although the 
FCA sets out a basic framework for subsidized guardianship programs, it 
also grants states the discretion to shape their programs in the way they 
believe will be the most beneficial to relative caregivers in their states.
314
  
b) Family First Prevention Services Act 
The ASFA and its preference for adoption remains current federal policy. 
Nevertheless, the increasing federal support for relative caregivers 
                                                                                                             
including 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 673(d)); Family First Prevention Services Act, 
Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 232 (2018) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.) (title VII of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 64). 
 311. 42 U.S.C. § 673(a)(1)(B)(i); see also Katz, supra note 42, at 1086 (“Once 
reunification is ruled out, ASFA creates strong financial incentives for states to pursue 
adoption, over legal guardianship, as a permanency goal through the open-ended entitlement 
program known as the Adoption Assistance Program.”). 
 312. See Christina McClurg Riehl & Tara Shuman, Children Placed in Kinship Care: 
Recommended Policy Changes to Provide Adequate Support for Kinship Families, 39 
CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 101, 115 (2019) (describing federal funding for kinship care); Katz, 
supra note 42, at 1087 (noting that the FCA helped subsidize “some kinship legal 
guardians . . . similar to the subsidy adoptive parents receive through the Adoption 
Assistance Program.”); see also Vesneski et al., supra note 287, at 33 (stating that “[a]s of 
this writing, 32 states, the District of Columbia and six tribes” offer these federal subsidies). 
 313. Riehl & Shuman, supra note 312 (noting such services may include “links to local 
county resources, connections to needed referrals, and a forum to answer questions regarding 
kinship caregiving”). 
 314. For example, states may “modify some eligibility requirements, provide [additional 
monetary] supports . . . and formulate the terms of the agreement between guardians and the 
states.” Vesneski et al., supra note 287, at 34. 
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demonstrates that the federal government no longer regards adoption as the 
preferred permanency option when relative care is available. In particular, 
the Family First Prevention Services Act,
315
 which permits family 
preservation and reunification funds to be used for relative caregivers, 
strongly demonstrates the federal government’s growing endorsement of 
relative caregiving.
316
 In addition, the FFPSA supports relative caregiving 
by mandating that states demonstrate how their foster care licensing 
standards encourage and accommodate kinship care,
317
 requiring agencies 
to identify potential relative caregivers within thirty days after a child’s 
removal,
318




The above state and federal laws supporting kinship care demonstrate 
that the ICWA’s relative preference is neither unique nor harmful. Today, 
relative preference is considered best practices for all children removed 
from parental care. This preference is not limited to Indian children and 
families. 
3. Community Preference 
The second ICWA preference requires states to place an Indian child 
with a member of their tribe if a relative placement is not available. Non-
Indian children are rarely members of Indian tribes. However, these 
children are members of other types of communities and child welfare 
policy is finally recognizing the importance of the child’s community. 
Today, growing numbers of states seek community support to help families 
facing child removal and provide potential caregivers when removal is 
necessary.  
  
                                                                                                             
 315. Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 232 (2018) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.) (title VII of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 64) 
 316. The need for such programs became clear as the number of children living with 
relative foster caregivers rose rapidly. For example, “[i]n 2014, 29 percent of the 415,000 
children in care were living in relative foster homes.” Vesneski et al., supra note 287, at 35. 
 317. Children’s Def. Fund, supra note 235, at 2. For children currently residing in foster 
care, the Act sets no limit on the amount of Promoting Safe and Stable Families Program 
funds that may be used for family reunification services. Id. In addition, it permits “an 
additional 15 months of family reunification services” after these children are returned to 
their families. Id. Such programs include the evidence-based Kinship Navigator program. Id. 
 318. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10)(D). 
 319. Id. § 671(a)(29). 
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a) Family Group Decisions-Making  
Many of the family support programs used by states to prevent child 
removals are now community-based. Community-based, in this context, has 
a dual meaning: it means that community resources are used to support 
families facing removal and that the community takes responsibility for the 
family and makes child welfare determinations in collaboration with the 
child’s family. This process is termed Family Group Decision-Making 
(FGDM).  
FGDM acknowledges the importance of including both the family
320
 and 
the larger community in child welfare decision-making.
321
 Consequently, 
when a critical child welfare decision is required, FGDM can be initiated 
and overseen either by service providers or by community organizations.
322
 
By including the community in child welfare decisions, FGDM 
demonstrates that the welfare of children is not just the parents’ 
responsibility but also the responsibility of the child’s community.
323
  
Extensive studies prove the success and benefits of FGDM. As Professor 
Charisa Smith notes, FGDM has “reduced the number of children in foster 
                                                                                                             
 320. Family Group Decision Making in Child Welfare: Purpose, Values and Processes, 
KEMPE CTR. FOR THE PREVENTION & TREATMENT OF CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT (May 2013), 
https://perma.cc/XG73-CN3B, quoted in Friend & Beck, supra note 204, at 278 (“When 
agency concerns are adequately addressed, preference is given to a family group’s plan over 
any other possible plan.”). 
 321. “FGDM affirms the culture of the family group, recognizes a family’s spirituality, 
fully acknowledges the rights and abilities of the family group to make sound decisions for 
and with its young relatives and actively engages the community as a vital support for 
families.” AM HUMANE ASS’N & FGDM GUIDELINES COMM., GUIDELINES FOR FAMILY 
GROUP DECISION MAKING IN CHILD WELFARE 8 (2010) [hereinafter GUIDELINES], 
http://www.pacwrc.pitt.edu/Curriculum/207RemoteFGDMPart2/TableResources/TBLR01_
GdlnsFrFmlyGrpDcsnMknginChldWlfre.pdf, cited in Friend & Beck, supra note 204, at 
277. For example, Connecticut DCF “began implementing a family conferencing model in 
2005.” CASEY FAM. SERVS., supra note 219, at 3 (“The primary goal of this initiative was to 
increase the level of family involvement in case planning by engaging parents and their 
networks in problem solving and identifying the strengths and needs of each family.”) 
 322. Charisa Smith, The Conundrum of Family Reunification: A Theoretical, Legal, and 
Practical Approach to Reunification Services for Parents with Mental Disabilities, 26 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 343 (2015) (“FGDM is typically initiated by service providers or 
community organizations and includes social services agencies and governmental authorities 
who assure that any plans created adequately address agency concerns.”).  
 323. Id. (“In the words of FGDM experts, ‘children have a right to maintain their kinship 
and cultural connections throughout their lives. Children and their parents belong to a wider 
family system that both nurtures them and is responsible for them.’”). 
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care, decreased instances of maltreatment, kept biological families intact, 
and improved holistic family wellbeing.”
324
 FGDM recognizes the 
important caregiving role that can be played by the child’s community. Its 
similarities to the ICWA have also been noted. As Michigan Judge Michael 
Cavanagh explains, FGDM is a great tool “to achieve a central goal of 
ICWA” and to “use in proceedings involving non-Indian children.”
325
 
b) Fictive Kin 
The idea behind the ICWA’s second placement preference is that 
placement with a member of the child’s tribe helps the child stay connected 
to his or her family and culture during a time of tremendous upheaval. A 
non-Indian parallel is state statutes permitting placement with “fictive kin,” 
meaning non-relatives who have established a close relationship with a 
relative of the child.
326
 Rights for fictive kin are an outgrowth of state 
recognition of the importance of placing children with relative caregivers 




                                                                                                             
 324. Id. 
 325. Justice Michael F. Cavanagh, State Court Administrative Office—Court 
Improvement Program: Indian Child Welfare Act Forum Remarks, October 6, 2008, 89 
MICH. B.J. 23, 25 (2010); see also C. Quince Hopkins et al., Applying Restorative Justice to 
Ongoing Intimate Violence: Problems and Possibilities, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 289, 
309 (2004) (“[O]ne commentator has questioned whether restorative justice methods, 
originally the province of indigenous peoples, would ultimately prove feasible or effective in 
non-indigenous contexts.”). Others have also noted that FGDM is based on more traditional 
decision-making practices. See GUIDELINES, supra note 321, at 6. Supporters of this 
community-based approach to child welfare decision-making note that “[t]he practice is 
informed by traditional decision-making processes in many cultures that accent the 
importance of custom, communality, collectivity, consensus and taking time in arriving at 
sound and lasting resolutions to issues affecting family life.” Id. 
 326. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-28-108(a) (West 2019) (defining “Fictive kin” as a 
person “who . . . [i]s not related to a child by blood or marriage; and . . . [h]as a strong, 
positive, and emotional tie or role in the . . . [c]hild's life; or [c]hild's parent's life if the child 
is an infant”); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-2 (West 2020) (“‘Fictive kin’ means a person who is 
not related to the child by blood, marriage, or adoption but who prior to his or her placement 
in foster care is known to the family, has a substantial and positive relationship with the 
child, and is willing and able to provide a suitable home for the child.”); N.M. CODE R. § 
8.26.4.7(R) (LexisNexis 2020) (defining fictive kin as a “person not related by birth, 
adoption or marriage with whom the child has an emotionally significant relationship.”). 
 327. Under the FCA, “states have the discretion to limit the definition of relatives to 
those people related by blood, marriage, or adoption, or to further expand their definitions to 
fictive kin—individuals with whom the child has a close relationship, such as close family 
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Numerous states now allow fictive kin to serve as relative caregivers.
328
 
In these states, the term “relative caregiver” is broadly defined. In 
California, such caregivers “may include relatives of the child, teachers, 
medical professionals, clergy, neighbors, and family friends.”
329
 In 
Montana, the definition of “kinship caregiver” is particularly interesting. It 
lists “the child’s godparents; . . . the child’s stepparents; or . . . a person to 
whom the child, child’s parents, or family ascribe a family relationship and 
with whom the child has had a significant emotional tie.”
330
 In addition, it 
includes “a member of the child’s or family’s tribe.”
331
 By including tribal 
members in this list, the Montana Code recognizes the similarities between 
members of the child’s tribe and other non-relatives with whom the child 
shares an important relationship. 
Supporters of expansive definitions of relative caregivers cite the 
significant research demonstrating that children’s successful development is 
closely tied to relationships with their family of origin and with other 
persons with whom they have close or meaningful relationships.
332
 In 
                                                                                                             
friends.” Vesneski et al., supra note 287, at 43; see also Patten, supra note 291, at 259 
(noting the majority of states employ an expanded definition of kin). 
 328. “Twenty-eight states have statutes that grant preference to placement with ‘fictive 
kin,’ or extended family, over strangers.” Rosie Frihart-Lusby, Note, Unconstitutional or 
Just Bad Policy?: Title IV-E's AFDC “Lookback” and the Constitutional Guarantee of 
Equal Protection, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1069, 1081 n.84 (2020). Notably, many of these states 
also make the explicit comparison between tribal members and fictive kin by considering 
tribal members fictive kin even if they are strangers to the child. Id. In addition, forty-one 
states currently permit fictive kin to serve as guardians under Guardian Assistance Programs. 
Vesneski et al., supra note 287, at 43. 
 329. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 362.7 (West 2014); see also ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 
47.10.080 (West 2018) (permitting placement with a “family friend”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 
587A-4 (2017) (using the Hawaiian term “hanai relative,” to indicate unrelated adults found 
“to perform or to have performed a substantial role in the upbringing or material support of a 
child”); MINN. STAT. § 257.85 (2015) (permitting children to be placed with a “relative or 
important friend with whom the child has resided or had significant contact”); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 3B:12A-2 (West 2002) (defining “Kinship relationship” to include a 
“family friend”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-505 (West 2017) (permitting placement with 
“nonrelative kin”).  
 330. MONT. CODE ANN. § 52-2-602 (West 2003). 
 331. Defining “Kinship foster home” to include “a member of the child’s or family’s 
tribe.” Id. § 52-2-602(4). 
 332. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Avery, An Examination of Theory and Promising Practice for 
Achieving Permanency for Teens Before They Age Out of Foster Care, 32 CHILD. & YOUTH 
SERVS. REV. 399, 399–402 (2010) (citing JEFFREY ARNETT & JENNIFER LYNN TANNER, 
EMERGING ADULTS IN AMERICA: COMING OF AGE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 27–28 (2006); Teresa 
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arguing for this expanded definition of “kin,” advocates note that not all 
communities and cultures define family based on blood relations.
333
 In fact, 
many tribes do not.
334
 The ICWA’s tribal preference reflects tribal 
conceptions of family but, as the state definitions of kinship caregiver 
demonstrate, it reflects non-Indian definitions of family as well.
335
 
c) Geographic Barriers to Adoption 
The ICWA placement preferences seek to keep children connected to 
their communities and tribes by preferencing tribal placements over non-
tribal placements, with the exception of non-tribal family placements. 
Critics of the ICWA assume that this preference to keep children in their 
geographic community is unique to Indian children but, in fact, the majority 
of states have in-state adoption preferences, many of which are quite strong. 
For example, more than one third of the states, as well as Guam,
336
 the 
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands require 
adoption petitioners to be state residents.
337
 
                                                                                                             
M. Cooney & Jane Kurz, Mental Health Outcomes Following Recent Parental Divorce: The 
Case of Young Adult Offspring, 17 J. FAM. ISSUES 495, 496 (1996)).  
 333. See, e.g., Patten, supra note 294, at 259 (“Not all cultures or communities delegate 
or assume child-rearing responsibilities based on blood relations. Where a family has 
demonstrated a commitment to a child and she is bonded to that family, it is incumbent upon 
agencies and courts to respect those affective bonds.”). 
 334. For example, “the Tlingit and Haida tribes traditionally define family broadly. 
Alaska Native tribes do not limit the definition of family to blood-ties or marriage links; 
family includes communal relationships within the tribe.” Laverne F. Hill, Family Group 
Conferencing: An Alternative Approach to the Placement of Alaska Native Children Under 
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 22 ALASKA L. REV. 89, 95 (2005); see also Addie C. Rolnick, 
Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Beyond Citizenship and Blood, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 337, 442 
(2014-2015) (“Before formal enrollment rules, membership in a tribal community was based 
on kinship, residence, and sometimes choice of affiliation.”). 
 335. Jeffrey A. Parness & Amanda Beveroth, The ICWA’s Pre-Existing Custody 
Requirement: A Flexible Approach to Better Protect the Interests of Indian Fathers, 
Children, and Tribes, 35 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 25, 37 n.144 (2015) (noting “the emphasis 
Congress placed on tribal culture, where an Indian child may have a close relationship with 
extended family members, who could provide care to the child while maintaining the child’s 
relationship with the tribal community”); see also Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 
U.S.C. § 1901(5) (noting the need for ICWA was due to the fact that state “failed to 
recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards 
prevailing in Indian communities and families”). 
 336. Who May Adopt, 19 GUAM CODE ANN. § 4203 (2020). 
 337. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-103 (LexisNexis 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 903 (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.207 (LexisNexis 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-3 
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State courts have upheld these preferences and explained the benefits of 
keeping children in state. For example, in Adoptive Parents v. Biological 
Parents,
338
 the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld restrictions on non-
resident adoptions, explaining that such restrictions help the state protect its 
children from the dangers of “baby selling.”
339
 Similar reasoning was used 
to uphold Rhode Island’s residency requirement. In In re Jeramie N., the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld residency requirements imposed on 
private adoptions and explained that such requirements allow the state to 
protect children’s best interest and ensure “children are not ‘“sold to the 
highest bidder and shuffled around like objects on an auction block.”’”
340
 
The Indiana Supreme Court has also used similar reasoning. As the court 
explained in In re Adoption of Infants H., “Residency does matter as 
respects the delicate question of adopting a child . . . [because] it is more 
                                                                                                             
(2018); IDAHO CODE § 16-1501 (2014); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/2 (LexisNexis 2015); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-2-2 (LexisNexis 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.470 
(LexisNexis 2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.22 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-11 
(LexisNexis 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.309 (2003); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-4 (1998); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-60 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-115 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 63.2-1201 (2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.82, 882.01 (West 1991); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-
22-103 (1986); CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WHO MAY ADOPT, BE ADOPTED, OR PLACE A CHILD FOR 
ADOPTION? 2 & n.6 (Jan. 2020), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/parties.pdf (noting 
requirements for the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands). In these 
states, “the required period of residency ranges from 60 days to 1 year.” Id. However, some 
of these states make exceptions for non-residents under certain circumstances. For example, 
in Indiana and South Carolina, a nonresident can adopt a child with special needs; “in 
Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Rhode Island, a nonresident may adopt through an 
agency”; and Illinois, Tennessee and South Carolina all make exceptions for members of the 
military. Id. “Some states make exceptions to the residency requirements for members of the 
military.” Id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-60 (2018) (excepting military personnel 
stationed in South Carolina). 
 338. 446 S.E.2d 404 (S.C. 1994).  
 339. Id. at 407, 410–11. 
 340. 688 A.2d 825, 830 (R.I. 1997). In addition, the Interstate Compact on the Placement 
of Children was created specifically because states recognized the dangers of placing 
children out of state due to the home state’s limited ability to continue to monitor that child’s 
safety. See, e.g., Bernadette W. Hartfield, The Role of the Interstate Compact on the 
Placement of Children in Interstate Adoption, 68 NEB. L. REV. 292, 296 (1989) (“The ICPC 
was intended to extend the jurisdictional reach of a party state into the borders of another 
party state for the purpose of investigating a proposed placement and supervising a 
placement once it has been made.”). 
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difficult for an Indiana court to evaluate whether adoption by a non-resident 
is in a child's best interest.”
341
 
As the courts in the above cases understood, it is much easier for a 
community to protect its children when the children remain within its 
jurisdiction. Tribal governments share this desire to keep an eye on their 
children and ensure they are protected and well cared for.
342
 The ICWA’s 
tribal placement preference simply ensures tribes, have the same ability as 
states to safeguard their children.
343
 
d) Open Adoptions 
The ICWA’s tribal placement preference keeps Indian children 
connected to their tribal communities—regardless of whether the child’s 
birth parents believe this connection is in the child’s best interest. In 
voluntary adoptions, this means the placement wishes of a fit custodial 
parent can be overridden. The ICWA’s critics claim this is unusual
344
 and 
note that fit custodial parents should have the right to make decisions 
                                                                                                             
 341. 904 N.E.2d 203, 206 (Ind. 2009). 
 342. In addition, such restrictions are common in the international context. Many 
countries give preference to citizens and some completely prohibit their citizen children to 
be adopted by non-citizens. See generally Bernie D. Jones, International and Transracial 
Adoptions: Toward a Global Critical Race Feminist Practice?, 10 WASH. & LEE RACE & 
ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 43, 58 (2004). See also infra Section III.E (discussing international 
adoption). 
 343. It should also be noted that tribes have similar concerns about “baby selling” but 
that these concerns are alleviated by the application of the tribal placement preference. See 
Berger, supra note 192, at 356 (noting that tribal placement preferences “will likely result in 
a child becoming entirely unavailable for a high-priced adoption”). 
 344. During a hearing in 1988 to consider amendments to the ICWA, one witness 
testified that the ICWA infringes on a mother’s rights to “determin[e] what the best interes ts 
of the child are . . . [and] subject[s] the interests of the child to the interests of the tribe.” To 
Amend the Indian Child Welfare Act: Hearings on S. 1976 Before the S. Select Comm. on 
Indian Affs., 100th Cong. 48 (1988), https://narf.org/nill/documents/icwa/federal/lh/ 
hear051188/hear051188.pdf (testimony of Ross Swimmer, Asst. Sec’ for Indian Affairs, 
Dep’t of the Interior); see also Christine D. Bakeis, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: 
Violating Personal Rights for the Sake of the Tribe, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 543, 568 (1996) (“The ICWA permits tribes and courts to blatantly disregard a natural 
parent’s deliberate and thoughtful decision to have their child adopted by a specific family of 
their choice. Even more frightening is the fact that under the ICWA courts and tribes can 
disregard a parent’s conscious decision not to have their child raised in the same social 
setting to which they belong.”). 
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regarding the care and control of their children.
345
 In general, this is true, 
but this right is not absolute and may be infringed to protect the health and 
welfare of the child.  
The ICWA applies to both involuntary and voluntary adoptions because 
Congress determined Indian children would continue to be harmed if 
voluntary adoption provided an exception to the Act.
346
 Congress 
recognized that Indian children benefit from a connection to their tribes and 
relatives. The growth of open adoption laws supports this conclusion.  
The ICWA is premised on the belief that it is in the best interests of 
Indian children to remain connected to their families and tribes.
347
 The 
tribal placement preferences help ensure that even if children cannot be 
placed with a relative, they will remain connected to their tribal culture and 
                                                                                                             
 345. For cases discussing a parent’s constitutionally protected right to raise a child free 
from governmental intrusion, see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Soc’y 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 346. ICWA applies to both because Congress recognized that voluntary placements could 
otherwise be used as a way to circumvent the Act. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 11 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7533 (anticipating the dangers posed by voluntary 
actions) (“[T]he voluntary waiver of parental rights is a device widely employed by social 
workers to gain custody of children.”). For a compelling disclosure of the use of voluntary 
adoptions by private adoption agencies as a device to place Native children outside the 
Native American community, see Oversight Hearings on the Indian Child Welfare Act: 
Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affs., 100th Cong. 362–66 (1987), https://narf.org/ 
nill/documents/icwa/federal/lh/hear111087/hear111087.pdf (stating that private adoption 
agencies in Alaska “consistently show an utter disregard for the Indian Child Welfare Act 
and the values it embodies” and that the Alaskan agencies “are in the adoption business”); 
see Erik W. Aamot-Snapp, When Judicial Flexibility Becomes Abuse of Discretion: 
Eliminating the “Good Cause” Exception in Indian Child Welfare Act Adoptive Placements, 
79 MINN. L. REV. 1167, 1196 (1995); see also Oversight on the Implementation of the Indian 
Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affs., 98th Cong. 
107–08 (1984) (statement of Ethel C. Krepps, President, Okla. Indian Child Welfare Ass’n) 
(describing an affidavit used by independent adoption agencies to bypass the ICWA). 
 347. Open adoption is similar to the long-standing tribal practice of customary adoption.  
[T]ribal customary adoption (TCA), is a legal adoption where the adopting 
parents receive all the rights any other adoptive parent would, but where TPR 
does not occur. California, Minnesota, and Washington have laws recognizing 
and requiring TCAs to be an option in pursuing permanent placement for 
Indian juveniles. If the government is seeking to alleviate the negative impacts 
of TPRs on children and their families, customary adoptions should be a 
permanent option for all juveniles. 
Polasky, supra note 182, at 403. 
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heritage. The goal of open adoption is similar.
348
 Open adoptions seek to 
keep children connected to their birth communities and culture.
349
  
Studies show that most adoptees want to have some contact with their 
birth parents
350
 and that contact strongly contributes to adoptees’ well-
being.
351
 Specifically, such studies indicate that post-adoption contact helps 
children avoid feelings of conflict between their birth families and adoptive 
families,
352
 helps them resolve identity struggles,
353
 reduces anxiety about 
                                                                                                             
 348. See Annette R. Appell, Increasing Options to Improve Permanency: Considerations 
in Drafting an Adoption with Contact Statute, CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J., Fall 1998, at 24, 42 n.2 
[hereinafter Appell, Increasing Options] (defining open adoption as “a broad and flexible 
concept encompassing a spectrum of relationships that range from preadotion [sic] exchange 
of information among the birth and adoptive parents to ongoing postadoption contact 
between the birth family and the adoptive family”). It is also important to note that while 
open adoptions are a relatively recent development in American family courts, there is a 
long-standing tradition of open adoption in many tribal communities. See, e.g., Atwood, 
Flashpoints, supra note 89, at 670 (“In this regard, state courts would do well to learn from 
their tribal counterparts in designing placements for children that avoid the head-to-head 
collision of interests.”). 
 349. One of the additional benefits of open adoption is that by ensuring adoptive parents 
have contact with birth parents or relatives makes them less likely to think poorly of the 
child’s birth relations, and thus avoid “perceptions that the child may absorb as negative 
messages about the child’s worth or that might produce cognitive dissonance for the child 
who has loyalties to the birth family.” Annette Ruth Appell, Reflections on the Movement 
Toward a More Child-Centered Adoption, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 7 (2010) [hereinafter 
Appell, Reflections]. 
 350. “This study indicated that: ‘having contact is generally associated with satisfaction 
with that contact; not having contact is generally associated with dissatisfaction about not 
having contact . . . .’” Maldonado, Permanency, supra note 265, at 327 (quoting Tai J. 
Mendenhall et al., Adolescents' Satisfaction with Contact in Adoption, 21 CHILD & 
ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 175, 186 (2004)). 
 351. “[O]ne longitudinal study of children adopted as infants concluded ‘that ongoing 
contact with a birth parent contributes to [children’s] overall well-being as they grow up.’” 
Maldonado, Permanency, supra note 265, at 327 (quoting Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Overview 
of Legal Status of Post-Adoption Contact Agreements, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION 
READER 159, 159 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger eds., 2004)) (alteration in 
original); see also Malinda L. Seymore, Openness in International Adoption, 46 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 163, 178 (2015) (“[T]he growing body of research paints a positive 
picture of how well open adoptions of various forms tend to work for their participants.”) 
(quoting DEBORAH H. SIEGEL & SUSAN LIVINGSTON SMITH, EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION 
INST., OPENNESS IN ADOPTION: FROM SECRECY AND STIGMA TO KNOWLEDGE AND 
CONNECTIONS 16 (2012)). 
 352. Maldonado, Permanency, supra note 265, at 328; see also Carol Sanger, Bargaining 
for Motherhood: Postadoption Visitation Agreements, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 309, 322 (2012) 
(“Adoptive parents are also understood to benefit from the arrangement. As already noted, 
 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021





 and enables children to address feelings of 
rejection.
355
 Studies also suggest that post-adoption contact may be 
especially important in transracial adoption.
356
  
The similarities between open adoption and the tribal placement 
preference are most strongly exemplified by the fact that the availability of 
open adoptions has repeatedly been used as good cause for deviating from 
the Act’s placement preferences. For example, in the Minnesota adoption 
case of Christian Good Bird, the mother initially objected to her son’s 
adoption by a non-Indian couple he had been living with since birth.
357
 The 
child’s tribe also intervened to contest the adoption.
358
 The result was a 
highly contentious two-year custody battle.
359
 This case, however, was 
                                                                                                             
the practice of open adoption is understood to contribute to an ongoing supply of desirable 
newborns. Open adoption may also benefit the adoptive parents and their child from a 
developmental perspective. The adoptive parents accept, as evidenced by their willingness to 
open adoption, that transparency about origins is good for their child and that it will not 
threaten their own status as legal parents.”). 
 353. Contact can enable children to incorporate birth-families into their identity. See 
Sanger, supra note 352, at 322. 
 354. Appell, Reflections, supra note 349, at 22 (“Children’s accounts of their feelings 
about adoption and contact suggest that, for most of them, their everyday lives were not 
clouded by a significant sense of loss. However, when we asked them if they ever worried 
about anything[,] thirty-six (61 per cent) children identified issues associated with adoption 
or their birth families . . . . Direct contact went some way towards quelling these worries for 
many children and adoptive parents were aware of its importance in this respect.”) 
(alterations in original) (quoting CAROLE SMITH & JANETTE LOGAN, AFTER ADOPTION: 
DIRECT CONTACT AND RELATIONSHIPS 144 (2004)). 
 355. Annette Baran & Reuben Pannor, Perspectives on Open Adoption, FUTURE CHILD., 
Spring 1993, at 119, 122 (noting that one of the benefits of open adoptions is that “adoptees’ 
feelings of rejection by the birthparents also can be greatly diminished”). 
 356. Open adoption can help provide adopted children with same-race role models who 
can help with racial identity formation. See Seymore, supra note 351, at 179; see also 
Barbara Yngvesson, Negotiating Motherhood: Identity and Difference in “Open” Adoptions, 
31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 31, 67–76 (1997) (exploring the practice of “other” mothering in 
African American communities). 
 357. Ronald M. Walters, Comment, Goodbye to Good Bird: Considering the Use of 
Contact Agreements to Settle Contested Adoptions Arising Under the Indian Child Welfare 
Act, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 270, 271 (2008); see also In re Adoption of Baby Boy J., 944 
N.Y.S.2d 871, 877 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2012) (using a post adoption contract agreement as part of 
its determination that “good cause exists to deviate from the preferences set forth in [the] 
ICWA”). 
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ultimately resolved when the non-Indian adoptive couple agreed to sign a 
“cultural connectedness agreement” obligating them “to establish and 
maintain contact with [the child’s] Tribal culture and his extended 
family.”
360
 The court determined that this promise was sufficient “good 
cause” to permit deviation from the ICWA’s placement preference.
361
 
Indian law scholars, such as Professor Barbara Atwood, have long 
recognized the potential benefits of permitting open adoption to serve as 
good cause to deviate from the placement preferences. As Professor 
Atwood explains, continued contact agreements “allow state courts to 
fashion remedies that accommodate the child’s interest in remaining with 
psychological parents while maintaining ties with her cultural community. 
Through continued contact, the child’s identity as a member of the tribe 
would remain vital, thus benefiting the child as well as the tribe.”
362
  
Historically, the biggest hurdle to permitting open adoption to constitute 
“good cause” for deviating from the placement preference was that open 
adoption agreements were frequently unenforceable. For example, in the 
2008 case In re Jesse, the Choctaw Nation was amenable to permitting an 
                                                                                                             
 359.  
Christian’s adoptive parents appeared on Dr. Phil after a judge had ordered 
them to return Christian to his mother in 45 days. Dr. Phil: Adoption 
Controversy (CBS television broadcast Jan. 28, 2005) (transcript on file with 
the author). While the Hofers were still expecting that they would have to 
return Christian, Dr. Phil suggested that the situation might best be resolved 
extrajudicially. The litigation settled soon thereafter. 
Id. at 270 n.2. 
 360. Id. at 272. 
 361. The Goodbird case is not unique. See, e.g., Baby Boy J., 944 N.Y.S.2d at 877 (using 
a post adoption contract agreement as part of its determination that “good cause exists to 
deviate from the preferences set forth in [the] ICWA.”); In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 
1361, 1363 (Alaska 1993) (citing the “‘open adoption’ petition allowing E.P.D. access to 
F.H. and possibly giving F.H. exposure to her Native American heritage”); see also Native 
Vill. of Napaimute Traditional Council v. Terence W. (In re Adoption of Keith M.W.), 79 
P.3d 623, 631 (Alaska 2003) (finding that reliance on adoption structure can serve as part of 
the basis for finding good cause to deviate from the Act’s placement preferences); Jeff O. v. 
Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., No. 1 CA-JV 11-0019, 2011 WL 3820513, at *7 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
Aug. 30, 2011) (citing “[t]he open adoption/relationship between the placement and 
biological parents and extended family” as part of its good cause determination). 
 362. Atwood, Flashpoints, supra note 89, at 670 (describing the Indian Child Welfare 
Act Amendments of 2001, H.R. 2644, 107th Cong. (2001)). The revisions “would authorize 
state courts to approve of post-adoption visitation agreements as part of an adoption decree” 
and these agreements “would grant enforceable rights of visitation or contact with the child 
by birth parents, extended family members, or a child’s tribe.” Id. at 669. 
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open adoption to serve as “good cause” to deviate from the preferences, but 
the agreement fell through when the child’s birth father informed the Tribe 
that there was “no such thing as an open adoption in California.”
363
 Today, 
that is no longer the case.
364
 California’s current law permits post-adoption 
contact agreements and assumes such contact may be beneficial for all 
adopted children. The provision also specifically includes tribal contact. It 
states: 
The Legislature finds and declares that some adoptive children 
may benefit from either direct or indirect contact with birth 
relatives, including the birth parent or parents . . . or an Indian 
tribe, after being adopted. Postadoption contact agreements are 
intended to ensure children of an achievable level of continuing 
contact when contact is beneficial to the children and the 
agreements are voluntarily executed by birth relatives, including 




California is not alone. Over the past twenty years, many states have 
“revised their statutory schemes regarding open adoption”; the majority 
provide “for some form of enforceable agreement between birth parents and 
                                                                                                             
 363. In re Jesse E., No. B200426, 2008 WL 651692, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 
2008). 
 364. This view changed in the 1980s, when courts began to 
take account of developing shifts in law and in sentiment regarding open 
adoption, and they began to reassess the nonenforceability of visitation 
agreements. Most of the cases from the period involved mothers who had 
existing relationships with their children prior to the adoption; the adopted 
children were children, not newborns, who had lived with their birthmothers for 
some time. 
Sanger, supra note 352, at 316. This reasoning is now being applied to the adoption of 
infants as well as older children. Today, most statutes apply to any adopted child but there 
remain some exceptions. For example, “Connecticut and Nebraska permit visitation only 
with children adopted from foster care; while Indiana limits coverage to foster children who 
are two and over.” Id. at 319 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-715 (West 2004); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 31-19-16.5-1 (West 2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-162 (LexisNexis 
2011)). 
 365. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(a) (West 2017). It is also telling that the California law 
does not only pertain to birth parents but also provides for information sharing with extended 
relatives.  
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 In fact, as Professor Carol Sanger notes, “[M]ost 
adoptions in the United States are now open in some respect.”
367
 Moreover, 
while all open adoption statutes include the birth parents, several include 
other birth relatives, such as siblings, grandparents, aunts, uncles, foster 
parents, and some states—like California—specifically include members of 
an Indian child’s tribe.
368
  
The inclusion of Indian tribes in open adoption statutes is significant. 
States with these provisions recognize the similarity between open adoption 
and tribal preference. Both keep children connected to their birth families 
and communities, but that is not the only similarity between the ICWA’s 
tribal preference and open adoption. In fact, the most important parallel 
between open adoption and tribal preference may be that both can be 
imposed against the wishes of the child’s parents.
369
  
                                                                                                             
 366. Sanger, supra note 352, at 319 (“By 2011, twenty-six states and the District of 
Columbia had enacted laws providing for some form of enforceable agreement . . . . While 
the statutes differ in interesting ways, each provides that postadoption visitation agreements 
are legal so long as the agreement is in writing and approved by the court, most often by 
being incorporated into the final order of adoption. The statutes also specify the type of 
contact to which the parties may agree. These include actual visitation, the sharing of 
information (identifying or non-identifying), and other forms of communication, such as 
letters and photographs. Information may be exchanged directly or through an adoption 
agency.”). 
 367. Id. at 321 (“[O]pen adoption is now a familiar and expected part of adoption 
practice and culture.”); see also Appell, Increasing Options, supra note 348, at 4 (“Open 
adoption has now become the norm in practice for all types of adoption.”). 
 368. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(b)(1) (“Nothing in the adoption laws of this state 
shall be construed to prevent the adopting parent or parents, the birth relatives, including the 
birth parent or parents . . . or an Indian tribe, and the child from voluntarily executing a 
written agreement to permit continuing contact between the birth relatives, including the 
birth parent or parents . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Sophie Mashburn, Comment, 
Mediating A Family: The Use of Mediation in the Formation and Enforcement of Post-
Adoption Contact Agreements, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 383, 388 (“California, Minnesota, and 
Oklahoma, children adopted from an Indian tribe are allowed continued contact with 
members of that tribe if they have a pre-existing relationship with the tribe from which they 
were adopted.”). 
 369. Annette R. Appell, Enforceable Post Adoption Contact Statutes, Part II: Court-
Imposed Post Adoption Contact, 4 ADOPTION Q. 101, 101 (2000) [hereinafter Appell, 
Enforceable]; see also Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: 
Implications for Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997, 1040 
(1995) (noting that some courts have ordered post adoption contact over adoptive parents’ 
objections); In re Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d 292, 300 (Mass. 2000) (citing Massachusetts 
law permitting the court to order visitation regardless of the wishes of the parties). 
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Several states have court-imposed post-adoption contact statutes that 
empower courts to order visits at the request of third parties and over the 
objections of the adoptive parents.
370
 As Professor Annette Appell notes, 
such orders “can be useful, particularly when there are people important to 
the child, but whose importance the adoptive parents do not appreciate.”
371
 
Similar to the ICWA placement preferences, these statutes permit parental 
wishes to be ignored in order to ensure a child has contact with their birth 
family and community. These statutes are significant, because one of the 
most common criticisms of the tribal placement preferences is that they 
promote a child’s familial and cultural connections regardless of the birth 
parent’s wishes.  
Court-imposed post-adoption contact is similar. Like the ICWA’s tribal 
placement preferences, court-imposed post-adoption contact orders assume 
that maintaining a child’s connection to family and community is important 
enough to override a biological parent’s desire to sever this connection.  
4. Any Other Indian 
The third ICWA placement preference gives preference to “Indian 
families” over any non-Indian families seeking to adopt an Indian child.
372
 
The ICWA’s critics claim this provision promotes race matching.
373
 As 
explained in Section II.E of this Article, this preference is not race-
matching because “Indian” is a political, rather than racial, category. 
                                                                                                             
 370. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3 (LexisNexis 2012) (stating that a court may 
dispense with need for consent to adoption in the best interests of a child); see also Appell, 
Enforceable, supra note 369, at 101–02. 
 371. Appell, Reflections, supra note 349, at 6. For example, 
. . . Massachusetts’ relatively longstanding and robust practice of court-ordered 
post-adoption and post-termination family contact. In fact, so rooted is this 
practice that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Adoption of Vito, 
explicitly rejected the argument that statutory amendments providing for 
adoption with contact and post-termination contact agreements removed the 
judiciary’s equitable authority to impose post-termination and post-adoption 
contact. It is not surprising, then, that there continues to be litigation regarding 
the court’s discretion to order post-adoption contact, which is limited only by 
the best interests of the child standard, a notoriously indefinite measure. 
Id. at 12. 
 372. 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (“In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a 
preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement 
with . . . (3) other Indian families.”). 
 373. See supra Section II.E (discussing the Brackeen case and the plaintiff’s—and their 
supporters’—arguments that the ICWA is unconstitutional racial discrimination). 
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Regardless, even if “Indian” was a racial category, this provision would still 
be permissible. Despite the perception that racial considerations in child 
welfare are forbidden, this contention is false. There are strong arguments 
that race-matching is undesirable, but it is far from prohibited.  
a) MEPA and the Illusion of Color Blindness 
The perception that racial considerations should be barred from child 
placement decisions gained nationwide prominence with the passage of the 
Multi-Ethnic Placement Act (MEPA).
374
 The MEPA was Congress’ 
response to growing criticism that the preference for placing black children 
with black parents prevented these children from being adopted and forced 
them to languish in foster care.
375
 As it was originally enacted, the MEPA 
prohibited officials from delaying or denying the placement of a child 
“solely on the basis of race.”
376
 The “solely” language led to public outcry 
that the statute did not go far enough and, in 1996, Congress amended the 
MEPA to remove the “solely” language.
377
  
The passage of the MEPA and its amendments created the perception 
that race-matching is both harmful and prohibited; yet, it remains legal and 
widespread. The most common example of modern race-matching is 
“facilitative accommodation,” the policy of considering a potential adoptive 
couple’s racial preference.  
b) Facilitative Accommodation 
“Facilitative accommodation” refers to the practice of categorizing 
children by race and placing them with parents according to the adoptive 
parents’ racial preference.
378
 Facilitative accommodation occurs in both 
                                                                                                             
 374. 42 U.S.C. § 5115a (1994) (repealed 1996). 
 375. Ralph Richard Banks, The Multiethnic Placement Act and the Troubling Persistence 
of Race Matching, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 271, 272 (2009) [hereinafter Banks, Multiethnic 
Placement Act]. It should be noted that MEPA has not succeeded in its goals of creating 
equality in adoption rates. Is MEPA/TEP Working for African American Children?, 27 
CHILD L. PRAC. 79 (2008) (“Adoption rates of African American children remain lower than 
those of other racial/ethnic groups.”). 
 376. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 5115a(a)(1)(A)–(B) (1994) (repealed)). This language 
permitted child placement decisions in which race was one factor among many, ironically 
making MEPA the first federal statute to condone race matching. 
 377. Banks, Multiethnic Placement Act, supra note 375, at 272–73. 
 378. For an example of how race matching works, see Banks, Multiethnic Placement Act, 
supra note 375, at 275–76 (describing South Carolina’s policy which asked parents if they 
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private adoptions, which do not receive federal funds and are not subject to 
the MEPA, and in public adoptions, which are subject to the MEPA.  
c) Private Adoptions 
In private adoptions, race-matching is open and notorious. As Professor 
Dov Fox notes, “Some private agencies still openly make placement 
decisions based primarily on race and prominently highlight the racial 
backgrounds of adoptive children in online advertising and other 
promotional materials, while charging higher fees to adopt white children 
than black ones.”
379
 This practice is compounded by the fact that, over the 
past four decades, the cost of adoption skyrocketed. “Estimates in the late 
1980s put the average agency fee between $7,000 and $10,000.”
380
 By 
2015, many agencies were charging more than $50,000 per adoption and 




Many scholars have criticized these racial premiums. As Professor 
Margaret Radin notes, pricing adoptions based on race creates both a literal 
and a rhetorical market in which there exists inferior and superior 
children.
382
 Similarly, Professor Michele Goodwin notes that “altruism as a 
primary goal in adoption has been overshadowed by supplication to 
                                                                                                             
were willing to “accept children who are Black, White, Black/White, or Other” and then 
used these answers to determine a child’s potential placement). 
 379. Dov Fox, Race Sorting in Family Formation, 49 FAM. L.Q. 55, 60 (2015) (citing 
Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory 
of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 27–30 (2003)); Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging 
Racial Preferences in Adoptions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1415, 1423 (2006); Barbara 
Fedders, Race and Market Values in Domestic Infant Adoption, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1687, 1696–
97 (2010); Michele Goodwin, The Free-Market Approach to Adoption: The Value of a Baby, 
26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 61, 65–66 (2006); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and 
Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203, 248 (2009). 
 380. Jack Darcher, Market Forces in Domestic Adoptions: Advocating A Quantitative 
Limit on Private Agency Adoption Fees, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 729, 737 (2010). 
 381. Id. 
 382. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 156 (1996) 
(“[P]ersons . . . possess objects that they may control or manipulate to achieve their 
ends . . . . Objectification is improper treatment of persons because it makes them means, not 
ends . . . . As means, objects may be bought and sold in markets, to achieve satisfaction of 
persons’ needs and desires. Objects, but not persons, may be commodified.”); see also 
Darcher, supra note 380, at 745 (“When a baby or child is objectified, all of its attributes—
sex, race, hair color, predicted intelligence, predicted height—become part of its ‘worth.’”). 
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 Despite such criticisms, today’s adoption market 
remains a highly racialized one.  
Adoption agencies establish fees with adoptive parents based on racial 
and other characteristics these parents find most desirable.
384
 In the U.S., 
white children or other lighter skinned children are more highly valued than 
black children and command a higher price.
385
 As Professor Jessica Dixon 
Weaver explains, “In many ways the process of adoption reinforces the 
privilege and status representative of the potential parent’s identity.
 
Potential adoptive parents can choose what race child they are willing to 
raise, yet the average child awaiting adoption, regardless of ethnicity, is 
unable to state a racial preference.”
386
  
There are multiples reasons to criticize an adoption system that 
accommodates potential parents’ racial preferences and objectifies children. 





                                                                                                             
 383. Goodwin, supra note 379, at 75. 
 384. Id. at 68–69. 
 385. Id. (“In U.S. adoptions, white children are more highly valued than black children 
by both adoption agencies and by those who seek to adopt them. Further, adoptive parents 
are acutely aware that competition is involved in free-market adoptions. Thus, those serious 
about adopting a white baby, and with the resources to do so, realize balking at the high 
costs associated with those adoptions would prove futile.”). 
 386. Weaver, supra note 274, at 175. 
 387. Some states have attempted to combat the market in babies by enacting laws 
intended to curb the profit of private adoption. 
For example, the UAA forbids the exchange of money or any items of value for 
the express placement of a minor for adoption. The UAA also explicitly forbids 
any payment for the birth parents’ consent or relinquishment. However, the act 
does allow payment to agencies for their services in connection with the 
adoption, including those incurred in locating the child—such as advertising 
costs. More importantly, it allows for several categories of compensation to the 
birth parents: (1) the medical, pharmaceutical, and traveling expenses incurred 
by the birth mother in connection with the birth (or any illness to the child); (2) 
any counseling services for the parent(s) for a reasonable time before or after 
the adoption placement; (3) living expenses for the mother within a reasonable 
time before the birth and for no more than six weeks after the birth; and (4) any 
legal costs incurred by the birth parents. 
Darcher, supra note 380, at 749. Consequently, it is not hard to get around these 
prohibitions. 
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d) Public Adoptions  
Public adoptions are governed by the MEPA, but the statute’s 
applicability doesn’t prevent race-matching. States continue to use racial 
preferences when determining potential placements for children in state 
care, and children who do not match the prospective parent’s preferred race 
are not listed as potential matches.
388
 Consequently, two decades after the 
MEPA’s passage, a child’s probability of being adopted remains strongly 
affected by his or her race; for African American children, this means a 
significantly lower likelihood of adoption.
389
 In their study on race-
matching in adoption, Mariagiovanna Baccara, Allan Collard-Wexler, 
Leonardo Felli, and Leeat Yariv demonstrated that “children’s aggregate 
probability of receiving an application is considerably affected by their 
race” and that “the probability that a 100 percent African American [baby] 
(of unknown gender) receives an application is 1.8 percent in contrast to a 
probability of 13.1 percent for a 0 percent African American child.”
390
 
Professor Ralph Richard Banks is one of the most vocal critics of 
facilitative accommodation and believes it is just as harmful as prohibited 
forms of race-matching.
391
 Still, such views remain rare.
392 
Courts and 
legislatures do not consider facilitative accommodation harmful.
393
 As a 
                                                                                                             
 388. See Banks, Multiethnic Placement Act, supra note 375, at 275–76; see also Fox, 
supra note 379, at 60 (noting adoptive parents’ racial preferences in adoption is given 
significant weight) (“Even in public agencies, however, social workers use the broad 
discretion afforded them to facilitate through quiet practice the very kind of race-matching 
that MEPA bars them from imposing.”); see also RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL 
INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE 134 (2001) (noting that even after 
MEPA, “agencies could consider the attitudes and preferences of prospective parents to 
decide whether placement was in a child’s best interest”). 
 389. Mariagiovanna Baccara et al., Child-Adoption Matching: Preferences for Gender 
and Race, 6 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 133, 153 (2014)). 
 390. Id.  
 391. R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial 
Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875 (1998) (asserting that 
race preferences in adoption are damaging because they limit the possibility of adoption and 
arguing in favor of a non-accommodation policy that would preclude adoption agencies from 
facilitating these racial preferences). 
 392. See, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 379, at 1470 (“Although there is a vast literature 
condemning race-matching practices, only recently have scholars begun to view adoptive 
parents’ racial preferences as problematic.”). 
 393. For example, when states are found to have violated MEPA it tends to be for 
denying a parent’s racial preferences as in the case of parents willing to adopt transracially 
rather than for abiding by it. See Schlueter, supra note 378, at 271 (“DHHS found illegal the 
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result, states prohibit racial considerations that delay or deny an adoption, 
but most allow other racial considerations. For example, Missouri law states 
that “[p]lacement of a child in an adoptive home may not be delayed or 
denied on the basis of race, color or national origin.”
394
 Yet, the law also 
accommodates race-matching through the “diligent recruitment of potential 
adoptive homes that reflect the ethnic and racial diversity of children in the 
state for whom adoptive homes are needed.”
395
 Similarly, both Vermont 
and New Jersey prohibit an agency from racially discriminating in the 
adoptive parent selection process but allow agencies to consider race when 
determining the best placement for a child.
396
 In Connecticut and Michigan, 
agencies are simply prohibited from making placement decisions “solely” 
based on race
397
 and, in Kentucky, race-matching is facilitated through a 
                                                                                                             
[South Carolina] agency’s practice of treating transracial adoptions with greater scrutiny, 
faulting, for example, the inquiries into prospective parents’ ability to adopt transracially, 
and ability to nurture a child of a different race, as well as inquiries into the racial makeup of 
such parents’ friends, neighborhoods, and available schools.”) (quoting Elizabeth Bartholet, 
Commentary, Cultural Stereotypes Can and Do Die: It's Time to Move on With Transracial 
Adoption, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 315, 316 (2006)); see also Eyer, supra note 247, 
at 580 n.201 (“Since MEPA was amended in 1996, only two courts have addressed the 
constitutionality of relying on race in adoptive or foster care placements, with opposite 
results.”). Eyer compared In re Andrea Lynn Carpenter, 1999 Mich. App. LEXIS 2140, at 
*8–10, n.3 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1999), in which the court found “the trial court’s reliance 
on race was constitutionally unproblematic where race was not the sole consideration,” with 
Kenny A. v. Perdue, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27025, at *21–22 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2004), in 
which the court allowed “a claim of unconstitutional racial discrimination, in a case where 
the circumstantial evidence supported the conclusion that the agency had a virtually 
categorical policy of race-matching, to survive summary judgment . . . .” Id. 
 394. MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.005(3) (West 2014) 
 395. Id. § 453.005(2). 
 396. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-203(d) (West 1997) (“A preplacement evaluation 
shall contain the following information about the person being evaluated:(1) age and date of 
birth, nationality, racial or ethnic background, and any religious affiliation.”); see also N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 9:3-40 (West 2006) (“[A]n approved agency shall not discriminate with regard 
to the selection of adoptive parents for any child on the basis of age, sex, race, national 
origin, religion or marital status provided, however, that these factors may be considered in 
determining whether the best interests of a child would be served by a particular placement 
for adoption or adoption.”). 
 397. “[T]he commissioner or such agency shall not refuse to place or delay placement of 
such child with any prospective adoptive parent solely on the basis of a difference in race, 
color or national origin.” CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-726(a) (West 2000); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 722.957 (West 1995) (“[A]n adoption facilitator shall not refuse to provide 
services to a potential adoptive parent based solely on age, race, religious affiliation, 
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statute permitting genetic parents to disapprove a placement for any reason 
and without any explanation.
398
  
The above laws comply with the MEPA, which simply prohibits 
agencies from delaying or denying an adoptive placement based on race.
399
 
They are also consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Palmore v. 
Sidoti, which held only that race may not be the sole factor in determining 
the best interests of the child for purposes of custody.
400
 Palmore prohibits 
courts from relying exclusively on race and racial concerns as the basis for 
their decisions, but it does not prohibit racial considerations in general.
401
 
Palmore is a very low standard. Professor Katie Eyer notes that “only the 
most unsophisticated government actor would be unable to demonstrate 
compliance” with Palmore.
402
 As a result, race is a permissible and 
common consideration in custody decisions.
403
 
Tellingly, objections to the use of race in custody decisions is primarily 
confined to the cases where a potential adoptive couple is prevented from 
adopting a different race child when no same-race parent is available. As 
Professor Banks wrote: 
                                                                                                             
disability, or income level. A child placing agency shall not make placement decisions based 
solely on age, race, religious affiliation, disability, or income level.”) (emphasis added). 
 398.  
The cabinet may refuse to approve the placement of a child for adoption if the 
child’s custodial parent is unwilling for the child to be placed for adoption with 
the proposed adoptive family. The cabinet may approve or deny the placement, 
in spite of the fact that the custodial parent or parents are unwilling to be 
interviewed by the cabinet or other approving entity . . . . 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.473 (West 2018). 
 399. In facilitative adoption the denial of the placement is based on the prospective 
parents’ decision not the agency’s. However, the decision to accommodate parental 
preferences, which are primarily for white children, arguably delays and may even deny a 
placement based on race. Leigh, supra note 72, at 396 (“By the child-placing agency helping 
parents exclude children of other races, it is actually delaying the adoption of minority 
children by making it easier for these minority children to be overlooked, and in turn, not be 
adopted in a timely manner.”). 
 400. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
 401. See id. at 432–34. 
 402. Eyer, supra note 247, at 575. 
 403. Gloria G. v. State Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 833 P.2d 979, 984 (Kan. 1992) 
(finding that race could be used as a factor in adoption decisions if it is not the sole factor); 
In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633, 646 A.2d 1036, 1036 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) 
(affirming circuit court’s holding that “determination that placement of child with same race 
family was in best interest of child was not abuse of discretion”). 
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I often raise this issue in my family law class by asking the 
students to imagine that there are black children and white 
children available for adoption, and that there are so many 
prospective parents of each race that all the children could be 
placed with suitable families even if none were placed across 
racial lines. It is striking to see how opposition to race matching 
diminishes once its effect is no longer to delay or preclude the 
adoption of some children. Many students are all too happy to 
race match, so long as there are enough families of each race for 
all the available children.
404
 
If “Indian” is considered a race, then § 1915(c) of the ICWA permits the 
scenario described by Professor Banks and should elicit the same general 
approval. The “any other Indian” requirement preferences an Indian parent 
over a non-Indian parent only when both are available and qualified. A 
racial preference under such circumstances is not prohibited by the MEPA 
and, as previously noted, is frequently encouraged under state law. 
Consequently, the fact that these placements have garnered such fierce 
opposition is more likely due to adoptive parents’ desire to adopt Indian 
children rather than an objection to race-matching in general. The 
objections to race-matching in the international adoption context reveals 
similar motivations. 
E. International Adoption 
International adoptions are now commonplace in the United States.
405
 
The United States is the number one country for international adoptions 
and, at its peak, in 2004, the United States accounted for nearly half of all 
transnational adoptions.
406
 However, since then, the numbers of 
international adoptions have been declining.
407
 This reduction is not due to 
                                                                                                             
 404. Banks, Multiethnic Placement Act, supra note 375, at 287. 
 405. See, e.g., Barbara Yngvesson, Transnational Adoption and European Immigration 
Politics: Producing the National Body in Sweden, 19 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 327, 331–
32 (2012) (describing the United States as “[t]he principal adopting nation today, as it has 
been for the past five decades”).  
 406. Id. (noting that the United States received 22,884 children that year). 
 407. See, e.g., Deleith Duke Gossett, If Charity Begins at Home, Why Do We Go 
Searching Abroad? Why the Federal Adoption Tax Credit Should Not Subsidize 
International Adoptions, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 839, 857 n.118 (2013) (“Recent figures 
show a decline of approximately 60%, from 22,991 international adoptions in 2004 to 
8,668 international adoptions in 2012.”). 
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a reduction in demand, which remains high,
408
 but is the result of increased 
restrictions and prohibitions on foreign adoptions.
409
 Not surprisingly, 
potential adoptive parents are often vocal opponents of these increased 
restrictions, many of which require racial and cultural similarities between 
the child and adoptive parent.
410
 
1. Adoption Prohibitions 
Foreign countries frequently prohibit adoptions by persons not deemed 
similar enough to the potential adoptive child. In some countries, this 
means adoptive parents must be the same religion as the child. For example, 
in Tunisia and Morocco, a Muslim child may only be adopted by another 
Muslim
411
 and, in Bangladesh, a Hindu child may only be adopted by 
another Hindu.
412
 However, international law also permits adoption 
restrictions to be ethnically or culturally based. For example, the preamble 
                                                                                                             
 408. See, e.g., Who Will Fill the Empty Cribs?, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 26, 2008, 8:26 AM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/105530. 
 409. See, e.g., James G. Dwyer, Inter-Country Adoption and the Special Rights Fallacy, 
35 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 189, 191 (2013) (explains that the decline in adoptions is due to the fact 
that “many countries that have been major ‘sending countries’ have imposed new procedural 
and substantive restrictions on foreign adoption or have foreclosed the practice altogether.”); 
Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, Review of the Year 2015-2016 in Family Law: 
Domestic Dockets Stay Busy, 50 FAM. L.Q. 501, 514 (2017) (“International adoptions have 
declined partly because of the Hague Convention on Cooperation with Respect 
to International Adoption and because several countries, including Russia, Romania, and 
Guatemala, have ended adoption programs or have diminished numbers of children 
available.”).  
 410. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Permanency Is Not Enough: Children Need the Nurturing 
Parents Found in International Adoption, 55 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 781, 782 (2010–11) 
(arguing against adoption restrictions to help increase international adoptions); Paulo 
Barrozo, Finding Home in the World: A Deontological Theory of the Right to Be Adopted, 
55 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 701, 704–05 (2010–11) (opposing restrictions on inter-country 
adoption). 
 411. See, e.g., Cantonal Court of Tunis, Decision No. 2272, Dec. 26, 1974, 1975 REVUE 
TUNISIENNE DE DROIT, no. 2, at 117, cited in Nadjma Yassari, Adding by Choice: Adoption 
and Functional Equivalents in Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 927, 
946 n.130 (2015); Morocco Adoption, RAINBOW KIDS: ADOPTION & CHILD WELFARE 
ADVOC., https://www.rainbowkids.com/international-adoption/country-programs/morocco 
(last visited Sept. 14, 2020). 
 412. See SARAH B. IGNATIUS & ELISABETH S. STICKNEY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE 
FAMILY app. G (2020 ed.), IMLF APP G (Westlaw) (“Laws of Selected Foreign Countries 
on Adoptions”). 
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to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
413
 asserts that the parties to the 
treaty must consider the “importance of the traditions and cultural values of 
each people for the protection and harmonious development of the child.”
414
 
Article 8 of the Convention requires that these parties “undertake to respect 
the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, 
name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful 
interference.”
415
 Most importantly, Article 21 states that intercountry 
adoption as a means of placement is only permitted “if the child cannot be 
placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be 
cared for in the child’s country of origin.”
416
  
The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in 
Respect of Intercountry Adoption
417
 also supports international adoption 
restrictions based on ethnic or cultural considerations. Specifically, Article 
16 states that, when considering foreign adoptions, the Central Authority of 
                                                                                                             
 413. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 2; see also 
Richard R. Carlson, A Child’s Right to A Family Versus A State’s Discretion to 
Institutionalize the Child, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 937, 978 (2016) (noting the Hague Adoption 
Conference has reaffirmed a principle of subsidiarity, which holds that intercountry adoption 
should be pursued only if a suitable family cannot be found in the child’s country of origin). 
 414. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 413, at 2. 
 415. Id. at 3. 
 416. Id. at 6. This may mean, as many intercountry adoption advocates note with 
concern, that the convention might require preference for local institutional care over an 
international placement. See Carlson, supra note 413, at 976 (“A more disturbing version of 
subsidiarity allows or even requires a state to place a child in a ‘suitable’ institution if local 
family placement is not possible, even if family placement outside the community is possible 
and the child is too young to have an emotional or psychological connection to the local 
community.”) (citing Laura McKinney, International Adoption and the Hague Convention: 
Does Implementation of the Convention Protect the Best Interests of Children?, 6 WHITTIER 
J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 361, 379 (2007)). However, others have argued this is not the case, 
citing the Hague Adoption Convention, which states that a child, “for the full and 
harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, 
in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding” and recognizes “that intercountry 
adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family to a child for whom a suitable 
family cannot be found in his or her State of origin.” Hague Conference on Private 
International Law: Final Act of the 17th Session, Including the Convention on Protection of 
Children and Co-operation in Respect to Intercountry Adoption at pmbl., May 29, 1993, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 105-51, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167, https://assets.hcch.net/docs/77e12f23-d3dc-
4851-8f0b-050f71a16947.pdf [hereinafter Hague Convention]. 
 417. Hague Convention, supra note 416. 
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the State of origin shall “give due consideration to the child’s upbringing 
and to his or her ethnic, religious and cultural background.”
418
  
2. International Adoption Proponents and Race Matching 
International adoption proponents criticize international laws that 
prohibit or discourage cross race or cross-cultural adoptions. Ironically, 
these critics are also some of the biggest proponents of race-matching, at 
least when it comes to their own adoptive children. 
The increase in American parents seeking international adoptions is a 
direct result of the decline in white children available for adoption in the 
United States. White parents unwilling to adopt from a primarily African-
American adoption pool are now using international adoption to seek more 
racially similar children.
419
 Foreign children who are white, or believed to 
be capable of passing as white, have become increasingly desired.
420
 In fact, 
the desire to adopt such children is so great that it nearly resulted in federal 
legislation conditioning U.S. aid on the increased availability of foreign 
children for adoption. 
 The proposed legislation was the Children and Families First Act 
(CHIFF),
421
 which sought to eliminate the Hague Convention’s preference 
for in-country care solutions in return for U.S. aid.
422
 Critics of the CHIFF 
                                                                                                             
 418. Id. art. 16 § (1)(b). 
 419. Maldonado, supra note 379, at 1423–26 (examining the myths surrounding 
domestic and international adoptions and demonstrating how racial preferences are an 
important factor in many adoptive parents’ decision to pursue an international adoption); see 
also Kim H. Pearson, Displaced Mothers, Absent and Unnatural Fathers: LGBT Transracial 
Adoption, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 149, 159, 165–67 (2012) (noting such policies have the 
“effect of leaving more Black children in foster care”). 
 420. Pearson, supra note 419, at 159, 165–67.  
 421. S. 1530, 113th Cong. 
 422. CHIFF imported the “concurrent planning” concept championed by Professor 
Bartholet and put it on equal footing with the Hague subsidiarity principle:  
The principle of subsidiarity, which gives preference to in-country 
solutions, should be implemented within the context of a concurrent 
planning strategy, exploring in- and out-of-country options simultaneously. 
If an in-country placement serving the child’s best interest and providing 
appropriate, protective, and permanent care is not quickly available, and 
such an international home is available, the child should be placed in that 
international home without delay. 
DeLeith Duke Gossett, Take Off the [Color] Blinders: How Ignoring the Hague 
Convention’s Subsidiarity Principle Furthers Structural Racism Against Black American 
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argued that the legislation treats children as a commodity.
423
 Professor 
Deleith Gosset described the CHIFF as serving “the interests of privileged 
families from wealthy nations at the expense of the poorest.”
424
  
Ultimately, the proposed legislation failed.
425
 However, the CHIFF fight 
demonstrated there is strong support for race-matching when it increases 
the number of white or passing-for-white children available for adoption. 
Indian children have often fallen into this category. Consequently, the real 
objection to the ICWA’s third preference category, “any other Indian 
family,” may not be that it promotes-race matching, but that it thwarts, 




Twenty years after its enactment, it is clear the ASFA is not the panacea 
that was promised.
427
 State and federal policy is increasingly turning away 
                                                                                                             
Children, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 261, 304 (2015) (quoting 2014 CHIFF § 2475; 2013 
CHIFF § 1530) (emphasis added by Gossett). 
 423. Id. at 305–06 (“Critics stated that CHIEF . . . actually aimed to tie foreign assistance 
to a country’s willingness to participate in intercountry adoption for the benefit of 
Americans who want to adopt . . . . However, tying federal aid to a country’s willingness to 
deliver its children for adoption is treating children as a commodity.”). 
 424. Id. at 306; see also Sarah Sargent, Suspended Animation: The Implementation of the 
Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption in the United States and Romania, 10 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 351, 373 (2004) (“The [Adoption Institute] report noted that the ‘market 
forces inherent in international adoption pose a potential threat to the welfare of children 
being considered for adoption, as well as their birth parents and prospective adoptive 
parents.’”) (quoting Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Inst., Recommendations to the State 
Department & Acton Burnell Re: Implementation of the Intercountry Adoption Act 2000 
(May 24, 2001)). 
 425. See CHIFF Is Dead: A Post-Mortem, LIGHT OF DAY STORIES (Jan. 11, 2015), 
https://lightofdaystories.com/2015/01/11/chiff-is-dead-a-post-mortem/. 
 426. The ICWA helps take wealth out of the adoption equation. See, e.g., Berger, supra 
note 192, at 356 (describing one particularly “outrageous recent case, [in which] a private 
adoption agency even claimed ‘good cause’ for deviation from the placement preferences 
after demanding that, to be eligible, any families from the child’s tribe had to be able to pay 
the agency’s $27,500 fee”). 
 427.  
In sum, after more than twenty years of state and federal initiatives aimed at 
bettering the prospects of abused and neglected children, there is no sign that 
those prospects have significantly improved. Children who enter foster care are 
at serious risk of remaining there, in unstable and impermanent placements, 
until adulthood. Neither intensive pre-placement services nor in-placement 
reunification efforts are currently adequate to provide safe and reliable homes 
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from the ASFA’s goals of quick removals and speedy terminations and 
focusing on family preservation. As a result, the ICWA’s provisions once 
again reflect state and federal child welfare policies applicable to non-
Indian children. Nevertheless, while these protections are expanding for 
non-Indian children, their continued applicability to Indian children is 
threatened.  
This Article has demonstrated that current ICWA challenges are 
unjustified.
428
 The goal of the ICWA is to protect Indian children and 
families by ensuring Indian children are not removed from their families 
without justification, aiding their return when removal was necessary, and 
finding them safe and loving homes when they cannot be returned. This is 
also the goal of non-Indian child welfare legislation. Today, more than ever, 
the application of the ICWA ensures Indian children are being treated the 
same as their non-Indian peers and, ironically, it is the ICWA challenges 
that pose the biggest threat to the continuation of this equal treatment. 
                                                                                                             
for many children at risk. Adoptive homes are not available for many children 
who need them. Increased caseloads have also strained an already overtaxed 
system to the breaking point. Foster homes are available for less than half of 
the children who need temporary care, a shortfall that often leads to placement 
in an institution or with poorly prepared relatives. 
Garrison, supra note 10, at 593–94. 
 428. In Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995), the Court 
of Appeals of Texas explained that “[u]nder the ICWA, what is best for an Indian child is to 
maintain ties with the Indian Tribe, culture, and family.” Id. at 169. Similarly, in Chester 
County Department of Social Services v. Coleman, 372 S.E.2d 912 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988), the 
Court of Appeals of South Carolina specifically noted, “The Act is based on the assumption 
that protection of the Indian child’s relationship to the tribe is in the child’s best interest.” Id. 
at 914. 
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